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There is an interesting and contradictory phenomenon about Japan in regional economic cooperation. 
On the one hand, Japan is the No. 2 biggest economic power in the world and the “leading goose1” in 
Asia’s economic miracle, and has been active in  Asia Pacific regionalism since 1960s; on the other hand, 
Japan is one of the stragglers in the current booming regionalism in the Asia Pacific region-both at a  
bilateral and regional level. Not until very recently did Japan even have EPA2 (Economic Partnership 
Agreement) processes with some not-very-important trade partners. Its FTA/RTA (Free trade 
agreement/regional trade agreement) negotiations and discussions with its most important trade partners 
South Korea, China, the US and the EU have stagnated. What impressed the world most on this issue is 
Japan’s FTA talk with South Korea, which was spurred on by strong political will and lasted for many years, 
but this has also failed. Beyond a bilateral level, one is also impressed by Japan’s contradictory attitude to 
regional institutions —supporting their establishment, but objecting them being strong and binding 
mechanisms, applicable to APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) and the EAS (East Asia Summit) 
and APT (ASEAN plus Three).  
It is true that Japan has taken a leading role in a variety of regional institutions in Asia Pacific with 
distinctive regional concepts, reflecting change in Japan’s interests in regional institutions—the current 
regional architecture has derived mainly from Japan’s leadership role and interest in regionalism. 
 This strange phenomenon causes me to consider if the current regional architecture---namely 
pluralized and loose regional institutions—is in Japan’s interests? Does Japan have any strategy towards 
regional economic cooperation since its rise-up in 1960s? If Japan has a strategy, what is it and what is the 
reason behind it?  
 
1.1, Research Questions, Previous Studies and Conceptual Definitions  
Japan is a main player in regional economic cooperation since 1960s. In 1968, Japan overtook West 
Germany as the world’s No. 2 largest economic power and has taken this position for the past 40 years. It 
began to be active in regional economic cooperation since then and, the regional economic cooperation in 
                                                  
1  The Flying Geese Paradigm is a view of Japanese scholars upon the technological 
development in Asia viewing Japan as a leading power. It was developed in the 1930s, but gained 
wider popularity in the 1960s after its author Kaname Akamatsu published his ideas in the 
Journal of Developing Economies. 
2  EPA-Economic Partnership Agreement. The Japanese governments likes this term instead of 
FTA/RTA. Japan signed its first EPA with Singapore in 2002 and Japan’s EPA is widely regarded 
as something like FTA/RTA, but less open and more limitations.   
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the Asia Pacific region is mainly shaped by Japan and its ally-the USA. Japan is a main builder and mentor 
of all regional institutions in the Asia Pacific region. These regional institutions include non-governmental 
institutions PBEC (Pacific Basin Economic Council, businessmen established in 1967), PAFTAD (Pacific 
Trade and Development Conference, scholars established in 1968), semi-governmental institutions like the 
PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, established by governments, academia and businessmen in 
1980), and the governmental institutions of APEC (established in 1989), APT (established in 1997) and 
EAS (established in 2005). Even proposed but not-yet-established institutions, such as OPTAD 
(Organization of Pacific Trade and Development, suggested by Kiyoshi Kojima and his 
 
Table 1-1 Japan and Regional Concepts and Institutions in the Asia Pacific 
 
 
Regional Concepts Institutions Approaches Main Purposes 
Asia or Southeast  
Asia (1957-) 
ADB & MCSED Inter-government Development cooperation 
including the provision of funds 
PAFTAD & PBEC Non-government Interaction and socialization of 
policy ideas on regional 
cooperation 
PECC Quasi-government  
(non-binding) 
Policy discussions and advices 






Inter-government Policy discussions and advices 






Trade Liberalization  
Trade Facilitation  
Economic and technical 
cooperation 













East Asia  
(21 Century) 







Source: based on Table of Regional Concepts and Institutions-- Terada, Takashi, ‘Japan and the Evolution of 
Asian Regionalism’, GIARI Working Paper, 2007-E-3, Waseda University Global Institute for Asian 
Regional Integration-with some revisions.  
 
colleagues in 1960s and 1970s) and EAEC (East Asia Economic Caucus, suggested by Mahatir Mohammed 
in 1990s) also had a strong Japanese influence. There is no country that has been as committed as Japan to 
conceiving ideas for, and taking a leadership role in, the establishment of various kinds of regional 
institutions in Asia.’3
 
                                                  
3  Terada, Takashi, ‘Japan and the Evolution of Asian Regionalism’, GIARI Working Paper, 
2007-E-3, Waseda University Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration. 
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1.1.1 Research Questions 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether Japan has had a united, cohesive strategy 
towards regional economic cooperation.  
As the Japanese government has never issued a policy paper on its strategy towards regional 
economic cooperation,4 the dissertation has to research Japan’s policies and participation in regional 
activities, and try to find some clues about Japan’s strategy from these activities. These regional activities 
include regional discussions and meetings on Asia Pacific regionalism between the 1960s and the1980s; 
regional organizations and regimes focused on by APEC between the 1980s and the 1990s; and new 
processes for the current regional economic cooperation, particularly concerning East Asian economic 
cooperation from the 1990s to the present day.  
The studies on Japan’s policies and participation in regional organizations and activities can answer 
the following questions:  
a, what are Japan’s general policies and role in the economic cooperation of the Asia Pacific region;    
b, what is Japan’s attitude towards the creation of a new regional mechanism;  
c, does Japan have any different attitudes towards different regional mechanisms;  
d, if Japan has different attitudes towards different regional institution, what is the reason behind this;  
e, has Japan changed its polices with regard to individual institutions? If yes, why; 
The studies on the above issues can describe a general picture of Japan’s polices and participation in 
regional economic cooperation from a long-term perspective, which leads the dissertation to conclude this 
is its strategy towards regional economic cooperation.    
 
1.1.2 Previous Studies 
Whether or not Japan has a strategy towards regional economic cooperation is a controversial question. 
In my personal interview with Professor Ippei Yamazawa5 on March 11, 2003, he strongly denied that the 
Japanese government had this kind of strategy and insisted that Japan has always been an active agent in 
regional economic cooperation. But Professor Kurt Radtke6 in the same school strongly regards Japan as a 
strategic country and should have this kind of strategy on regional economic cooperation.   
In a wider context, whether Japan has had a strategy to the outside world has been disputed time and 
time again among politicians, scholars and businesspersons both domestically and internationally.  
After the end of the Cold War, Japan’s strategy has been a hot topic. Yasuhiro Nakasone, the 
Japanese Prime Minister from 1982 to 1987, asserts that Japan ‘now, and traditionally has been, weak in 
                                                  
4  In October 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan issued a “Japan’s FTA Strategy”, 
providing general principles on “what to negotiate” “strategic priorities”, etc. Since then, in every 
year’s Japan Diplomatic Bluebook, Japanese government also reiterates its principles, but as 
these principles are on FTA/EPA area, it could not be regarded as its strategy on regional 
economic cooperation.  http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/strategy0210.html  
5 Ippei Yamazawa was then professor in Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies (GSAPS), 
Waseda University.  
6  Kurt Radtke was then professor of GSASP, Waseda University. 
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terms of strategy’.7 Dennis T. Yasutomo supports Nakasone’s, stating that Japan ‘is a timid, hesitant 
nation requiring the prodding of the world community to induce substantive contributions, especially in 
the strategic and political arenas.’8 Yoichi Funabashi also supports this opinion, saying that ‘Japan has 
increasingly become an enigma to the rest of the world because of a variety of seeming inconsistencies’.9 
He adds, although Japan heavily concentrated its ODA on Asian neighbors—more than 60 percent of all 
aid money—it did not develop a comprehensive regional policy.10
Kiichi Saeki, the former deputy president of the Institute of International Policy Studies, argues that 
both pre- and post-war Japan has an ‘absence of strategy’. He defines ‘strategy’ as equal to ‘long-term 
goals’ which should include: (1) a more desirable life-style; (2) independence; (3) security; (4) 
self-realization based on an awareness of international responsibility.11
Reinhard Drifte also holds the same standpoint. He states that ‘although there is broad agreement that 
Japan has power, there are considerable differences about exactly what kind of power and in what areas. Is 
it an economic superpower but a political and military dwarf? How, if at all, is this power instrumentalized 
and exerted, and where does this kind of power lead to in Japan?’ 12His further conclusion is that ‘Not only 
does Japan seem unable to make use of its power, at least not commensurately with its economic power, but 
there is also no apparent leadership nor master plan for Japan’s foreign and economic policies.’13 In other 
words, he asserts that Japan has no strategy. 
Robert A. Scalapino states, ‘Japan’s reluctance and resistance to formulating a regional strategy and 
the heavy dependence of its economic expansion on the United States and world trade have made Japan one 
of the few countries in the modern world with truly global interests.'14
In explaining why Japan has lacked strategy, Nakasone argues, that ‘Traditionally, Japan’s 
geopolitical position [was] as a chain of islands in the Pacific Ocean separated from the Asian Continent’, 
and so ‘foreign strategy has been given little attention and we have been guided by a general feeling 
domestically of cherishing harmony. In contrast with Japan, China, Russia and the US, are man-made, and 
such nations are strongly strategic’. He adds, ‘the latter half of twentieth century was an era overshadowed 
by the Cold War: non-military strategic clash of the United States of America and the Soviet Union,’ and so 
‘Japan has been excessively dependent on the United States since the war’, this made Japan strategically 
                                                  
s
c
7  Nakasone, 2002, p.1. 
8  Yasutomo, Dennis T., The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy, London: 
MacMillan Press, 1995, p. 33. 
9  Funabashi, Yōichi, ed., Japan’  International Agenda, New York and London: New York 
University Press, 1994, p.1. 
10  Funabashi, 1994, pp.9-11. 
11  Quoted in Nakasone, 2002, pp.9-23. 
12  Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s—From E onomic Superpower to What 
Power?, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, p.4. 
13  Drifte, 1996, p.5. 
14  Scalapino, Robert A., ‘Perspectives on Modern Japanese Foreign Policy,’ in Robert A. 




In May 2001, Nakasone made a proposal to a meeting of the Lower House Commission on the 
Constitution. ‘One of the reasons that Japan lacks a strategy of its own and that Japanese politicians are 
criticized as faceless is that we lost the self-awareness and the industry necessary for politicians to develop 
long-term state strategy and, to that end, to create a stable, strong political base. The root cause of this was 
that the present constitution was drawn up by the American army of occupation under conditions where 
Japan had virtually no say, and that, consequently, independence of spirit and ethnic pride were lost and 
politics became suborned by a utilitarian tendency to yield to the powerful. In order to distance ourselves 
from this prevalent debased mentality, we must begin the twenty-first century by revising the existing laws 
and enacting an independent national constitution and Fundamental Law of Education. To enact this 
legislation and to create afresh the political base to back it, we must carry out a policy-based reformation of 
the political world in the period between the Lower House election in the year 2000 and the election for the 
Upper House in July 2001. ’16
Yasutomo argues that the reason why Japan lacks strategy is that ‘defeat and occupation gave birth to 
the truncated diplomacy of a passive, reactive state,’ and this course, ‘retroactively labeled the Yoshida 
Doctrine after the pivotal prime minister who headed five cabinets in the first decade after the war, entailed 
a three-pronged strategy of emphasizing economic reconstruction and growth, minimal defense efforts, and 
reliance on the United States.’ 17 Though Yasutomo admits that ‘there is little question that the Yoshida 
strategy led Japan to its current status as an economic great power, ’‘it also yielded an ‘ad hoc, reactive and 
equivocating’ foreign policy that ‘at best----is characterized by a shrewd pragmatism and, at worst, by an 
irresponsible immobilism.’18 It was a minimalist, risk-avoidance diplomacy that seemed single-mindedly 
obsessed only with economic gain, separating politics from economics, and excessively dependent on and 
deferential to the United States.’19
     Funabashi holds a similar opinion. He states, ‘over-dependence on its bilateral relationship with the 
United States undermined Japan’s creative diplomacy by closing off avenues to other foreign policy 
initiatives-----The leadership developed a psychology of dependency—a tendency to view America as a big 
brother—and failed to assert a distinctively Japanese foreign policy, in effect inviting foreign pressure, or 
gaiatsu.’20
     Karel Van Wolferen analyzes Japan’s political structure and concludes that problems in Japanese 
politics have made Japan lack in strategy.21 These problems with Japanese politics include: 
                                                  
15  Nakasone, 2002, pp.1-3. 
16  Quoted in Nakasone, 2002, p.3. 
17  Yasutomo, 1995, p.34. 
18  Satō, Seizaburo, ‘The Foundations of Modern Japanese Foreign Policy,’ in Robert A. 
Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977, p.389. Quoted in Yasutomo, 1995, p.34. 
19  Yasutomo, 1995, p.34. 
20  Funabashi, Yōichi, ‘Japan and the New World Order’, in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991-92, 
p.62. 
21  Quoted in Nakasone, 2002, p.5. 
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-----Political accountability is absent; 
-----Since the end of World War II, no one has made any change in respect of prioritizing  
tasks related to national targets; 
-----There is no confidence in government leaders; 
-----To illustrate the problem, it is as if a big truck were running away down a mountain and, though it was 
coming up to a bend, there was no driver and the brakes were not working.22   
  
It is very popular to use the present Japanese Constitution to explain the reason why Japan lacks 
strategy. Like Nakasone, Ohtori Kurino argues that ‘processes and contradicting interpretations and theories 
on the Constitution have caused confusion in the thought and ideas of the Japanese people about national 
policies on peace, defense, security and even on diplomacy.’23 Glenn D. Hook further says of the 
Constitution that ‘among intellectuals are many who have peace thought and ideas, but intellectual 
coordination between them and the officials responsible for diplomatic matters has been scarce, the latter 
merely sticking to the ‘US-Japan Ampo’24 ideology’.25The question remains. If Japan has not had a strategy 
with respect to the outside world, what kind of country Japan has been in the world? Takashi Inoguchi uses 
David Lake’s typology of international roles: leader, supporter, spoiler, and free rider, as measured by the 
relative size and relative productivity of an economy26 as a starting point to analyze Japan position in the 
world. A leader is an actor who shapes and sustains the framework for international economic interactions. 
A supporter is an actor who helps to support and sustain such a framework. A spoiler is an actor who 
benefits from such a framework but whose behavior often has a negative effect on such a framework. A free 
rider is an actor who benefits from such a framework but who does not dare to shoulder the costs for the 
framework in any systematic manner.27 Inoguchi’s conclusion is that Japan is a ‘supporter’ role in the 
international society, following the US as leader.28
On this issue, Yasutomo’s conclusion is in line with the school of ‘Japan is a passive-reactive state in 
the world affairs.’29 The basic tenets of the passive-reactive state approach are found scattered throughout 
the literature on Japanese foreign policy, with some stressing the passive more than the reactive. The school 
                                                  
s e
r r
22  Ibid. 
23  Kurino, Ohtori, ‘Sengo Nihon gaikō no shisō’ (Thought and Ideas in the Post War Diplomacy 
of Japan: A Study of Causes for Confusion), in Kokusai Seiji (International Relations), vol. 71, 
August 1982, pp.160-172.  
24  Ampo is a Japanese term, means ‘US-Japan Security Treaty’. 
25  Hook, Glenn D., International Politic , no. 69, 1981. Quoted in Kokusai S iji (International 
Relations), vol. 71, August 1982, p.14. 
26  Lake, David, `International economic structure and American foreign economic policy, 
1887-1934’, in World Politics, Vol. 35, no 3, 1983, p.517-43. Quoted in Takashi Inoguchi, 
Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Change, London: Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1993, p. 
149. 
27  Lake, David, Power, P otection, and F ee Trade: International Sources of US Commercial 
Strategy, 1887-1939, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. Quoted in Inoguchi, 1993, 
p.149-150. 
28  Inoguchi, 1993, pp.149-155. 
29  Yasumoto, 1995, pp.33-60. 
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exhibits some differences in their conceptions of the reactive process, but the core tenets are fairly clear.  
First, Japanese foreign policy is defined as a response to the external, not the internal, environment. 
As Donald Hellmann states, ‘to an extraordinary extent during the past two decades [1950s and 1960s], 
Japan’s international role has been reactive, defined almost entirely by the outside environment.’30 Kent 
Calder states that ‘the reactive state interpretation merely maintains that the impetus to change policy  is 
typically supplied by outside pressure, and that reaction prevails over strategy in the relatively narrow 
range of cases where the two come into conflict.’31 Funabashi also argues that ‘Japan has seldom tried to 
present itself as a rule-maker in the world community. The rules were already there-----the world order is a 
given, and Japan a reactor par excellence.’32
Michael Blaker distinguishes ‘strategy’ and ‘copying’, concurs that by arguing that Japan’s main 
modus operandi is to cope: ‘coping means carefully assessing the international situation, methodically 
weighing each alternative, sorting out various options to see what is really serious, waiting for the dust to 
settle on some contentious issue, piecing together a consensus view about the situation faced, and then 
performing the minimum adjustments needed to neutralize or overcome criticism and adapt to the existing 
situation with the fewest risks-----Coping is no calculated strategy. Rather, it is an automatic, knee-jerk, 
almost unconscious pattern in Japan’s handing of its foreign affairs.’33
Yasutomo also argues that ‘at its extreme, Japan is so reactive to external stimuli that it lacks a 
genuine or conventional foreign policy,’34 in other words, ‘a reactive state fails to undertake major 
independent foreign economic policy initiatives even when it has the power and national incentive to do 
so’.35 He asserts that ‘in essence, it is difficult to escape the feeling that Japan does not define its own 
foreign policy interests or shape its own policies, even with favorable changes in the external environment 
and enhanced national capabilities. The dynamics of reactive state theory are thus ‘outside in,’ but there 
does seem to be something wrong within.’36‘Although seeming obvious, this point needs to be stated 
explicitly because of the widespread view of a dual diplomacy—an active and successful foreign economic 
policy and a passive and questionable political-strategic diplomacy—and because the origins of the theory 
are found in the political-strategic rather than economic-financial realm. A comprehensive theory of 
Japanese foreign policy must encompass both political and economic dimensions.’37
To say that postwar Japan is a country without strategy, but is ‘passive-reactive’ to the world's affairs, 
is to hold a prevalent opinion to explain Japan actions, policies and appearances in international affairs.  




30  Hellmann, Donald, Japanese Domestic Politics and F reign Policy: the Peace Agreement 
with the Soviet Union, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, p.135. 
31 Calder, Kent, ‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,’ 
in World Politi s, no.40, July 1988, p.518. 
32 Funabashi, ‘Japan and the New World Order’, p.60. 
33 Blaker, Michael, ‘Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance,’ in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., 
Japan’s Foreign Policy af er the Cold War: Coping with Change, Armond, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 
1993, pp.1-42. 
34 Yasutomo, 1995, p.37. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Yasutomo, 1995, p.41. 
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Some scholars also hold almost the same opinion. Hisahiko Okazaki agues that all of Japan’s 
neighboring countries, namely, the USSR, China, Anglo-Saxon countries, even North Korea are strongly 
strategic countries, but Japan is not.38 Shinsaku Hōgen, former deputy foreign minister of Japan, also 
argues that Japan needs strategy.39  
General speaking, both these Japanese and foreign observers tend to argue that Japan is a country 
lacking strategy or weak in strategy, and they almost unanimously argue that as a big power in the world, 
Japan need strategy. This is a widely shared opinion.40  
But some observers also give an ambiguous answer to Japan’s strategy issue. For example, Inoguchi 
admits, though Japan ‘has the image of being adrift, with an ad hoc, opportunistic, and short-term 
pragmatism,’ on the other hand, ‘Japan projects the image of an actor ‘determinedly and tenaciously 
steadfast to its national interests.’41’ Tetsuya Kataoka eloquently encapsulated this frustration of the 
observer in understanding the co-existence of certain classic power components with what he calls ‘idle 
power’ in the following way, ‘by general consent there is in Japan a strange combination of strength and 
weakness, resilience and fragility, expansiveness and subservience, aggressiveness and self-effacement, 
keen competitiveness and placid stupor, cohesion (or ‘consensus’) and apparent headlessness, cynicism and 
innocence.’42  
Funabashi analyzes Japan’s past strategy, which includes (1) Adaptation and Catch-Up; (2) 
Concentration on economic gains; (3) Following the lead of the United States; and (4) restraint of regional 
strategy.43 He argues, ‘the strategy changed during the Nakasone era when Japan tried to seek a high profile 
and a broader role in world politics. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s commitment to the Western 
alliance based on the assumption of global security as ‘indivisible’ reflected Japan’s search for leadership. 
Nakasone’s high-yen strategy, which contributed to laying the ground for the Plaza Agreement in 1985, was 
tantamount to a declaration of Japan’s new role as world banker. Nakasone’s policy change for fiscal 
expansion that he pledged at the Venice Summit in 1987 paved the way for Japan’s new task as an 
‘absorber’ country—a market power.’ 
Actually, Funabashi’s analysis is in line with the so-called Yoshida Doctrine. As discussed above, the 






38 See Okasaki, Hisahiko, Kokka to jōhō—nihon no gaikōsen yaku w  motomeru (state and 
information—searching for Japanese foreign strategy), Tokyo: Bungeishuju, 1980; and Mineo 
Nakajima, Nihon ni ajia senryaku wa arunoka : gens  no chūgoku yuji no kyokutō (Has Japan 
Strategy toward Asia?), Tokyo: PHP kenkyujo, 1996. 
39 See Shinsaku, Hōgen, Nihon no gaik  senyraku (Japan’s foreign strategy), Tokyo: Harashobō, 
1981. 
40 On this issue, also see Inoguchi, Takashi, G ndai nihon gaikō (Modern Japanese Diplomacy), 
Tokyo: chikumashobō, 1993a; JIIA, ed., Nihon no senryaku deki kadai (Japan’s strategic 
priorities in the 1990s), Tokyo: JIIA, 1993; Kenyichi Itō, ed., 21 seiki nihon no daisenryaku 
(Japan’s great strategy for the 21 century), Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Fōramu, 2000; Nihon 
kokusai seiji gakkai, Nihon gaik  no bunseki, Kokusai Seiji (International Relations), 
summer issue, 1957. 
41 Inoguchi, Takashi, 1993, p.ix. 
42 Kataoka, Tetsuya, The Price of a Constitution. The Origin of Japan’s Post-war Politics, New 
York: Crane Russak, 1991, p.3. 
43 Funabashi, 1994, pp.5-11.  
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Yoshida Doctrine entailed a three-pronged strategy of emphasizing economic reconstruction and growth, 
minimal defense efforts, and reliance on the United States. It has to be admitted that the Yoshida strategy 
led Japan to its current status as an economic great power. It is very difficult to assert that the Yoshida 
Doctrine is not a strategy.  
As for the others, they hold a complete different opinion on whether or not Japan is a country ‘weak 
in strategy’. “Japan is a highly regulated, rigid and systematic society without much flexibility and 
tolerance. Japanese prefer thorough and long-term results when they conduct political, economic and social 
changes”, says Lim Hua Sing.44  Kurt W. Radtke analyzes Japan-China relations in 1920s and 1930s, and 
concludes that Japan had a very strong and lasting strategy towards the Asian continent. The Japan-China 
war and so-called ‘Great East Asia War’ was the natural extension of this strategy. This strategy was began 
in the Meiji Period and was practiced gradually. Any attempt to explain the Japan-China war as resulting 
from Gunbu (military sector) was an excuse to reduce the war responsibility of the other party.45 He adds, 
in addition, that after the end of the Second World War, Japan’s policies to Southeast Asia have been very 
persistent from the 1960s to 1990s; if we do not admit these persistent policies as ‘strategy,’ then what is 
strategy?46  
Norman D. Levin is another one. Levin argues, if ‘strategy’ means a plan or stratagem for achieving 
some goal perceived as fundamental to a country’s national interest, however, then Japanese postwar 
foreign policy can be said to have always had a ‘strategic’ dimension—indeed, the link between Japan’s 
national strategy and foreign policy has been unusually direct.47 He adds that ‘all nations have multiple 
objectives. The task of strategy is to prioritize these objectives and integrate them into a coherent set of 
policies. A successful strategy will keep the objectives in balance with both available resources and the 
environmental conditions that affect the ability of the state to achieve its objectives.48  
Levin analyses Japan’s postwar strategy—‘among Japan’s many national objectives, two have been 
overarching throughout the postwar period: promoting economic growth and prosperity, and ensuring 
national security. These objectives, of course, hardly make Japan unique. Almost all nations share these 
objectives. What make Japan somewhat unique is the broad strategy its leaders adopted to achieve these 
objectives: to concentrate national energies on expanding foreign markets for Japanese exports while 
protecting Japanese industries against foreign competition and gaining control over high-value-added 
technologies critical to Japanese industrial competitiveness; and to minimize military expenditures while 
relying on the United States to provide Japan’s external security.’49 He assesses the strategy as ‘this strategy 
has dictated in general a low-cost, low-risk set of foreign policies, with paramount importance—given the 
U.S. roles in facilitating access to both markets and technology and protecting against foreign intimidation 
                                                  
44 Lim Hua Sing is professor in GSAPS, Waseda University. Quoted from “Preface to the Fifth 
Edition”, Japan and China in East Asian Integration, ISEAS: Singapore, 2008, p.xviii 
45  Radtke’s seminar lecture, January 2003. 
46  Ibid. 
47 Levin, Norman D., ‘The Strategic Dimensions of Japanese Foreign Policy’, in Curtis, 1993, 
pp.202-203. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid.  
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or aggression—placed on maintaining close ties with the United States. The viability of Japan’s strategy 
hinged on three critical assumptions: that the global competition between the United States and Soviet 
Union would make Japan essential to U.S. global strategy, and hence that the United States could be 
counted on to help promote Japanese economic development; that the same competition would ensure a 
major U.S. military role in Japan’s defense—as in maintaining regional and global security more 
broadly—and that hence Japan could make do with a relatively minimal defense effort; and that the world 
more broadly would ‘allow’ Japan to concentrate on its own economic advancement, without requiring 
major reciprocal Japanese contributions to the common welfare. These assumptions, on the whole, have 
been well founded.’50
As Uno Shigeaki argues, in Japan the historical development of political culture is almost 
unchanged.51 It is unbelievable that Japan changes its strategy so quickly. 
If we turn to a narrow scope of strategy question, to Japan’s strategy towards regional economic 
cooperation, the disputes continue.    
Makoto Taniguchi52 strongly denies that Japan has had any continuous strategy towards Asia and 
regional economic cooperation.53 On Japan’s policy toward APEC, he comments: 
 
Furthermore, in Japan’s Asia policy, in 1970s, former Prime Ministers, Miki, Ohira, and Saburo Okita 
proposed “the Concept of Pan-Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation”, which was related to the 
establishment of present APEC. However, in 1989, when APEC came into being, it was not Japan 
that took the initiative but Australia.54 Since 1993, when President Clinton held the first APEC 
Summit, APEC has developed towards trade liberalization and investment liberalization under the 
leadership of the US and Australia, while Japan’s influence became increasingly weaker. Owing to 
the problem of agricultural liberalization, Japan couldn’t take an active leadership. Consequently, 
Japan’s proposal ended with a minor issue. In last year’s Shanghai APEC Summit, based on 
Australia’s proposal considered as the second pillar to APEC (investment liberalization) and the US’ 
proposal, as the first one (trade liberalization), China put forward a proposal of ECOTECH, as the 
third to APEC, which shows its obvious presence . 
Since the concept of ECOTECH (economic and technological cooperation) was originally 
emphasized in Japan’s “Conception of Pan-Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation”, it feels like the 
                                                  
50  Ibid. 
51  Uno, Shigeaki, ‘China and Japan in Search of their Roles in the 21st Century:              
Regionalism or Globalism?’ in Kokusai Seiji (International Relations), vol.114, March 1997. 
52 Makoto Taniguchi was the former Japanese ambassador to the United Nations and former 
Deputy Secretary General of OECD, and was also professor at GSAPS of Waseda University, s 
53 Taniguchi, Makoto, ‘Jishuteki takaku teki gaikō nakushite nihon no shōrai wa nai—nihon no 
gaikō e no teigen’ (No future for Japan without an independent and multilateral 
diplomacy—advice on Japan’s foreign policy), Seikai, July 2002. pp. 152-163. 
54 It should be argued that what Professor Taniguchi says here neglected or lightened Japan’s 
role in Asia Pacific.  
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feeling that our stocks have been robbed by China.55
 
Taniguchi also criticizes Japan’s governmental action and reaction to the Asia Crisis which began 
from July 2 1997, and points out that Japan’s ‘no action’ led the crisis to spread to more countries in 
Asia.56  
As mentioned-above, Funabashi also argues that Japan has not formulated any strategy towards 
regional economic cooperation. On Japan’s policy to APEC, he comments, ‘Japanese Prime 
Ministers—Morihiro Hosokawa and Tomiichi Murayama—have reflected the confusion and lack of 
direction that confront Japan’s attempt to forge a comprehensive foreign policy. Hosokawa’s participation 
in the first APEC summit meeting seemed to bode well for Japan’s future. Urbane and charismatic, he 
swept into Tokyo with a new party, new agenda, and new image. Murayama’s premiership was the 
product of a strange marriage of convenience that in the eyes of the Japanese people embodied the cynical 
and opportunistic world of Japanese politics. ‘Murayama is like the round hole in the middle of a donut,’ 
one observer quipped of the prime minister’s role in the coalition government. ‘It lacks substance, but you 
can’t make a donut without it.’57 He adds, Japan remained a mystery to the other Asian Pacific countries, 
as very few initiatives or inspirations emanated from Tokyo. Japan’s prime ministers left Blake Island, 
Washington, and Bogor without significantly imprinting their voices or spirits on the proceedings. The 
view of Japan as a member of the ‘go slow’ club persisted.58  
Wolf Mendl argues Japan’s regional policy as “the Enigma of Japanese policy—Japan drifted along 
the currents of international politics in the post-war era without any particular purpose or sense of 
direction; or so it seemed in contrast to other states of similar importance.”59
But others express different opinions on Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation. 
‘The perception of Japan’s leadership gradually changed. Japan’s leadership was determined, 
meticulously thorough, and quite courageous,’60 says Tony Miller, Hong Kong’s SOM representative. 
Australian Trade Minister Robert McMullan observes: ‘Japan’s attitude has shifted markedly in the 
lead-up with clear indications of its preparedness to take a leadership role in achieving regional trade 
liberalization’61
     Hanns W. Maull, analyzes all major powers’ strategy and policies toward regional economic 
cooperation, and concludes that ‘Of all major players in APEC, Japan’s interest in setting up a regional 
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economic institution in Asia-Pacific has probably been the most persistent, coordinated and far-sighted.’62
 
     The previous studies can not answer the question of whether Japan has a strategy towards the world 
and towards regional economic cooperation.63 Though these observers cannot come to a consensus on this 
issue, they unanimously regard that as the second largest economic power in the world and in a changing 
world order, Japan needs to have a strategy not only to the world, but also to the region. They also suggest 
many strategies to Japan. For example, Funabashi’s suggestions were (1) Global civilian power; (2) 
Multiple value-oriented diplomacy; (3) Full partnership and supportive leadership; (4) Pacific 
globalism.64 Taniguchi’s suggestion was Japan needs ‘an independent and multilateral diplomacy.’65
In sum, the previous studies on Japan’s strategy issue are quite contradictory, ‘Japan lacks strategy, 
or Japan is weak in strategy’ seems the prevailing opinion. Yet these studies have not answered the 
question of whether or not Japan has a strategy towards regional economic cooperation; even if some 
analysts observe this issue, they neither go in detailed study, nor give a conclusion on what Japan’s 
strategy has been in regional economic cooperation.  
Bearing in mind the complexity of the issue of Japan’s strategy, this dissertation strictly focuses on 
the issue of whether Japan has had a strategy towards regional economic cooperation, and tries to give an 
answer on what the strategy has been. The dissertation researches Japan’s strategy and policies toward 
regional economic cooperation through Japan’s participation in regional activities. 
 
1.1.3 Conceptual Definitions 
There are some important concepts need to be defined in this dissertation. The first one is ‘Strategy’, 
which suggests comprehensive reflection and planning, the aim of which is to decide processes and draw 
up measures to achieve specific goals.66 Though strategies of various kinds are used socially, and state 
strategy can be subdivided by purposes into military, diplomatic, economic and domestic strategies, this 
dissertation uses the ‘strategy’ to mean comprehensive, all-round planning by the state with regard to 
regional economic cooperation in its foreign policies. In contrast with this, ‘policy’ means governmental 
concrete measures taken with regard to specific issues.  In the long term, some policies may be regarded 
as strategies.  
The term ‘region’ is primarily in a geographic sense, the most common and most conventional 
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usage—and the most understandable. It should be remembered, however, that there are other definitions 
of international or world regions, and that these may be more appropriate for certain purposes. As Joseph 
S. Nye, Jr., reminded us, “Region is an ambiguous term, there are no `absolute` or `nationally determined` 
regions. Relevant geographical boundaries vary with different purposes. ------- a relevant region for 
security may not be one for economic integration.” 67 Regions’ may also be described in terms of levels of 
analysis as an increasingly important level between the nation-state and international institutions. They 
are also the geographic home for a variety of political, economic, social and cultural systems. The concept 
of regional systems or subsystems is particularly useful for political analysis. This was developed quite 
extensively during the early phase of regionalism, especially in the form of state systems or subsystems.68 
Some scholars regard geographical identity as only one of several essential characteristics of region. In 
1967, for example, Bruce Russett listed five characteristics of region. In addition to “geographical 
proximity,” he listed “social and cultural homogeneity,” “shared political attitudes and behavior,” 
“political interdependence in the form of shared institutional membership,” and “economic 
interdependence.”69  
Indeed,as to what a ‘region’ is and why Asia Pacific can be called a ‘region’, I personally 
interviewed Yoichi Funabashi. Funabashi argues that APEC—the organization in Asia Pacific—has 
defined Asia Pacific as a region, whether or not it is a real region. Funabashi does not use hyphenate 
‘Asia’ and ’Pacific’ in his book ‘Asia Pacific Fusion’, and said that if we regard Asia Pacific as a region, 
we need not use a hyphen between these two words.70 I follow his example, and I also do not hyphenate 
‘Asia’ and ’Pacific’ in this dissertation. 
    For the conceptual framework of its geography, concretely speaking, Asia Pacific is a wide concept, 
including East Asia (wide), North and South America and Oceania countries around the Pacific Ocean. It 
is also called the Pacific Basin. Obviously, APEC only includes some of the members of Asia Pacific.  
But ‘East Asia’ has two meanings.71 In Japanese, East Asia includes Japan, Koreas, China (and 
Hong Kong, Taiwan included), and Mongolia. This is a narrow definition, equal to Northeast Asia. In 
English, East Asia includes Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. This is a wide definition. This dissertation 
adapts the wide one.   
‘Regionalism’, according to Andrew Hurrell, has five factors: (1) regionalization; (2) regional 
awareness and identity; (3) regional interstate cooperation; (4) state-promoted regional integration; (5) 
regional cohesion.72 Based on Hurrel’s theory, Ryuhei Hatsuse defines regionalism as ‘spiritual and 
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material movement toward a regional identity. The reasons behind regionalism are the forming of regional 
identity and the progress of regionalization.’73 Muthiah Alagappa defines ‘regionalism’ as ‘sustained 
cooperation, formal or informal, among governments, non-governmental organizations or the private 
sector in three or more contiguous countries for mutual gain’, and so, ‘regionalism is a multilateral 
institution and thus requires the participation of a minimum of three states. There is no upper limit’.74 It is 
obviously different from ‘regime’, because regime means a set of arrangements among governments, in 
terms of organizations, treaties, and unions, etc., but regionalism is usually broad-ranging in terms of 
goals, issue areas, processes and arrangements.75 Regionalism in this dissertation is solely used to mean 
international regionalism, not regionalism within a nation-state. 
The development of regionalism in Western Europe stimulated the development of regionalism 
theory. In the 1950s and 1960s, a great deal of attention was given to international regionalism, both in 
theory and in practice.76 An extensive literature on regionalism, featuring conceptualization and theories, 
was produced. Two “high priests” of this theoretical development are Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas. 
Deutsch makes major contributions to the theories of political and security communities, both integrated 
and nonintegrated, amalgamated and non-amalgamated, and in general to theories of the process of 
community formation. He tests his theoretical propositions by a detailed study, often in collaboration with 
other scholars, of the burgeoning regionalism in Western Europe; and he developed rather novel and 
promising techniques of analysis, for example, the use of transaction flows, to study these phenomena.77 
Haas helps to bridge the conceptual gap between federalism and functionalism by elaborating the concept 
of neo-functionalism, although he later repudiates this concept along with most other concepts that are 
central to the development of theories of regionalism at the time.78                       
Both Deutsch and Haas emphasize the importance of the “spillover” effects of functionally based 
organizations such as the European Coal and Steel Community that made these organizations the basic 
institutions of evolving political and economic communities. In common with many others they ring the 
changes on the theme of integration, perhaps the most widely used term during the theoretical renaissance 
of the old regionalism years. Haas and other regional theorists come to a belated awareness of the 
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deficiencies in their theories for understanding the changing world; but their initial reaction is more one 
of disillusionment and resignation than of reconceptualization and renewed analytic vigor.  From the 
1970s, the so-called “New Regionalism” is among the most significant aspects of the rapidly changing 
international scene. Unlike the “old regionalism” of the 1950s and 1960s, new regionalism is a worldwide 
phenomenon and deserves greater attention and more sophisticated analysis then it has yet received.   
‘Integration’ was the word commonly used to characterize the new and more successful regional 
experiments.79 While it fell far short of the aspirations of the federalists and was used in so many ways 
that it almost lost any terminological precision, integration did serve as a term that, perhaps more than 
any other, seemed to be most appropriate for the new forms of regional institutionalization and for their 
conceptual and political underpinnings. These new institutions came closer than any previous forms to 
breaking the sacred barrier of national sovereignty; but it soon became apparent that, like less successful 
efforts of the past, they were primarily instruments of the nation-state system. It remains to be seen 
whether they will also be forerunners of a higher level of effective authority.  
International economics textbooks typically describe ‘regional integration’ as going through five 
stages: a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union, and a complete 
economic union. The regional groupings of NAFTA, AFTA, and MERCOSUR are all in the free trade are 
stage, with tariffs eliminated on trade within the region but all of the member countries maintaining their 
own tariffs on imports from outside. Today, the EU is at the highest level of economic integration.80  
Drysdale and Garnaut define economic integration as: 
movement toward one price for any piece of merchandise, service or factor of production----. 
Dis-integration persists because of barriers, or resistances, to trade. We define resistances to trade 
as phenomena that prevent or retard the immediate movement of commodities (service or factors) 
in response to price differentials.81
 
Their further distinguish `objective resistances`, which include official barriers to trade (principally 
protection) as well as transport and other transaction costs, and `subjective resistances`, in which they 
include psychological and institutional factors such as perceptions of risk and uncertainty and 
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imperfections in the information available to firms.82 One might object that information costs are as 
objective as transport costs and risk reflects information costs; the subjective category therefore seems 
unnecessary. But with this qualification, the Drysdale-Garnaut definition of economic integration is 
extremely helpful.  
     A word related to ‘integration’ is ‘cooperation’. ‘Cooperation’, as Robert Keohane notes, ‘should 
not be viewed as the absence of conflict, but rather as a reaction to conflict or potential conflict’.83 And so, 
‘it entails policy adjustment among actors so that eventually all will be better off than had they acted 
independently,’ says by Alagappa, ‘cooperation is goal-directed behavior. The goal of cooperation may be 
facilitation of orderly interaction in a given issue area, resolution of a substantive problem, collaboration 
to enhance a set of values, or the power and influence of the collective in its interaction with other states 
and organizations, all with the ultimate purpose of enhancing the national well-being of participating 
states.’84
    A regional institution as an organizational body that usually sets up clear criteria for membership and 
one of the major criteria is whether potential participants, be they nation-states or individuals representing 
an organization such as a corporation, belong to a certain region. In other words, a regional institution 
needs to define its boundaries in order to distinguish between members and non-members, an approach 
which allows only members to enjoy benefits of cooperation within the regional institution.85
In the dissertation, I would like to use term of ‘economic cooperation’ rather than ‘economic 
integration’. As I quoted above, ‘economic integration’ is a natural economic integrating process, while 
‘economic cooperation’ has a wide context, including discussing, meeting over, and participating in 
policies and in related regional activities.  
Functionalism is another important concept. It emphasizes functional needs to create an institution. 
It argues that the incentives for states to cooperate and further open their economies and liberalize their 
trade policies are generated by the expansion of economic activities, since such moves increase the 
benefits that they obtain from the process. Functionalism stresses the importance of the creation of 
specific administrative structures (institutions) to which certain functional tasks would be transferred 
from state governments.86   
There is also a need to clarify ‘mechanism’, ‘institution’ and ‘regime’. In the dissertation, I use 
‘mechanism’ as an abstract term, while use ‘institution’ and ‘regime’ as concrete terms. Sometimes I get 
mixed up, but it is easy to understand. Relatively, ‘functional institution’ or ‘functional regionalism’ means 
this institution/regionalism is only concerned with specific matters, for example, ARF (ASEAN Regional 
Forum) is concerned with security and ADB (Asia Development Bank) is concerned with finance. They are 
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functional institutions. If someone only wants this kind of regional institution, they could be called 
functional regionalism.  
 
1.2, Analytical Theories and Methodology 
This dissertation analyzes Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation through its 
policies and participation in Asia Pacific regionalism since the 1960s. To this purpose, methodological 
approaches of realism, liberalism, constructivism and regime theory on the field of regional economic 
cooperation and their implications of their interpretations for Japan and the regional economic 
cooperation are discussed. All their theories have been developed over the past half-century and have 
provided some analytical theories for explaining Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation 
in the context of Asia Pacific regionalism, but none of these theories can explain Japan’s behavior in this 
region alone. Anyway, no country’s behavior is strictly based on a theory.  
 
1.2.1, Theories on Regional Economic Cooperation 
Regime theory is one of the main theories that explains countries’ motivation to take part in 
regional economic cooperation.  
Yoshinobu Yamamoto states that a theory in international relations can be defined as a set of 
concepts and propositions (hypotheses) which aims at describing, explaining, interpreting, and predicting 
the phenomena of international relations.87 Such a theory not only guides research but also offers basic 
information and policy prescriptions to decision-makers and citizens.88   
     ‘Regime’ has many definitions. Stephen D. Krasner defines ‘regime’ as ‘a set of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations’.89 Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill define ‘regime’ as ‘those 
multilateral arrangements that are created to facilitate international cooperation,’ and add that ‘in the 
increasingly interdependent world of the 1990s, international ‘regimes’ have grown rapidly in number, in 
scope and importance.’90  
Why do countries create and formalize regional regimes for promoting regional economic 
cooperation? Mack and Ravenhill explain that this is ‘because policymakers recognize that there are 
fewer and fewer unilateral solutions to the problems they confront across a range of foreign policy issue 
areas and thus there is an ever-increasing need for multilateral cooperation. The ‘regimes’ that have 
emerged in response to the growing need for multilateral cooperation are sometimes, but not always, 
institutionalized.’91
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Components provide the theoretical framework within which other scholars have examined how 
international regimes should function within a global or regional context. The collection of essays edited 
by Krasner in 1982 provides a thorough evaluation of international regimes by scholars who interpret the 
international system in different ways. Scholars of various liberal idealist perspectives provide most of 
these interpretations: both the functionalist perspective and a more explicitly idealist perspective. Realists, 
on the other hand have been relegated to the role of critic; a role they fill quite well. Representative of the 
structural school of thought, Robert Keohane examines the emergence of regimes “under certain 
restrictive conditions involving the failure of individual action to secure Pareta-optimal outcomes.” 92
     Keohane employs a rational actor model, assuming “that, in general, actors in world politics tend to 
respond rationally to constraints and incentives”, in order to “generate hypotheses about international 
regime change on an a priori basis.”93 He suggests that regime creation can be divided into “the 
imposition of constraints” by more powerful states upon weaker states, and “decision-making” by 
individual states.94 Thus, according to the first of these aspects, even voluntary decisions by states to 
enter into a regime can be constrained by power and inequality in the international system. 
Decision-making allows states to pursue their own self-interest by choosing which international regimes 
to join and which to avoid.  
     Drawing heavily on Coase’s social choice theory, Keohane elaborates on why states would enter 
into regimes. Regimes facilitate agreements between states for three reasons: they can “provide 
frameworks for establishing legal liability,” they “improve the quantity and quality of information 
available,” and they “reduce transaction costs” in international interaction.95 In their opinion, international 
regimes make information available to all member states equally, eliminating inequality that may 
discourage some states from participating. Transaction costs are reduced when issue density, “the number 
and importance of issues arising within a given policy space,” is high, resulting in a regime of increasing 
size so long as “they are increasing rather than diminishing returns to regime-scale,”96 Thus, as long as a 
member believes that the benefits that they receive from membership in an international regime are 
increasing, they will attempt to expand that regime to new members.  
     Keohane adds a significant caveat to his explanation for the creation of an international regime, 
stating that the “politicization of issues” is “likely to reduce the quality of information (between 
government officials) and will therefore tend to reduce cooperation (between states).”97 This occurs 
because of the convergence of two phenomena: cooperation between states is advanced when higher 
quality information is passed between member states’ officials, which occurs when bureaucratic rules 
governing the movement of information are less developed; and as issues gain importance in domestic 
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politics, the bureaucracies that deal with those issues become more formalized, restricting the 
transmission of information. So it logically follows that if an issue becomes important in domestic politics, 
international cooperation on that issue will become more different. 98
     Representative of the more explicitly idealist school of thought, Raymond Hopkins and Donald 
Puchala, “see regimes as a pervasive characteristic of the international system” that are necessary to 
sustain “patterned behavior ------ for any length of time.”99 Their 1982 analysis, included in the same 
volume as articles by Keohane, Krasner and Yong, draws six conclusions concerning the existence and 
behavior of regimes.  
       First, “regimes exist in all areas of international relations, even those------traditionally 
looked upon as clear-cut examples of anarchy.” Even when diplomats and government 
officials are acting in an area with little formal institutionalization, they still feel 
constrained by “principles, norms, and rules,” placing their behavior within the definition 
of a regime. Second, Puchala and Hopkins find “that regimes mediate between goals, 
interests, and power on the one hand, and behavior on the other.”100 They provides three 
situation in which this mediation occurs: between “powers of comparable capability” 
where conflict might harm both, “under conditions of diffuse power” where some 
agreement is necessary for any action to take place, and “during transitions of power” 
where a form of inertia keeps a set of norms in place longer than calculations of state 
interest would necessitate.101 In one sense, this makes regimes most useful as a constraint 
on state action, thereby reducing anarchy within the international system as a whole. Their 
third conclusion states that a regime will be more politicized the more “functionally 
diffuse” it is because government personnel associated with it will be higher-ranking and 
less technical.102 So domestic political considerations will play a larger role in regimes that 
address a broad range of issue’s different aspects. A corollary to this argument is the idea 
that it will be more difficult to link these aspects in specific regimes, but more difficult to 
abide by rules and norms in diffuse ones. Forth, although the level of formalization has 
little to do with the effectiveness of a regime, “regimes tend to become more formal over 
time------because maintenance often comes---to require explicitness.” Informal agreements 
between decision-makers are often difficult to pass from one group of decision-makers to a 
succeeding group. To prevent these agreements from lapsing, they will be formalized. 
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However, informal arrangements are also formalized to prevent “proponents of change” 
from altering the regime, signaling the “beginning of its decline.” Almost identical to the 
claims of Keohane, Puchala and Hopkins’ fifth conclusion states that “it is self-interest, 
broadly perceived, that motivates compliance” with accepted norms and principles.103  
States obey a given set of rules because it is in their best interest; the cost of 
non-compliance appears higher that the cost of compliance making the regime useful when 
taken as a whole.  
     The two authors finish their conclusions on an uncharacteristic note, suggesting that power and 
interest play a major role in triggering changes in international regimes. As the structure and allocation of 
global (and regional) power changes, a regime based on the power structure in question eventually 
changes as well. They may take significantly longer to do so, as demonstrated by the 30 –year interlude 
between when Europe lost its ability to maintain its overseas presence and the final dissolution of most 
colonial empires, but regimes inevitably change or dissolve given a redistribution of power. 
     The conclusions drawn by Keohane, Puchala and Hopkins are mutually reinforcing, with little, if 
any, direct contradiction. Despite the problems that realists, most notably Susan Strange and John 
Mearsheimer, have with both explanations of regime formation, these theories do provide a valuable 
framework for examining international institutions such as APEC and individual country’s policy towards 
this institution.104
     More recent work has built on these theories,105 providing a more thorough analysis of regional 
integration. Realists, liberals and constructivists argue about regional economic cooperation from 
different viewpoints, while realists pay more attention to material power, liberals tend to argue that the 
lack of formal multilateral institutions means that the region remains unable, and constructivists stress: 1, 
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in International Relations or International Political Economy. On the other hand, to dispose of 
realism because some of its versions have been proven empirically wrong, a historical, or logically 
incoherent, does not necessarily touch its role in the shared understandings of observers and 
practitioners of international affairs.” Guzzini stressed, “ (realism) can still powerfully enframe 
action. It exists in the minds, and is hence reflected in the action, of many practitioners.------ In 
other words, realism is still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world 
politics.” 
 Guzzini, Stefano, Realism in International Relations and International Political 
Economy—the con inuing story of a death fore old, London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 234-235.   
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actors are not considered as atomistic egoists, but social entities; 2, actors’ interests are not exogenously 
given, but constituted through social interactions; 3, society is not seen as a strategic realm where actors 
rationally pursue their interests, but as a constitutive realm, an environment which generates actors as 
knowledgeable social and political agents, the realm that makes them who they are.106 Comparing with 
regime theory, all these theories show their explanatory weaknesses with regard to Japan’s participation in 
the Asia Pacific regionalism.  
    Traditionally, the study of regionalism in international relations has primarily focused on 
understanding two main features of the regional integration process: (a) the structural make-up of regional 
institutions and (b) their policy dimensions. An alternative theory of regionalism has arisen in reaction to 
"formal regionalism" that defines a region according to how it "functioned," and hence is called 
"functional regionalism." 
 
1.2.2, Analytical Theory on Japan’s Strategy towards Regional Economic Cooperation 
This doctoral dissertation uses regime theory on regionalism as a theoretical framework. The 
theoretical framework is based on the following three hypotheses: 
1, States pursue their own interests by choosing which international regimes to join and which 
to avoid. Even voluntary decisions to enter into a regime can be constrained by power and 
inequality in the international system.  
2, Domestic political considerations play a larger role in regimes that address an issue's 
different aspects. A corollary to this argument is the idea that it will be more difficult to link 
these aspects in specific regimes, but more difficult to abide by rules and norms in diffuse 
ones. 
3, Interest and power play a major role in triggering changes in international regimes. As the 
structure and allocation of regional power changes, regimes based on the power structure in 
question eventually change as well, but regimes inevitably change or dissolve given a 
redistribution of power. 
 
These hypotheses will be used to analyze Japan’s participation in regional economic cooperation.  
The first hypotheses will examine why Japan has been enthusiastic in Asia Pacific regionalism, 
APEC and proposed bilateral FTA arrangements and East Asia economic cooperation; the second 
hypotheses will examine why Japan falls into a dilemma in regional economic cooperation and the third 
hypotheses will examine why Japan still insists on the same policies towards regional economic 
cooperation (both bilateral level and regional level), even if it faces huge pressure both domestically and 
externally.   
Only after I use these three hypotheses to analyze Japan’s participation in the region, can I find out 
Japan’s genuine strategy towards regional economic cooperation through all kind of appearances, policies 
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and phenomena.   
 
1.2.3, Methodology 
Before embarking on a detailed examination of Japan’s participation in regional economic 
cooperation, it is necessary to address these methodological problems, not because they can be resolved 
completely, but in order to establish the parameters of this study and to avoid misunderstandings. Given 
the complexity of Japan’s participation in the region from 1960s, and despite methodological framework 
applied, research outcomes usually reflect researcher’s personal background and research interest.  
An obvious danger in the evaluation of any real-world institution is to compare it with what would 
essentially be a caricature—an ideal-typical international regime. All real-world international agreements 
contain various ambiguities. In the case of Japan's regional economic cooperation, some of these 
ambiguities result from (often international) lack of specificity in a treaty’s terminology. Others arise 
because circumstances may change in a direction that the original drafters of the agreement failed to 
anticipate. These ambiguities also exist in other regional regimes. It increases the difficulties in evaluating 
Japan’s role in regional regimes. It is not easy to distinguish regimes’ ambiguities and Japan’s insistence. 
The failure of APEC EVSL (Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization) is a good example of these 
ambiguities.  
The second danger is how to understand relations betweenJapan’s strategy, Japan’s foreign policy, 
and its real performance in regional economic cooperation. Complicated relations between the Prime 
Minister, MOFA, MITI/METI, other ministries and agencies and related political groups increase these 
difficulties. So, assessing Japan’s strategy and its actual performance is very difficult. Sometimes, these 
policies seem united, while sometimes they seem separated. Regime theory can provide a method to 
analyze its participation based on its own interests, but regime cannot provide a method to analyze every 
concrete policy. For example, Japan’s   performance in the Asian Crisis is very difficult to explain. 
Someone may wonder whether Japan had a policy at all or simply reacted to an event of regional 
economic cooperation. For this study, though the theme concentrates on economic affairs, political 
influence and regional political and secure relations are of course important. Though I have seldom 
analyzed the political influence on economic affairs, these influences also can not be neglected. 
Thirdly, outside actors’ influence on Japan’s policy towards regional economic cooperation is also 
very difficult to be assessed.  Japan-US relations, Japan-China relations, Japan’s ODA policy and 
relations with Southeast Asia, Japan-Australia relations, etc, all influence Japan’s policy with regard to 
regional economic cooperation are main topics. The pressure of the international environment is an 
important influence on the course of any country’s foreign policy. It is a complex phenomenon and 
concerns events beyond Japan’s direct involvement and control.  In the post-war period, Japanese 
foreign policy was structured around the preservation of good relations with the United States. Japan’s 
relations with regional countries and involvement in regional issues were relatively underdeveloped even 
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though Japan was the biggest regional economic power.107 Though the U.S.’s presence and influence in 
Japanese foreign policy and regional economic cooperation policy is a worthy topic and interesting to 
research, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and so this dissertation only discusses some concrete 
issues when American affects Japan's regional economic cooperation. But it is obvious that Japan-US 
relations are not as simple as the two governments said or the bilateral arrangements expressed. They 
must be some secret arrangements between these two governments. For example, on Japan’s policy 
towards China, APEC and proposed EAEC, etc, we may guess that there exist some secrets between 
Japan and the US. 
Fourthly, materials on such a huge topic are apparently inadequate. An attempt to describe and 
analyze foreign policy is fraught with difficulties, especially when dealing with contemporary affairs 
without full access to the official and confidential records of government. Although there are obvious 
disadvantages to relying on governmental statements and public media as the basis of a scholarly study, in 
the case of Japan there are also compelling reasons for doing so. In contemporary Japan, for example, 
access to government information is relatively limited. Documents on the policymaking process and 
foreign policy issues, in particular, are not open to the public. Governmental sources, such as the 
“Kampo”, provide only formal accounts of events bereft of any critical commentary of elaboration. Thus, 
as Kusano Atsushi argues, it is impossible to find a better source than the newspaper in tracing 
policy-making in Japan.108 Martin E. Weinstein concurs: “the print media in particular is an extremely 
rich source in studying politics and foreign policy in Japan.” 109Another peculiarity in Japan is that 
memoirs by former policy-makers -a valuable source of information in the United States and other 
countries- are almost unheard of. Instead the common practice is for a journalist who covered the 
government to later write a book about the administration. These books constitute another vital source of 
information on such topics.  
     Fifthly, the other people's assessments of Japan’s strategy and policies towards regional economic 
cooperation are completely different. These differences sometimes affect my judgment.  
     In sum, these dangers make me understand that Japan’s strategy toward regional economic 
cooperation is a manifold, not monolithic one. 
 
1.3, Expected Contributions and Analytical Framework 
History is the mirror of the future. Japan’s strategy issues remind me of Tanaka Memorial to the 
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Throne110 on July 25th, 1927. Whether the Memorial existed or not, Japan’s subsequent action in China and 
Asia proved this strategy. After the exposure of this Memorial in 1929, one could easily expect that Japan 
would invade the whole China and Asia at some point, and would fight the US and Great Britain sooner or 
later.  
So, why study on Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation? If we can find Japan’s 
strategy towards regional economic cooperation and successfully explain why Japan has had this strategy, 
we can easily expect what Japan could do on regional economic cooperation. 
    
1.3.1, Expected Contributions 
This dissertation’s research on Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation has not only 
historical significance, but also practical significance. As Inoguchi points out, Japan’s role in regional 
economic integration and multilateral economic activities is no less important.111 Research on Japan's past 
strategy in the region is important in order to understand Japan's regional economic cooperation policy and 
to understand Japanese policy-making towards regional economic cooperation, and also to anticipate 
changes in future policy.  
Though plenty of studies have been done on Japan’s policy towards regional economic cooperation, 
the studies are still incomplete and are worthy of further research. This is because Japan is an important 
actor in regional economic cooperation, and APEC, along with ADB, proposed by EAEC, AMF, etc., are 
important regional economic organizations in this region which can shape the future of regional 
integration, and affect the world economic situation.     
So far, neither longer term and wider perspective studies nor doctoral dissertation has been done in 
Japan on Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation. Even in these limited previous studies, 
research methodology is very weak. Some Japanese researchers do not like to pay attention to approach 
methodology in their studies. It seems that using a theory to analyze Japan’s foreign economic policies is 
a big challenge. However, Japanese scholars are good at event-analysis and policy-making process studies 
in international studies. Their studies on Japan’s policy towards APEC and other regional regimes usually 
use these approaches. Meanwhile, my personal background gives me a different and special angle with 
which to assess Japan’s polices towards regional economic cooperation.  I started my studies on Asia 
Pacific studies from 1989 as a graduate student of Center of Asia Pacific Studies of Peking University and 
joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China in 1993 in charge of APEC and regional economic 
cooperation studies from then on. Twenty years of study and work on regional economic cooperation 
increased my practical understanding, in addition to academic research.  
Bearing in mind the complex link of national objectives in international cooperation, the main 
focus of this dissertation is on the economic factors in Japanese foreign policy. Political and security 
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factors are dealt with only in so far as they affect these dimensions of Japan’s policy towards regional 
economic cooperation.  
Taking regime theory as a basis, this dissertation will examine Japan’s policy towards regional 
economic cooperation from the 1960s to the present,  as observed through its participation in regional 
economic activities in a longer term—and a wide perspective—in the context of regional economic 
cooperation with the background of regionalism and globalization. 
The findings of this dissertation challenge prevailing opinions that ‘Japan lacks strategy’ by  
arguing that Japan has a very strongly united, continuous strategy towards regional economic cooperation, 
and based on the findings, I can examine Japan’s current policies and expect future policies towards 
regional cooperation.  
I believe my findings about Japan’s strategy toward regional economic cooperation have never been 
completely expressed by others, and I hope this is an academic contribution. 
 
1.3.2 Analytical Framework 
In this dissertation, academia studies and materials from MOFA, METI/MITI and regional 
institutions will provide the main source of information. The deadline for this information is mid-2009. 
Meanwhile, the Japanese press, and personal interviews with the people involved in Japan’s regional 
economic cooperation issue in the region are also great sources. These people are not only experts on 
Japan and regional economic cooperation affairs, but also experts on wide topics, for example, on 
international economics, on Japanese foreign policy and regional relations, etc.  I also interviewed some 
correspondents and columnists in Japan.  Interviews with them colored my understanding of Japan’s 
strategy towards regional economic cooperation.  
But there are also a lot of methodical problems. A study on Japan’s role in economic integration in 
the region in the past half century is an ambitious and a challenging topic for a doctoral dissertation. This 
is a huge topic which is difficult to manage. 
The research is focused neither on an event, nor on some events, but on a lasting process from the 
1960s to the present. It is impossible to research all content in this process, so this dissertation conducts 
research directly related to the main theme. Only after Japan’s long-term policies and appearances in 
regional activities  have been analyzed can I find out the genuineness of Japan’s strategy toward regional 
economic cooperation.   
The dissertation is divided into three parts according to its sub-themes, namely, Japan in Asia Pacific 
regionalism (1960s to 1980s), Japan in regional organizations focusing on APEC (1980s to 1990s) and 
Japan in East Asia economic cooperation (1990s and after). This dissertation is a continuous study of 
Japan’s policy towards regional economic cooperation from the 1960s to the present. So, according to 
three hypotheses of regime theory, the analytical framework of this dissertation is based on Japan’s actual 
performance in the region from 1960s to 1990s.  
Chapter I is an Introduction. It includes Research Questions, Previous Studies and Conceptual 
Definitions, Analytical Theory and Methodological Dangers and Expected Academic Contributions and 
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Analytical Framework. It is about the research questions and methodological framework of the 
dissertation.  
Chapter II is Japan and Asia Pacific Regionalism: 1960s-1980s. In this Chapter, I will  
use the regime theory’s three hypotheses to analyze global and regional regionalism, discuss Japan’s 
foreign policy and policy toward regional economic cooperation in 1960s-1980s, argue Japan’s role in 
Asia Pacific regionalism, focusing on regional activities, initiatives on regional economic cooperation and 
regional organizations/regimes before the establishment of APEC in the 1960s.  In the conclusion, I will 
try to assess and describe a general portrait of Japan’s participation in Asia Pacific regionalism in the 
1960s to the 1980s and find out some hints about Japan’s strategy towards regional economic 
cooperation. 
     Chapter III is Japan and APEC Process: 1980s-1990s. It focus on a general discussion on Japan’s 
participation in APEC, especially Japan’s role in APEC’s two pillars—TILF (Trade and Investment 
Liberalization and Facilitation) and ECOTECH (Economic and Technologic Cooperation).  I will also 
do some comparative studies on Japan’s APEC TILF policy to its FTAs strategy, and Japan’s APEC 
ECOTECH policy towards its ODA strategy. In the conclusion, I will assess Japan’s participation in 
APEC, and also try to find out some hints about Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation. 
Chapter IV is Japan and East Asian Economic Cooperation: 1990s to present. In this chapter, East 
Asia economic cooperation and Japan’s participation in the current regional economic cooperation will be 
discussed. In the conclusion, I will assess Japan’s participation in East Asia economic cooperation, and try 
to find out some hints about Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation.  
Chapter V is Conclusions.  After having analyzed Japan’s policies and participation in regional  
economic cooperation since the 1960s, I can answer the questions of whether Japan has a strategy towards 
regional economic cooperation, what the strategy is, why Japan has this kind of strategy towards regional 






Chapter Two  
 Japan in Asia Pacific Regionalism: 1960s-1980s 
 
2.1, Global Regionalism and Asia Pacific Regionalism 
2.2, Japan’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Economic Policy 
2.3, Japan and the U.S. in the Asia Pacific  
2.4, Japan in Regional Institutions before APEC 
2.5, Japan and Functional Regionalism: ADB as a Case Study 
2.6, Arguments on Japan in Asia Pacific Regionalism 1960s-1980s  
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2.7, Conclusion: Japan in Asia Pacific Regionalism 1960s-1980s 
 
Trends towards regional economic integration could be a phase of the larger trends towards greater 
globalization and interdependence. Before the establishment of APEC, regionalism in the Asia Pacific 
region was a very important development in contemporary international relations. The increase of 
regional economic interdependence in the Asia Pacific region between the 1960s and 1980s encouraged 
greater regionalism, and Japan started to become active in the Asia Pacific region in the 1960s, resulting 
in its economic integration process with the region. Since the 1960s, Japan’s foreign economic policy and 
policy with regards to international institutions has been in constant flux, and Japan’s role in the region 
had been debated both domestically and internationally. 
 Regime theory shows that states pursue their own interest by choosing which international regimes 
to join and which to avoid. How did Japan define its interest in the Asia Pacific region between the 1960s 
and 1980s? How did Japanese domestic disputes affect its performance in the region and how did Japan’s 
foreign economic policy adjust in response to global regionalism and Asia Pacific regionalism? 
Japan’s policy adjustment towards regional economic cooperation between the 1960s and 1980s 
was reflected by its participation in regional activities related to economic integration, as well as in its 
bilateral economic relations, especially with its main partner the United States. Japan’s role in regional 
regimes/organizations before APEC also showed their changes of policy, and the ADB gives a good 
example of Japan’s role in the regional regimes.  
This chapter will analyze global regionalism and Asia Pacific regionalism between the 1960s and 
1980s; discuss Japan’s foreign policy and foreign economic policy against the background of regional 
economic integration and try to explore how domestic political concerns affected Japan’s position in Asia 
Pacific regionalism between the 1960s and 1980s; research the strategies of both Japan and its main 
partner—the United States and their influence to Asia Pacific regionalism; study ADB- a successful 
functional regional institution-which largely initiated by Japan; and summarize scholarly arguments 
concerning Japan and regionalism between the 1960s and 1980s. The analysis will conclude with an 
assessment of Japan's role in Asia Pacific regionalism between the 1960s and 1980s.  
 
2.1, Global Regionalism and Asia Pacific Regionalism 
As discussed in the first chapter, regionalism here means international regionalism, not 
regionalism within a nation-state.  
Regionalism, which has been called “a halfway house between the nation-state and a world that is 
not willing to become one”112 by Joseph S. Nye in 1968, was rising in 1950s and 1960s with the creation 
of the Europe Economy Community.  
Asia Pacific was an area where lacked regionalism before 1960s. Only with the US’s integration 
with the region and Japan’s rise to become the second economic power in the world did Asia Pacific 
                                                  
112 Nye, Joseph S., Jr., ed., International Regionalism: Readings, v., Boston: Little Brown, 1968, 
pp.60-77. 
 27
regionalism begin. Most of the regionalism in the Asia Pacific has emerged mostly since the late 1960s. It 
has brought into being the first comprehensive regional arrangements in the area, of which ESCAP, ADB, 
ASEAN, and the South Pacific Forum are the leading official bodies, and PBEC, PAFTAD, and PECC are 
the leading interregional organizations, all institutionalized examples before the establishment of APEC. 
The increase of regionalism in Asia Pacific region led to many proposals of Asia Pacific 
“Community”. Before the establishment of APEC, there have been all kinds of proposals for 
comprehensive cooperation and institutionalization in the Asia Pacific region. The concept of a “Pacific 
Community” has been an underlying theme of many statements and proposals by official spokesmen of 
several Asia Pacific countries, of many studies and proposals by academic scholars, especially Japanese, 
and of a large number of conferences and seminars in many countries of the region and beyond. In the 
1970s, in particular, there was much discussion of this theme, especially after it had been endorsed and 
expounded by some top Japanese leaders.  
 
2.1.1. Global Regionalism: European’s Practice 
The background for European regionalism is the idea that only cooperation could put a definitive 
end to conflicts and wars in Europe.113 After World War II, the call for European cooperation became 
louder and the idea was supported by the US, especially after the beginning of the Cold War. 
Many proposals for one form or another of European cooperation were launched. Not all of them 
made it or were successful.  
 In 1948 the West European Union (WEU) was formed, a Defense Community initially 
between the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, joined in 1954 
by Germany and Italy. The WEU never played an important role, although there were attempts to 
revitalize it in times of crises in European cooperation. 
 Also in 1948, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was founded 
by 16 European countries; the countries not belonging to the Soviet sphere of influence. The 
OEEC organized the implementation of the Marshall Plan. In 1960 it was transformed into the 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) and most Western countries 
and Japan became members. At present, 29 countries are members of the OECD, plus the 
European Commission. The OECD has its own organization to promote nuclear energy: the 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. All 29 member states, except New Zealand and Poland, are 
members of the OECD/NEA.  
 In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed, with the US, Canada 
and nine West European countries, joined by Greece and Turkey in 1952 and by West Germany in 
1955.  
                                                  
113 See A Guide to European Integration, European Documentation, Brussels: European Union, 
1997. 
 28
 In 1950, a European Defense Community was proposed.114 
There are three treaties signed in the 1950s which marked the beginning of the European Union: the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC-1951), the European Economic Community (EEC-1958) and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom-1957). All three treaties had the same six members: 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, West Germany and Italy. These were the countries which 
received Marshall aid from the US after the Second World War. On May 9, 1950, the Schumann plan was 
proposed, to coordinate the French-German production of steel and coal. This date is seen as the most 
important step in the process towards European unification. On April 18, 1951, at the behest of French 
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
was signed. For the first time one of the central areas of policy, until then a matter exclusively for 
individual nation-states, passed into the hands of a supranational organization. This comprehensive 
economic integration of the coal and steel industries was intended to lead eventually to a political union. 
In 1957 the Treaties of Rome (Euratom and EEC) were signed. One of the aims of the EEC was a 
common market to allow the free movement of persons, services and capital. The Euratom Treaty was 
meant to give new impetus to European cooperation and was set up to promote nuclear energy. Together 
with the Treaties of Rome, an Assembly of the European Community was set up, responsible for the ECSC, 
Euratom and EEC. The European Parliament (consisting of 142 members) was established in March 1958, 
with Schuman as its first chairman. Although in the Treaty of Rome direct elections were already promised, 
it would take 20 years before those took place in June 1979. Before that, the members of the European 
Parliament were chosen by the national parliaments. The Merger Treaty of April 8, 1965, which came into 
force on July 1, 1967, established a single executive for the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom. The term 
European Community (EC) describes the union of these three organizations. 
On January 1, 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the EC. The parliament grew 
to 198 members. In January 1981 Greece joined the Community, and in 1986 Spain and Portugal followed. 
The parliament continued to grow; from 410 (in 1979) to 518 members. In 1986 the Single European Act 
(SEA) was signed. Its aim was to complete the creation of a common market no later than December 31, 
1992.  This regionalism in Europe stimulated regionalism in other areas of the world.  
2.1.2. Asia Pacific Regionalism 
There were some experiments on regionalism in the Asia Pacific region. IPR (Institute of Pacific 
Relations) which was established in 1925 and dissolved in 1960 was one of the pioneer regional 
organizations.115  
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But Asia Pacific regionalism was a strengthening between the 1960s and the 1980s. In fact, the Asia 
Pacific was a region where lacked regionalism before the 1980s. In the midst of the Vietnam War, the Asia 
Pacific region did not really exist as an entity. As stated by Inoguchi, the emergence of the Asia Pacific 
region was consolidated by two movements in the 1970s and 1980s: One was the increasing integration of 
the regional economy with the US economy; the other was the tighter strategic integration with Japan, 
South Korea, and the Philippines, and to a lesser extent Thailand, Taiwan of China, and Australia.116 
Economic integration between the US economy and the Asia Pacific economies continued at a steady pace, 
with the US economy trade pattern shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the late 1970s. But this trend 
broadened in the 1980s. This finally made the Asia Pacific a more united region. 
Meanwhile, economic development in the West Pacific was accelerating in the 1960s. After 
Japan’s economic take-off in 1950s it finally became a developed country and the second economic 
power of world in late 1960s, so Japan’s economic ‘spillover’ led to the economic advancement in Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (the so-called ‘Four Little Dragons’, or Newly Industrialized 
Economies, NIEs) in 1960s, and economic development across Southeast Asia in 1970s and in China, 
Vietnam in 1980s. Plus Australia and New Zealand, and the west Pacific as a whole became more 
important in world economy and trade. With the economic growth coupled with the economic 
interdependence in the region on trade, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and economic links increased 
quickly.  Economic interdependence increased the sense of ‘region’ as an entity and regionalism.  
But as early as the 1960s, some kinds of regionalism had already begun in Japan, and then spread to 
the wider region. Japanese scholars, businessmen and finally officials actively took part in the movement of 
Asia Pacific regionalism, and this led to the establishment of ADB (Asian Development Bank), Pacific 
Basin Economic Cooperation (PBEC, 1967), Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD, 1968), and Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC, 1980). The representatives of the Japanese elite in Asia Pacific 
regionalism are Professor Kiyoshi Kojima, Dr. Saburo Okita in PFATAD, Ryuzo Sejima and Noburo Gotoh 
in PBEC, Masayoshi Ohira and Okita in PECC.  
     There are many forms of regionalism and regional interaction. Among the most numerous are 
various patterns of economic associations, alliance systems, professional and technical organizations, and 
international organizations that are especially active in the Asia Pacific or that have members outside of 
this area as well as within it. The concept of international regimes can serve as an integrative and 
analytical factor in the construction of a comprehensive framework for analyzing the multitude of 
associations and links in Asia Pacific, especially if these regimes are considered, as they usually are, as 
intervening variables.  
     The PECC was the highest-level regional organization before the establishment of APEC. With the 
growth of Asia Pacific regionalism, the final result was the creation of the APEC.  
Most of the regionalism in the Asia Pacific has emerged since the late 1960s. It has developed wider 
regional and even global connections and linkages.  It has also, for the first time, made regionalism a 
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factor equal in significance to the strong nationalistic behavior and outlook, on the one hand, and the 
growing global interdependence, on the other. It has given regionalism a newer and greater place in the 
nationalism-regionalism -internationalism spectrum.  
     In the Asia Pacific region, since the 1960s, some of obstacles have not been as serious as they once 
were. Moreover, some major changes in both the global and regional environment have made real 
regional cooperation at many levels both more possible and more advantageous.117
The increase of regionalism in the Asia Pacific region led to many proposals of Asia Pacific 
“Community”. Before the establishment of APEC, there were all kinds of proposals for comprehensive 
cooperation and institutionalization in the Asia Pacific region. The concept of a “Pacific Community” has 
been an underlying theme of many statements and proposals by official spokesmen of several Asia Pacific 
countries, of many studies and proposals by academic scholars, especially Japanese, and of a large 
number of conferences and seminars in many countries of the region and beyond. In the 1970s, in 
particular, there was much discussion of this theme, especially after it had been endorsed and expounded 
by some of Japan's top leaders. But while it was an appealing theme for official speeches and conferences, 
it was too nebulous and subject to too many interpretations to provide the basis for concrete progress. In a 
sense, a “Pacific Community” was already being formed by the growing interactions among the countries 
of Asia Pacific; but in another, more realistic sense, the countries of the region were by no means ready to 
move immediately to take the steps necessary to create a real “community” or to give it institutional form. 
The concept of a “Pacific Community” was too vague, and in some respects too misleading. The Asia 
Pacific region was far from a real community, except in a symbolic sense.  
     Even the former USSR also proposed “a system of collective security in Asia” and the “Pacific 
Community” idea.118 The Soviet proposal, first advanced by Leonid Brezhnev in 1969 and often repeated, 
with some variation in detail and degree of enthusiasm, would receive oral endorsement from a few Asian 
leaders, but was opposed by most, either publicly or by tacit silence. No specific guidelines for creating 
“a system of collective security in Asia” were ever advanced by the Soviet. It was widely interpreted as 
one of the more ingenious elements of the Soviet “propaganda offensive” in Asia, as the Soviet attempted 
to enlist Asian support against China while the tensions cause by the Sino-Soviet split were at a height. In 
all probability the Soviets would not try to revive this proposal in any significant way.  
     As the countries of the Asia Pacific move towards greater regional cooperation, they learned many 
lessons from a close examination of the experiences of other regions, especially Western Europe. 
Regionalism in the Asia Pacific evolved slowly and hesitantly for more than a quarter of a century after 
World War II, and then experienced rapid development. What was needed were approaches and 
organizations suitable for the special conditions and needs of the region, and farsighted and influential 
leaders of regional cooperation movements, such as those that Western Europe had in the early days of the 
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European Community movement.  
So, what was Japan’s role in Asia Pacific regionalism between the 1960s and 1980s? Did Japan’s 
participation in Asia Pacific regionalism, including its policies and appearances, hint at its strategy 
towards regional economic cooperation? 
 
2.2, Japan’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Economic Policy 
Since becoming the No. 2 global economic power in the 1960s, Japan’s regional economic 
cooperation policies have seen two major adjustments. One occurred in the 1960’s and aimed to develop 
markets in order to maintain Japan’s economic growth. The other one was in the 1980’s, when Japan set out 
to become an even more important economic and political great power in Asia and in the world.119 This 
policy adjustment has been lasted right up to today, and Japan is still looking for a proper regional 
economic policy.   
2.2.1 Foreign Policies and Policymaking 
Japan’s foreign policy has been quite controversial—its diplomacy characteristics, its 
policymakers, its role in the world, its relations with the US and with neighboring countries, etc.—all 
these questions have been discussed time and time again. 
The most important characteristic of Japan’s foreign policy is its relation with the United States. In 
the postwar period, Japan’s foreign policy has been dominated by its relations with the United States. This 
was the result of the US occupation from 1945-52 after Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, and the 
overwhelming economic and strategic superiority of the United States worldwide, particularly in East 
Asia. Under these circumstances, and given the frail and dependent nature of their country’s economy, 
Japan’s conservative politicians under Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida accepted the leadership of the US. 
The Peace Treaty of San Francisco, ratified in 1951 with 48 Western-orientated countries, returned 
Japan's sovereignty and helped to reintegrate the country into the world economy and international 
relations. The Japanese-US Security Treaty in the same year provided Japan with cost-effective security 
protection, in return for which the country had provide the United States with military bases in Japan and 
to shoulder rearmament commitments of its own, tailored to the needs of the US. Japan’s conservative 
leaders had few difficulties in accepting the ‘cold war world’, as they had no sympathy with communism 
at home or abroad.  
The war in Korea reinforced their concerns about Soviet intentions in Asia, and demonstrated the 
US commitment to Japan’s security. In addition the war and ensuing US procurement orders helped Japan 
out of a serious business slump.  
Japan’s postwar leaders also realized that without a strong economic base there could be no 
political power. The first diplomatic White Paper in 1957 concluded that the only way to raise living 
standards and to increase national power lay in the peaceful development of economic strength. As a 
result the economic effort took precedence over military power, and foreign policy became equated with 
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foreign economic policy. Consequently, the Japanese continued, under the benevolent eyes of their US 
protectors and promoters, to concentrate on the economy even after reconstruction had ended. 
At first glance, the Japanese foreign policy-making process was not as transparent as America’s. In 
America it is split between Congress, Prime Minister and related Ministries. The lack of powerful 
political leadership in foreign policy-making makes it seem like it 'flip-flops'. There are only rare 
moments in history when we can discern a clear and unambiguous line of policy which is followed with 
single-minded determination. In the technologically advanced democracies of the present age, lines of 
policy are usually confused and applied with hesitation. They tend to veer wildly between alternatives and 
follow a zigzag course.  
The factor behind this is the clash of interests and the divergent pulls among elite groups within 
Japanese society. Their impact depends, of course, on the relative strength of the various components of 
the policy-making elites. In post-war Japan, they included the bureaucracy, business circles, and 
politicians of the ruling LDP (Liberal and Democratic Party), though the influence of the opposition 
parties has also been significant on certain occasions. The media constitute a fifth component, though one 
that is more of a restraining than an active force. It is essential to bear in mind that the balance and 
relative importance of these groups is not static but is constantly shifting. Furthermore, none of them is 
monolithic. Each is composed of sub-groups, such as the factions within the LDP or different ministerial 
bureaucracies, which compete among themselves.    
Meanwhile, there is a link between the economic, political, and security dimensions of foreign 
policy, and which to prioritize. The short answer is to say that to concentrate on one at the expense of the 
others would be misleading and unrealistic. The three are intricately linked and to insist on the separation 
of economics from politics in relations with particular countries, as governments are wont to do when it 
suits their purpose, is nonsense. Indeed, to say one can make such a separation is in itself a political 
statement, for one is setting limits to the extent to which one is prepared to go in applying political 
pressure. But it is equally misleading to deny the differences between the three dimensions or to suggest 
that only one or the other matters when studying foreign policy.  
 
Generally speaking, the main players in Japan’s foreign policy are politicians, bureaucrats and 
business.120 As Drifte states, there is no one theory or model for explaining the role and interactions of the 
actors in Japan’s political economic system.121 Their weight and importance has shifted over the postwar 
period, and not necessarily in a linear process. 
Politicians--The role of politicians has traditionally been to keep the hands of the bureaucrats free 
from political interference in politically non-sensitive areas. Politicians have been too dependent on the 
bureaucracy and business to be able to dictate their own terms, and have more often then not been 
amplifiers or instruments of bureaucratic and business interests as partly demonstrated by the unending 
series of corruption cases since the Lockheed scandal in the 1970s. Nowhere is the limited role of 
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politicians more obvious than in Japan’s foreign policy. A major exception has been the politically 
sensitive area of security policy when Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida played a high-profile and crucial 
role in setting up the present US-oriented foreign and security policy of Japan in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. But in an era of high economic growth and a stable US-dominated regional environment it was not 
very attractive for politicians to become involved in foreign policy, let along in security policy. In the 
1980s, when economic growth rates declined and the budget deficit offered fewer opportunities to satisfy 
voters, politicians had a somewhat increased interest in foreign policy. Foreign demands for a greater 
opening of the Japanese market and more Japanese burden-sharing created a mood encapsulated in the 
slogan ‘internationalization’ (kokusaika), which was put into practice by Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone (1982-1987) who benefited domestically from a high-profile foreign policy.  
The bureaucracy—the part of the central bureaucracy most involved in foreign policy is obviously 
the MOFA. Despite being the window of Japan to the outside world in receives less attention than MITI 
or more recently the Ministry of Finance. The reason for this neglect has to do with the increasingly 
multifaceted tasks of the MOFA in contrast to more delineated tasks and objectives of other functional 
ministries and agencies. The MOFA is structurally in a weak position because it has no clear domestic 
constituency or parliamentary interest group like other ministries and agencies.  
Meanwhile, the bureaucracy can be split not only by inter-ministerial and inter-agency turf battles, 
but sometimes also by intra-ministerial competition. While outside observers envy or bedevil Japanese 
business for the support it gets from the bureaucracy, there is also strong criticism of the bureaucracy for 
its weakness and unresponsiveness, in many cases affecting foreign interest, such as the opening the 
Japanese market. Kent Calder explains Japan’s intermittent responsiveness by describing Japan as a 
political system which is ‘in the throes of perpetual domestic conflict, driven by political cycles, 
interest-group pressures, and bureaucratic machinations in complex inter-relationships with one 
another.’122
The business—a crucial point for the understanding of the bureaucracy-business relationship is the 
size of the business entities which most enjoy the support of the bureaucracy. It is the interaction between 
the bureaucracy and business which is the most crucial for the understanding of Japan’s political 
economy.123 Business, not even big bussiness, is unified into homogeneous institutions like the big 
employers’ federations such as the Keidanren or the Nikkeiren make it appear. In order to wield more 
influence, the bureaucracy has to concentrate on the big companies, although because of their growing 
size they are also less amenable to bureaucratic control. At the same time, the global marketplace is 
favoring big global companies and this fact promotes the concentration of corporate players.  
Drifte stresses the importance of Japan’s bureaucracy in Japan’s foreign policy-making, by saying 
that ‘the bureaucracy in all advanced industrialized countries has a built-in strength accruing from its hold 
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on specialized information and from its long office-holding compared with politicians and often even 
with business. The bureaucracy acquired particular strength in the postwar period because of a long 
tradition of state control and the continuity of personnel between the war-planning era and the immediate 
postwar economic catch-up era.'124 In the postwar era many links developed between bureaucrats, 
politicians and business due to the skilful exploitation of social network links, provision of jobs for 
bureaucrats taking early retirement by private and public companies, frequent moves between 
bureaucracy and the political world, and a pervasive attitude of give-and-take which also provided, less 
ideally, an ideal soil for corruption on a wide scale.’125
   Takeshi Inoguchi also asserts that Japan’s foreign policymaking is mainly controlled by the 
bureaucrats.126 He tests his assertion by Japan’s reaction to EAEC proposals by Malaysia, and states that 
the disputes among different bureaucratic ministries made Japan’s policy toward EAEC unclear.127  
For the problems of a bureaucratic polity, Karel Van Wolferen points out:  
--Politicians have very little control over the bureaucracy and the people are naïve, bureaucrats use 
informal powers get their own way. 
--Bureaucrats themselves believe that they understand the problem and that they are capable of weighing 
up solutions and repairing the political process. However, they do not understand things that fall 
outside their purview and cannot resolve fundamental problems or deal with new phenomena. 
--Government is in a worse state than ever and the country is degenerating into a bureaucratic polity 
where intellectual ability is in short supply. 
--There are individual bureaucrats who grasp the nature of the problem accurately, but the bureaucracy as 
a whole invariably becomes agitated and tries to protect the status quo. 
Wolferen adds, the harmful influence of the bureaucratic system is most clearly evident in the destruction 
of the natural environment along beautiful coastlines and in remote mountains, and in the impact on 
relations with the United States.128
Ravenhill reiterates Japan’s bureaucratic foreign policy, by saying ‘to date, few studies have been 
made of the role of interest groups in the construction of intergovernmental collaboration in East Asia. 
The common assumption is that governments have generally enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in their 
pursuit of foreign economic policies , particularly in regional collaboration .  
Some observers notice the need to reform the bureaucratic polity. Funabashi explains why Japan’s 
political reform was needed in foreign policy making, saying that Japan cannot develop an effective 
international role until there is a significant measure of domestic political change. First, Japan has only 
one political party capable of ruling. There is not yet a viable two-party or multiparty system. Secondly, 
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Japan will see a change in the political leadership of all the major political parties in the next decade. 
More international-minded, confident, and self-assertive leaders will appear in the top echelon of the 
leadership. Thirdly, Japan must give make strengthening its political leadership and foreign 
policy-making capabilities a top priority in the coming decade.  
Akihiko Tanaka also stresses the importance of a powerful cabinet and powerful people in strong 
leadership when creating foreign policy.129Meanwhile, Nakasone stresses ‘strengthening prime ministerial 
politics’130 in foreign policy making. 
  
2.2.2 Foreign Policy: Characteristics and Arguments 
Few people discuss Japanese foreign policy in ‘strategic’ terms. Indeed, most observers 
characterize Japan’s postwar policies as ‘passive,’ ’reactive,’ excessively ‘deferential’ to the United States, 
and lacking any articulation of ‘Japanese’ interests—all characterizations that connote the absence of any 
strategic logic or rationale. Michael Blaker describes Japan’s foreign policy thus:   
 
‘The foreign policy behavior that reflects these political and perceptual patterns is—in a 
word—‘Coping.’ Coping means carefully assessing the international situation, methodically 
weighing each alternative, sorting out various options to see what is really serious, waiting for the 
dust to settle on some contentious issue, piecing together a consensus view about the situation faced, 
and then performing the minimum adjustments needed to neutralize or overcome criticism and 
adapt to the existing situation with the fewest risks. If it is determined that a sufficiently major 
change has occurred in the environments or factors relevant to Japanese interests, then and only are 
changes in Japan’s own policies considered desirable. This describes Japan’s ‘situational ethic’ 
or ’go-with-the flow’ style of diplomacy conduct. Some observers are inclined to label it pragmatic 
or realistic; others call it spineless or immoral. Coping is no calculated strategy. Rather, it is an 
automatic, knee-jerk, almost unconscious pattern in Japan’s handling of its foreign affairs. It is also 
time-tested, and accepted response mechanism of survival that stems from little-changing Japanese 
perceptions of the world and the way Japan’s policies are formulated and implemented. The 
architects of Japan’s postwar diplomacy have been permitted the luxury of following this 
minimalist approach in part because they have strictly adhered to Shigeru Yoshida’s sage advice: ‘If 
you like the shade, find yourself a big tree, ’ with the tree having been the United States. Of the 
three officially sanctioned and much hallowed ‘pillars’ of post-World War II Japanese diplomacy 
(UN centrism, Japan in Asia, and close ties to the United States), the American pillar dwarfs the 
others. Indeed, the evolution of postwar Japanese diplomacy can only be grasped if it is examined 
through the prism of the U.S.-Japanese relationship’.131
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Inoguchi observes that there two competing images of Japan’s diplomacy at this time of great 
transformation-cum-transition after World War II can be identified. One is the image of Japan adrift, with 
an ad hoc, opportunistic, and short-term pragmatism. The other is the image of Japan being determinedly 
and tenaciously steadfast in its national interests.132 He adds, ironically, both images can cite the same 
examples as evidence to advance their arguments. For instance, Japan’s fairly strong resistance to 
liberalization of the rice market can be used to support the argument that Japan is drifting without being 
able to maintain a more enlightened position of facilitating the formation of a global free trade regime in 
the framework of the Uruguay Round of GATT. Yet from another angle such resistance can be interpreted 
as the tenacious pursuit of Japan’s national interest in producing at least one kind of principal grain, rice, 
when its food consumption is overwhelmingly dependent on imports from abroad, and especially when 
there is little likelihood of an accord in the negotiations on agricultural subsidies between the two major 
giants, the United States and the European Community. Another example is the territorial issue between 
Japan and Russia. The former argument holds that, despite the demise of the Cold War and despite the 
urgent need to extend aid to Russia for its fledgling democracy and to rescue its free market system, Japan 
has been narrow-minded and opportunistic in its attempt to settle the territorial issue first before further 
rapprochement is made and large-scale financial assistance is offered. Japan was considered adrift for its 
short-sighted attempt made without seeing through sea changes in its diplomatic environment. The latter 
argument goes that Japan is steadfast in its attempt to prioritize, namely, conclude a Treaty of Peace with 
Russia, including a territorial settlement, since Japan and Russia have restarted diplomatic links in 1956 
and nothing beyond that since then. Japan is to be lauded for exercising political leadership in adopting 
this course despite the calls made by Europeans and Americans for Japan to do something, although they 
themselves have made no further large-scale commitments to financing aid.133  
     Inoguchi also states that perhaps both images coexist, firstly because Japan has been unable to 
convey clearly how it conceives its own interests, and second because Japan has been unable to 
demonstrate a ‘world vision’ which it is supposedly beginning to realize.134 First of all, Japan’s 
conception of its own interests is perhaps less articulated in terms of goals and defined more in terms of 
pragmatic rules of thought and behavior such as ‘seeking consensus before acting’, ‘doing not swim 
against the great tide of market forces’, and ‘respect coexistent harmony more than competitive discord’. 
The salience of pragmatic rules in guiding Japan’s diplomacy is fathomable if one understands how Japan 
perceives its standing in the global community since 1945: Japan has been a semi-sovereign state with its 
right to resort to war removed even for the settlement of international disputes, according to the 
still-dominant view in Japan. Therefore, Japan has opted for a course largely confined to the economic 
sphere. In the marketplace, pragmatic rules are clear. Such dicta as ‘build economic infrastructure’, 
‘consolidate manufacturing capabilities through all sectors’, ‘put the market in command’, and ‘pool 
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money in such a way that it can be lent to critically important sectors’ have been shared by many Japanese 
leaders. These could be regarded as a set of instructions to an individual playing the market, but never as 
guidance to diplomats representing the state. Second, the fact that Japan does not posses much of a ‘world 
vision’ may be normal for a non-hegemonic power. Given the fact that Japan is not a hegemonic power 
nor is it declining, expecting Japan to have a world vision may be slightly excessive.135
     From the totally opposite angle, one can argue that Japan possesses a world vision in fledgling form 
and that the only pity is that Japan’s world vision is not universally applicable. Former Primer Minister 
Noburu Takeshita’s pet words were, ‘when you do something, sweat by yourself and give credit to others’, 
may be the epitome of humility, generosity, and altruism. However it is argued it cannot be as great a 
world vision like freedom and democracy. Nor are those guidelines of strategic pragmatism such as `don’t 
swim against market force`, ‘strategic fuzziness may be better than misplaced precision’, and ‘go 
multilateral rather than bilateral, or unilateral’ well-regarded. Yet one can argue that such pragmatism can 
be restructured as the guiding principles of the post-Cold-War era into the twenty-first century. They 
represent the spirit of conciliation, consultation, and cooperation along with deep acknowledgment of 
global and military life, rather than assert overpowering sovereignty reminiscent of the nineteenth century.  
They are principles of sharing responsibility and shaping the future. Naturally one can argue that such 
pragmatism is merely a behavior model or at best a guiding principle, but not values nurtured and shared 
among nations. To this end one can counter argue that in tandem with the globalization of human 
life—technological, economic, and political—the values many aspire to achieve are increasingly common, 
especially since the end of the Cold War, which coincided with the breakdown of European communism.  
     How does Japan determine its role among international regimes? Customarily, this question is 
addressed on three levels: the international system, the nation-state, and individuals.136
     Inoguchi uses David Lake’s typology of international roles as a starting-point: leader, supporter, 
spoiler, and free rider, as measured by the relative size and relative productivity of an economy.137 A 
leader is an actor who shapes and sustains the framework for international economic interactions. A 
supporter is an actor who helps to support and sustain such a framework. A spoiler is an actor who 
benefits from such a framework but whose behavior often has a negative effect on such a framework. A 
free rider is an actor who benefits from such a framework but who does not dare to shoulder the costs for 
the framework in any systematic manner. According to Lake, the role of a country is fairly well 
determined by its position in the world economy in terms of its size and productivity in relation to other 
major economies. Thus, according to Lake, how the United States moved from rider through spoiler and 
supporter to leader in the international economic sphere between the late nineteenth century and the 
present can be well explained by looking at its relative size and relative productivity.138
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     Using this perspective, Inoguchi argues that Japan is perhaps a supporter in international regimes, 
although other images are no less widely held.139 As long as one looks at its relative economic size and its 
relative productivity, Japan is not number one; it occupies the number two position following the United 
States. If the European Community is considered to be one integrated entity, then Japan is number three 
after the EC and the United States. Nor is Japan’s relative productivity number one. Seen in this way, 
Japan’s international role is closer to supporter than to the other roles. Yet there are intense 
counter-arguments that Japan is either free rider or spoiler or challenger. For example, in the area of 
international trade , it is arguable that Japan is a supporter given the immense stake it has in a 
well-functioning world economy. Lacking huge natural resource endowments, Japan must utilize 
resources abroad to support its own economy, either in the form of trade or by investment. It is not 
surprising to find out that Japan’s imports are largely in the areas of food and energy. On the other hand, 
Japan’s exports tend to focus on manufactured products. These are massively exported to many countries, 
in part because as Japan’s direct investment in manufacturing goes up, then imports of parts also increase 
from Japan. Thus this pattern of Japan’s trade and especially the trade imbalance created have tended to 
encourage many to place Japan in the categories of free rider, spoiler, or challenger rather than supporter.    
     Inoguchi adds, although there are often significant differences in Japan’s position in some areas, the 
basic role of Japan as supporter in the international system seems to be affirmed.140 This is a very 
important characteristic of Japan’s foreign policy and is a starting-point for analyzing Japan’s role in 
regional economic integration.  
Wolf Mendl argues, that both the “Japan has no policy” argument, encapsulated in the epigram: 
“economic giant—political dwarf”, and the “Japan out to dominate the world economy” theories make 
sense within the framework of ideas that place the political ambitions of states at the center of 
international politics.141 But, “Japan has no policy” and “Japan aims at global domination” are, of course, 
very simplified descriptions of the two main explanations of Japan’s post-war external relations. These 
two main explanations were U. S. orientation and “Yoshida Doctrine”.142
T. J. Pempel analyzes Japan’s foreign policy changes, and outlines the basic features of ‘embedded 
mercantilism’, the dominant post-war policy orientation of successive Japanese governments. He argues 
that, beginning in the 1980s, regime stability was eroded by a series of shocks that resulted in changes to 
domestic political structures and institutions, such as electoral reforms, bureaucratic reforms and political 
realignment, including the demise of the traditional left in Japanese politics. Moreover, according to 
Pempel, progressive reforms and economic liberalization have also eroded the mercantilist orientation of 
the Japanese government. All these changes lead him to conclude that Japan is in the middle of a regime 
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shift and that the shape of the future regime, while still uncertain, can be gleaned from an examination of 
probable socio-economic cleavages, political and economic institutions, and public policy profile. In 
terms of foreign policy, it would be unlikely for Japan to continue its relatively passive international role 
but he also argues that we should not expect a dramatically more activist foreign policy role. In general 
the shape of Japanese foreign policy will be decided by outcomes in the three central areas of tension 
faced by the Japanese government: that between regionalism and internationalism; between domestic and 
international forces; and between economic orientation and a military/diplomatic focus.143
     Since the 1980s, Japan has been increasingly willing to act as a major power as this quote by the 
former Vice Foreign minister Takakazu Kuriyama shows, ‘For medium and small countries, the 
international order is basically a given framework; their diplomatic goals should be to best adapt 
themselves to the existing order, thereby protecting their security and preserving their economic 
interests----Postwar Japan, using such passive diplomacy and maximally utilizing the international order 
supported by the United States, enjoyed peace and prosperity-----But today’s Japan [with its economic 
power] should participate more positively in international efforts to create a new order, thereby achieving 
its own security and prosperity. In this sense, Japan’s diplomacy should transform itself from that of 
medium and small countries into that of a big country [taikoku].’144
Japan’s foreign policy transition faced pressures and difficulties both in 1960s and in 1980s. 
Inoguchi analyzes both international and domestic pressures and difficulties in connection with Japan’s 
role in regional economic integration and in international regimes.145 Inoguchi analyzes these pressures 
and impediments.        
     Both Japanese and others debate about the role that Japan should play in the international regime. 
Some maintain that Japan should do more, given its position as one of the world’s leading economic 
powers. Others worry that the emergence of an active, assertive Japan would alarm its neighbors and 
disrupt existing patterns of relations among the great powers.  
     The international and domestic factors shape the course of Japan’s role in the international regime. 
Domestically, ‘occupying an honorable place in the international community’ was the aspiration of 
Japanese people even before this phrase was written into the 1952 Constitution. Since 1952, Japan’s 
desire to be accepted as a fully-fledged member of international institutions such as the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the Western Economic Summit.  
     Since the 1970s, Japan began to play a more influential role in institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This is not at all surprising, given Japan’s position in the 
international economic hierarchy and the Japanese people’s long-standing interest in multilateral 
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organizations. In the World Bank, for example, Japan’s capital share was 2.77 percent in 1952 when it 
obtained membership and 6.69 percent in 1987, second only to the United States. In the International 
Development Association, an arm of the World Bank, Japan’s replenishment share was 4.44 percent in 
1961 and 20.98 percent in 1990, again second only to the United States.146
Meanwhile, there were also hinderances to Japan’s role in international regimes. The increasing 
demands for Japan to assume more global responsibilities, in conjunction with the international and 
domestic opposition to such steps, has led Japanese policy to zigzag in a manner frequently characterized 
as ‘two steps forward and one step backward’. In the words of Ichiro Ozawa, the former secretary general 
of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, it is ‘the Japanese way of leaving everything in an ambiguous 
state and accumulating established facts through makeshift circumstantial judgments’.147
Internationally, Japanese aggressive war in the 1930s and 1940s casts a long shadow over Japan’s 
international activities even today.148 Not surprisingly, many of Japan’s neighbors—the two Koreas, 
China, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong—are apprehensive about Japan’s growing 
economic influence. The concern is that economic preponderance could transform at some point into 
military dominance.  
    There are also many domestic hindrances to Japan’s active role in an international regime. First, the 
pacifist tendencies that grew out of Japan’s experiences in World War II are still strong. A particularly 
powerful domestic approach is ‘pacifist in one country’, which maintains that even if other states are 
aggressive, Japan should restrain itself from using force or participating in violent international conflicts. 
Secondly, domestic interests oppose taking any steps that might undermine economic prosperity at home. 
Many believe that the preservation of Japan’s economic dynamism is the key to overcoming global 
economic difficulties. Thirdly, the decision-making in Japan is consensual, and it is undermined by a lack 
of strong political leadership. Consequently, it is difficult for the Japanese government to move quickly to 
shoulder new international responsibilities. Instead, the government tends to move incrementally. For 
example, it might attempt to develop a broader or more flexible interpretation of the Constitution..149  
 
2.2.3. Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy      
As Tadashi Kawata states, ‘when a country’s international competitiveness in the world market 
and the country’s industrial and economic superiority becomes apparent, the country is required to make 
appropriate policy changes for the sake of its own economy and the world economy. If no suitable policy 
change is made, the balance of the world economy will be destroyed and this will ultimately be a severe 
blow to the economy of the country in question.’150 Postwar Japan has been adjusting its foreign 
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economic policy from 1960s.  
Foreign economic policy,151 or strategy of a state is decided, maintained and changed according to 
various factors, argued by Hirata, Okamoto and Ogita, these factors include: 
     Firstly, the international environment of time inevitably influences states’ foreign economic policy. 
No state is totally free from what others do in this era of complex interdependence. Secondly, 
governments decide and implement foreign economic policies according to their domestic economic 
necessity and their level of industrial structures. Thirdly, domestic policy-making processes, which 
somewhat differ from state to state, have of course a lot to do with their foreign economic policies.152  
These three factors of foreign economic policy conception are a good starting point to analyze 
Japan foreign economic policy.  
Postwar Japan has emerged as the center of economic gravity for the countries of the western 
Pacific and has become an important factor in economic development in the region. Its rapid economic 
growth has resulted in a sharp rise in demand for minerals and energy, food, and agricultural raw 
materials for industry; and consequently, the entire system of regional economic ties has profoundly 
changed profoundly. The significance of the Pacific region for Japan has been growing along with the 
growth of the country’s economic potential and industrial power. The countries of the western Pacific 
have become the most important field for the trade and investment expansion of Japanese corporations. 
Japan has become heavily dependent on raw materials and food supplies from Australia, the ASEAN 
countries, Canada, and New Zealand. As a result of with Japanese industrial growth, in the 1960’s the 
Pacific Coast of the United States and Canada became the most dynamic region in North America in 
terms of  concentration of population, urban areas, infrastructure, economic growth rates, and scope of 
industrial development. The countries of the western Pacific have become increasingly important for the 
foreign trade of the United States and Canada. By the end of the 1970’s, Pacific trade had become more 
important for the United States than that with Europe. 
After the end of the World War II, the earlier Japanese foreign economic policy was marked by 
protection from most imports and capital investments, by restrictions against the outflow of capital from 
Japan, by a high reliance on technology purchases from other advanced economies, by tight control over 
foreign entry into the labor market, and by a foreign aid policy designed to develop Asian markets for 
Japanese manufacturing firms. Economics took clear priority over security considerations, and low levels 
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of defense spending freed up investment capital for use in industrial development.   
     Any nation’s foreign economic policy reflects an interaction between domestic and international 
pressures—both political and economic.153 The particularities of these interactions differ from one 
country to another, from one time period to another, and vary in accordance with endogenous changes in 
either the domestic or the international arena. But almost without exception, foreign economic policy is 
incomprehensible without an understanding of that policy’s domestic roots and domestic consequences.154  
     This is certainly the case with regard to Japan. The foreign economic policies of the 1950s, 1960s, 
and early 1970s rested fundamentally on a specific set of domestic political and economic structures, 
without which the policies would have been impossible to pursue and sustain. Despite the electoral 
success of the left-of-center opposition in the 1947 elections and the opposition’s ability to form the only 
(albeit short-lived) non-conservative government in Japan’s modern history, electoral conservatism 
prevailed through the 1950s and into the early 1970s. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) practiced an 
extraordinary success of domestic and foreign economic policies.155   
     A sequence of industrial policies sought to improve the domestic infrastructure and international 
competitiveness of certain targeted Japanese industries, particularly in machinery, chemicals, and steel, by 
allowing oligopolistic reorganization of companies, selective imports of foreign technologies, lower than 
market-interest capital loans, R&D cartel, and a host of cognate policies, all in the interest of increasing 
Japan’s international competitiveness and maximizing economic growth rates.156 During the 1960s, 
upwards of five-hundred major and minor mergers occurred each year, by the end of 1960s and the 
beginning of 1970s these were taking place at the rate of more than one thousand annually.157 This made 
several dozen of Japan’s largest companies truly world players with offices throughout the world and with 
total sales and employed personnel figures comparable to other companies in Fortune’s Global 500.  
     Success in the external market was paralleled by a domestic market that remained relatively closed 
and protectionist. The American Occupation had initially and theoretically committed itself to an 
antimonopoly policy. Yet under the Export and Import Trading Act of August 1952, virtually coterminous 
with the end of the Occupation, the Japanese government explicitly permitted exporters to enter cartel 
agreements on price, quality, design, or other matters connected to the export of their products.  
     The government also controlled the access of Japanese firms to foreign technology and to large 
quantities of raw materials. Formally until 1961 and informally for a long period thereafter, the 
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government maintained strict controls over Japanese imports. Consumer products were tightly restricted, 
through both tariff and import quotas; in contrast, raw materials and the machinery needed to fuel the 
domestic transformation were encouraged. However, the raw materials that were imported were subjected 
to strict governmental controls to ensure that they were distributed in conjunction with governmental 
economic and sectoral priorities. Only in  
1962 did the government replace its short list of items that could be imported by a list of items that were 
explicitly prohibited without specific governmental permission. All technologies brought into the country 
until 1968 were screened by the government on a case-by-case basis, even though such screenings were 
by then difficult to justify on the basis of the original balance-of-payments claim.  
     Extensive restrictions on the import of most manufacturing goods and the high degree of 
manufactured exports from Japan left it a country with one of the most skewed import-export balances in 
the industrial world.158
     Financial policy, too, was enlisted in the support of Japan’s overall domestic and foreign economic 
policies. Both MITI and the Ministry of Finance provided financial assistance to targeted firms and 
sectors through low-interest government loans, aid in securing private loans, accelerated depreciation, and 
tax-free reserves. Even more important for the overall direction of economic policy, the Ministry of 
Finance managed to maintain overbalanced budgets until 1965.  
     Even more fundamental to monetary policy was the maintenance of an undervalued yen. From the 
time of the Dodge Mission to Japan in 1949 until the end of the Bretton-Woods System in 1971, the 
Ministry of Finance maintained a yen closely linked to the U.S. dollar at a rate that rarely deviated more 
than a yen or two from Y360 to $1. As the Japanese economy grew in strength, the yen became an ever 
more undervalued currency. This in turn provided both a catalyst to Japan’s exports and a barrier to 
foreign imports and investments.159 Meanwhile, foreign direct investment in Japan was also strongly 
discouraged through the Foreign Exchange and Control Law. With few major exceptions, into the early 
1970s Japan was a country almost devoid of significant foreign direct investment.160
     In a most fundamental way, this restriction of capital investment allowed Japanese foreign and 
domestic polices to be fused in the creation of industries at home that were deemed critical to Japan’s 
overall economic success without having to confront, as did many European countries at that time, the 
problems associated with foreign or multinational penetration and internal market competition.  
     One final element critical to foreign economic policy was Japan’s relatively low commitment to the 
security and military aspects of foreign policy. A close security alliance with the United States and a low 
position in international affairs left the Japanese government free to hold down the military share of the 
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national budget.  
     Two major shocks in the early 1970s changed the portrait of Japanese foreign economic policy: the 
breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system (i.e.. the sudden and forced revaluation of the Japanese yen) and 
the quadrupling of world oil prices as a result of OPEC policies between 1973 and 74. Following these 
two events, Japanese foreign economic policy could never again be the same.   
As Levin argues, beginning in the 1970s, Japanese leaders modified their economic policies, 
largely to placate U.S. pressures for greater liberalization but also to adjust to broad macroeconomic 
changes reflected in the sudden move from high to low growth. It is hard to argue, however, that they 
suggest any fundamental change in Japan’s national strategy.161 While Japan liberalized its barriers to 
foreign imports, for example, it did so only grudgingly and incrementally, with key industries protected 
until they could compete internationally.  
During the 1960s Japan also gradually relaxed its foreign exchange regulations to permit Japanese 
foreign investment. This investment went overwhelmingly to Asia; particularly helpful were reparation 
agreements with several Asian nations, which prepared the way for entry into these markets. The oil crisis 
of 1973 had a most profound effect on Japan’s high growth rates and on its relationship with the outside 
world. The relative decline of US economic power was symbolized by the abandonment in 1973 of the 
fixed exchange-rate system established at Bretton Woods at the end of World War II. It became obvious 
that the United States was no longer able or willing to shoulder to the same extent as before the 
responsibility for the maintenance of the economic order which had been so beneficial to Japan. As a 
result, the Japanese lost their hitherto unshaken confidence in the reliability of the United States as a 
partner. 
Professor Walt W. Rostow, the well-known US economic historian, stresses the difficulty of 
economic policy change, saying that ‘the difficulty at the turning point which Japan is now experiencing 
resembles well one which the United States met after World War I’. He points out how important it is for 
Japan, a newly-rising economic power, to get rid of its previous image and practices and to play leading 
role in the world economy and meet its inescapable responsibilities.’162
It is essential to note that Japan’s protectionist stars have been changing very steadily. There were 
textiles in the late 1960s, steel and petrochemicals in the 1970s, through automobiles in the 1980s. 
Japan’s structural adjustments took place in three waves: (1) the first oil crisis in which energy costs 
forced business firms to become energy-efficient; (2) the high yen revolution of the first Reagan 
presidency which forced business firms to become labor-efficient; and (3) the Structural Impediments 
Initiatives talks between Japan and the United States which will become a trigger to help make Japanese 
daily life more attuned to amenities. 
In the period since the late 1970s, Japan’s formal trade barriers have been drastically reduced; its 
currency flows have become far more internationalized; Japanese banks float company debt warrants in 
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Europe with minimal oversight from the Bank of Japan or the Ministry of Finance; Japanese companies, 
once subject to heavy MITI and MOF directions to ensure conformity with particular government 
industrial plans, are now largely liberated from the club of capital controls. Japan’s foreign aid has 
expanded rapidly and Japan is now the largest single donor of economic assistance. Furthermore, aid is no 
longer so geographically concentrated in Asia nor so tied to market development.  
The principal thrust of foreign economic policy through the 1960s was overseas exports from a 
protected home market. In the early 1970s that basic thrust shifted to greater integration of the Japanese 
and world markets, led principally by overseas investment.163  
     One of the main props of early foreign economic policy in Japan was destroyed by the breakdown 
of the Bretton-Woods system and the consequent strengthening of the Japanese yen. This change 
drastically altered the economic incentive structures for Japanese government’s economic agencies. The 
incentives for Japanese companies to continue manufacturing at home diminished as the costs of 
investing abroad dropped dramatically and as the implicit subsidization of Japanese-based manufactures 
was eroded. Similarly, once the Ministry of Finance could no longer control exchange rates, the economic 
incentives for Japanese firms to borrow only in yen were drastically reduced. The rising yen also altered 
the relative land, labor, and costs in Japan and abroad. Foreign labor, land, and factories all became much 
cheaper when paid for in the newly appreciated yen. 
     Meanwhile, as the price of oil soared (and not at all incidentally as concerns about the 
environmental impact of many of Japan’s manufacturing firms increased), policies predicated on cheap 
energy and cheap international transportation costs were also undercut. Instead, there were strong 
incentives to move many energy-consuming, and manufacturing, plants to sites abroad.  
     These two changes in exchange rates and the prices of energy were accompanied by strong Western 
pressures for Japan to reduce the quantity of its exports and also to open its home markets to Western 
products and capital investments. As Watanabe notes, these pressures began as frictions over specific 
sectors such as textiles, steel, and automobiles starting in 1965, but they soon took the form of broader 
bilateral clashes with the first of the so-called Nixon shocks in the form of yen-dollar currency 
realignments.164
     One of the first changes involved a government liberalization of the conditions for foreign direct 
investment by Japanese firms starting once the country began to witness a large current accounts surplus 
in 1971-72 (although these were temporarily tightened with the oil shock and long-term capital outflows 
in 1974). As government constraints were lifted, Japanese firms responded with alacrity to their new 
opportunities to invest abroad.  
     A drastic expansion in capital outflow and overseas investment ensued. Thus, the total investment 
for the for years 1973 to 1976 was nearly double that for the preceding twenty years.165 This expansion 
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has continued throughout subsequent years with ever-escalating proportions.  
     Residual import restriction also dropped rapidly. In 1960s Japan had restrictions on some 490 
product categories. This figure was reduced to 120 in April 1968 and to twenty-nine (seven in 
manufacturing and twenty-two in agriculture) in February 1975.166 By early 1981 only twenty-two 
agricultural restrictions remained, but there were restrictions on only one manufactured item. In contrast, 
there were forty-six such restrictions in France and forty-one in Italy, while industrial restrictions posed 
an even sharper contrast, with the United States, France, Britain, Italy, and Canada all having more 
products under restrictions than did Japan.167
     In short, the formal barriers that had been such strong impediments to the sale of foreign goods in 
Japan were rapidly swept away and Japan’s market became, at least on paper, one of the most open in the 
industrialized world.  
     Japanese government assistance also underwent substantial readjustments. As an international 
consensus coalesced against the export-promotion basis of Japan’s earlier aid efforts, Japan began 
providing increased levels of untied aid. In 1972 Japan extended its first untied loan, and in 1978 it 
declared its support for the principle of untying most development loans.168 A dramatic expansion began 
in 1977, and by 1989 Japan had advanced to being the world’s largest single aid donor.  
     Opportunities for foreign capital to move into Japan were also liberalized, most fundamentally with 
the scrapping of the Foreign Exchange and Control Law in 1980. Direct investment jumped as a result. 
Some $299 million was invested in 1980; by 1983 this had nearly tripled, and by 1988 it was up nearly 
tenfold to $2.6 billion. During the mid-1980s, some 3,000-3,500 investments were made annually.169
     The rise of yen has also led to pressure from workers outside Japan anxious to take advantage of 
the potential disparity in earning power between their own countries and Japan. This pressure has been 
exacerbated by domestic Japanese employers, typically producing for the domestic market and often in 
subcontracting positions, which have made them even more cost-conscious since the yen’s upward 
revaluation.170  
     Japan’s relationships with the United States and its own defense and security spending have also 
changed substantially. The United States once provided large quantities of what Japan needed, from a 
nuclear umbrella and a defense shield to cheap technology and a wide open market. That is no longer the 
case. Japan’s defense and military spending have subsequently shifted considerably—largely in the 
direction of greater defense planning and higher shares of the national budget. Indeed, it is hard not to 
conclude that the United States has been the subject of more foreign policy, and foreign economic policy, 
controversies than all of Japan’s potential enemies combined. 
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     In all of these ways, and more, since the early 1970s, Japan’s foreign economic policies have a 
distinctly more international character than the mercantilist caste they carried in the first two decades or 
so after the war.  
     Japan’s economic development increased its economic dependence on Asia Pacific region, and this 
dependence led Japan searching for how to best protect its interest in interregional regimes. 
 
2.3, Japan and the U.S. in the Asia Pacific  
With becoming the No.2 economic power in the world, Japan found its interests in Asia Pacific 
increasing from 1960s. From then on, Japan’s foreign policy had been constantly shifting, and Japan also 
has been searching for its role in the region. 
 
2.3.1. Japan in the Asia Pacific: A Historical Review 
Japan’s role in regional organizations and Japan’s perception of Japan’s place in the Asia Pacific has 
been constantly changing.  
The first attempts at forming a trans-Pacific forum date back as far as about 80 years ago to the 
creation of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). The IPR brought together scholars, merchants, and 
bureaucrats with an interest in expanding contacts across the Pacific. One of the early and ardent 
supporters of the effort was Japan’s Inazo Nitobe, famous for his passion to become a ‘bridge across the 
Pacific.’ Nitobe’s internationalist dreams were crushed when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, sending 
the Asia Pacific region down the road to all-out war. The IPR lingered on until it fell victim in the 1950s 
to US Senator Joseph McCarthy’s ‘red-baiting’ committee, which labeled the private organization a 
communist front.171
On an official level, they were three major attempts at creating regional organizations, all of which 
ended in failure. The first one was the so-called Washington System. In 1921, in parallel with the League 
of Nations, representatives from Asia Pacific powers (including colonial European nations) met in 
Washington to enact naval disarmament measures meant to reduce the threat of war. The second regional 
meeting was more representative in that it excluded European colonizers, but it almost suicidal. The 1943 
Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo was a thinly veiled plot to cloak Japan’s imperial aggression as a 
quest to protect self-determination. The assembled Asian delegates could claim that they were free of 
Western control but not foreign domination, and the fall of Japan three years later would put an end to any 
dreams Tokyo officials had of an Asian bloc led by a paternal Pax Nipponica. All these plans vanished as 
Japan lay demolished in 1945. The third recent attempt at official coordination in the region came in 1955 
with the Bandung conference, which launched the Non-Aligned Movement. Meant as a forum for 
‘Afro-Asian’ unity, the movement was a political attempt by the South to resist control by the North (or 
more aptly, the West). American columnist Walter Lippmann termed the conference ‘the most formidable 
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and ambitious move yet made in this generation to apply the principle of Asia for the Asians.’172 But the 
Non-Aligned Movement’s effectiveness is negligible. 
Soon after the end of the World War II, Japanese self-confidence was completely lost. Japan was 
discredited in Asia Pacific and had no role whatsoever in the region. All efforts were directed at recovery 
and reconstruction under the benevolent umbrella of the United States. In 1955 the accelerating recovery 
of their country encouraged the Japanese to announce the end of the postwar era in a white paper of the 
Economic Planning Agency. Also, Japanese war reparations were underway to a number of East and 
Southeast Asian countries. With the departure of the occupation forces, the armistice agreement in the 
Korean peninsula and the inauguration of rapid economic development, Japan’s role in Asia Pacific was 
motivated by the combination of the debt of history and economic opportunities in such forms as 
reparations, foreign aid and export market.  
     Japan’s role in the Asia Pacific region is primarily conceived as economic but with increasing 
security components as well. The Japanese elite have come to acquire a sense of mission through 
representing the interests and concerns of the regional countries in international forums such as the 
OECD. They have also moved to forge and/or promote regional institutions such as the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC), Asian Development Bank (ADB). This is indicative of their concern for 
shaping and sharing the benefits of the Pacific dynamism encompassing northern Mexico, the Pacific 
areas of the United States and Canada, East and South East Asia and the South Pacific, as North America 
and Western Europe appear to be moving toward the formation of regional protectionist blocs.173 The 
Japanese defined their role in this respect as shaping a Pacific economic community in an open 
multilateral form, which would create a zone of prosperity with free trade, and rolling back the 
protectionist and regionalist trends that might accelerate in other parts of the world.  
     But before the mid-1960s, all efforts to establish a regional institution failed, no matter whether it 
was non-governmental or official. In that time, Japan did not have enough confidence and power to 
pursue its strategy and own interests in international regimes and in the Asia Pacific region. As discussed, 
Japan was a supporter in international regimes, and its foreign policy, both foreign economic policy and 
policy toward regional economic integration was deeply affected by the Japan-US bilateral relation and 
US’s strategy toward the Asia Pacific.  
     For Japan’s role in the Asia Pacific, Robert Gilpin doubts that Japan will replace the US as a 
hegemony because of its inward-looking foreign policy, foreign economic policy and lack of military.174 
Fukai Shigeko doubts the validity of Gilpin’s prediction at least for the region because the relative weight 
of military might has declined.175 But she agrees with Gilpin and others that Japan is not (yet) willing to 
                                                  
o
o r
172  Quoted in Funabashi, 1995, p.7. 
173  Inoguchi, 1993, p.173. 
174 Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of Internati nal Relations, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987, p.376. 
175  Fukai, Shigeko, ‘Japan, ASEAN and the Asian NIEs’, in David Mason and Abdul M. Turay, 
eds., Japan, NAFTA and Eur pe, T ilateral Cooperation or Confrontation? London: 
Macmillan, 1994, p.172. 
 49
be a global hegemony because of the lack of domestic consensus on any value beyond economic growth. 
She believes, however, that Japan has already become a new regional hegemony as defined by Antonio 
Gramsci. According to Fukai, ‘Gramsci defined hegemony as a relationship, not a domination imposed by 
force, but of consent generated by political and ideological (or intellectual and moral) leadership’.176 In 
order to prove this effort at creating consensus in Asia she measures ‘Japan’s political and organizational 
efforts aimed at the formation of an international and a domestic consensus on a regional integration’ and 
Japan’s manufacturing of ‘networks of economic interests through a coordinated use of economic aid, 
technical cooperation and private sector FDI’.177 Her conclusions about Japan’s hegemony are not final, 
particularly in view of the question of how Japan will tackle the growing gap of inequality in Asia, but the 
approach adds to the urgency of understanding better Japan’s soft power and not only its hard power.178  
As stated by Drifte, over the succeeding decades, the Asia Pacific region stretching from Burma to 
Japan has become more diversified both in its political structure and in terms of economic performance. A 
‘three-stage’ economic hierarchy has emerged, which in practice tends to resemble the ‘flying geese’ 
pattern of development much beloved by Japanese economists. Japan is at the top providing aid, 
investment funds, technology and, increasingly, market opportunities for the products of the region. Next 
are the NIEs, consisting of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. These economies are at the 
developmental stage that Japan was and depend on Japan for investment, technology, spare parts and 
market. The NIEs are followed by the other member states of ASEAN, notably Thailand and Malaysia, 
and by Chin. Because of the dynamism of development at all these levels and the growing linkages 
between then in terms of trade and investment, each member is forced to improve continually and 
upgrade its industrial structure and performance.179  
 
2.3.2. Japanese-U.S. Economic Relations and U.S. Factor in Regional Economic Cooperation 
     The bilateral U.S.-Japanese relationship is the indispensable link to Pacific Basin Cooperation 
(PBC). It offers many mutual economic and political implications, and it holds the potential for 
international cooperation to foster a more stable world environment. Having the world’s largest 
economies, the United States and Japan are emerging as the two most significant players in the field of 
development—a field that is likely to define fast-paced economic development and prosperity in the 
region.  
     Historically, postwar U.S.-Japanese economic relations have gone through three major stages: (1) 
American military-economic hegemony over a subdued Japan until     the reversion of Okinawa in 
1972; (2) relative politico-economic cooperation, up to the 1979 Afghan crisis, rather reluctantly on the 
part of Japan; and (3) since then, an open competition, if not conflict, in trade, investment, and 
manufacturing on a global scale.180
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     The trade balance has shifted dramatically from a steady surplus in the U.S. favor through 1964 to a 
growing deficit thereafter. There has been a remarkable change, of course, in the composition of Japan’s 
exports. In the 1980s, Japan’s major exports to the United States largely consisted of high-technology 
goods, instead of textiles as in the 1960’s, whereas agricultural products and raw materials still dominate 
U.S. exports to Japan. In other words, what the Japanese supply is abundantly available—albeit with 
differences in price and quality—from competing U.S. firms.   
    A cause of the U.S.-Japanese trade conflict is the erosion of the postwar international system. During 
the height of the cold war, the United States, as long as its economy was strong and healthy, was 
excessively generous to Japan and other Western industrial allies. While leading a global anti-Communist 
crusade, the United States not only provided a relatively open market for Japanese products but in fact 
allowed Japan to engage in severe import and foreign-exchange restrictions on goods, service, and capital. 
Meanwhile the relative decline of the U.S. macro-economic position during the détente era was 
accompanied by Japan’s sustained economic growth, its increasing penetration of the U.S. market, and its 
control over economies quite often in defiance of Washington.  
Meanwhile, U.S. policies towards Pacific economic cooperation were also changing. Following 
World War II, the United States’ basic objectives in the Asia Pacific region were shaped primarily by 
security considerations.181 The central concern was to prevent anti-U.S. offensive operations from being 
launched from the Asian mainland. This eventually was formulated by Secretary of States Dean Acheson 
in his “defensive perimeter” speech before the National Press Club, January 12, 1950. 
     At that time the link between the security and prosperity of the Asian nations and that of the United 
States was clearly recognized and so stated by the National Security Council in its 1949 outline “The 
Position of the United States with Respect to Asia.” Notably, however, the NSC specifically ruled out any 
initiative by the United States to form regional associations with the non-communist states of the Pacific. 
Much of what is contained in the document continues to apply to the current U.S. stance toward Pacific 
Basin Cooperation: 
  
1, Any association formed must be the result of a genuine desire on the part of the participating nations to 
cooperate for mutual benefit in solving the political, economic, social and cultural problems of the 
area. 
2, The United States must not too active a part in the early stages of the formation of such an association 
that it will be subject to the charge of using the Asiatic nations to further United States ambitions.  
3, The association, if it is to be a constructive force, much operate on the basis of mutual aid and self-help 
in all fields so that a true partnership may exist based on equal rights and equal obligations.  
4, United States participation in any stage of the development of such an association should be with the 
view of accomplishing our basic objectives in Asia and of assuring that any association formed will be 
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in accord with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with regional arrangements.182
 
The NSC also cited the need to “obtain the adherence of Asiatic countries to the  
principles of multilateral, non-discriminatory trade as embodied in the General  
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as a means of reducing trade barriers and expanding  
the international and intra-regional trade of the region.”183
    The long-standing interest of the United States in Pacific regional associations therefore is not in 
question, but economic and political relationships were hardly conducive to the development of the idea 
until the mid- to late 1970s, when burgeoning Pacific trade, the end of the Vietnam War, and a 
rapprochement with China lent added force to suggests for new institutional arrangements.  
     It was only in the early 1980s that the political and economic developments that encouraged the 
consideration of Pacific economic cooperation began to be more clearly and generally recognized in the 
United States, particularly since the major economic downturn (the “Great Recession”) which forced 
Americans to confront the international economic challenges and opportunities that face them in Asia and 
elsewhere.184 Japan’s economic surge, the similarly dynamic growth of the newly industrialized countries, 
and the opening up of China have been important elements in this development. The political emergence 
and economic growth of ASEAN has been important also but of lower note. In sum, Americans are 
finding Asia’s economic impact increasingly difficult to ignore. “Part of the national debate over our 
economic future is implicitly one of how to cooperate and compete in the western Pacific. This has 
encouraged a delayed but growing U.S. government interests in Pacific cooperation which is based on 
global as well as regional interests.”185
     These multilateral consultations and in general the concept of a Pacific Community had developed 
sufficiently within the State Department by 1979 to support a September mission to Asia for the purpose 
of exploring ASEAN and other Asian attitudes toward these and related issues. Thus in September 1979 
the East Asia Division’s deputy assistant secretary for economic affairs, Erland Heginbotham (later to 
become director of the Foreign Commercial Service in the Department of Commerce), and Donald 
Zagoria, Columbia University, visited several Southeast Asian capitals to assess, among other things, 
interest in a consortium of private, Asian-Pacific institutions and to explore Asian views concerning 
regular, informal, non-governmental discussions about economic issues. The Heginbotham mission did 
not represent an official U.S. move towards pan-Pacific institution building. Rather, it assessed and 
discussed which people and institutions might wish to participate in an informal network for regular 
communications about the Pacific Community concept.  
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Though the U.S. government paid with great care and precision on U.S.’s position on “Pacific 
Community” in the 1960s and 1970s, Washington has been unwilling —perhaps also unable—to take the 
lead in its development, despite its potential.186 This left rooms for Japan to be leading role in Asia Pacific 
regionalism in 1960s to 1980s.  
2.4. Japan in Regional Institutions before APEC 
     Except for the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), the first regional organization between 1925 and 
1960, many suggestions and proposals for economic cooperation in Asia Pacific began to take shape and 
to attract region-wide attention, if not region-wide support only in the 1960s and 1970s. Four of these 
initiatives of an essentially private or unofficial nature were of particular significance, and had visible 
impact. In three of the four cases, these initiatives, led to concrete implementation and institutionalization, 
well beyond the levels envisioned, or even desired by some participants in their early stages. In each of 
these organizations, Japan played an important role.  
 
2.4.1. PAFTAD and OPTAD 
     The first of these initiatives was most clearly formulated by Professor Kiyoshi Kojima of 
Hitatsubashi University in Tokyo in the 1960s. His proposal, for a Pacific Free Trade Area attracted 
widespread attention, especially after he and a colleague at Hitotsubashi University, Hiroshi Kurimoto 
presented it at a conference in November 1965 of the Japan Economic Research Center (JERC).187 “The 
outcome of this initiative was the implementation of a series of Pacific Trade and Development 
(PAFTAD) Conference, comprised primarily of regional economies.”188
     In the 1960s, after a century of struggle Japan had finally emerged as one of the world’s great 
economic powers, only to be awakened from its dream of an ever-widening global market by the 
formation of the European Community and the threat of protectionism in the United States. The buoyant 
mood dissolved into an atmosphere gloomy at the prospect of an impending international economic crisis. 
In these circumstances more and more Japanese leaders in business, government, and academia began to 
look around for additional partners with whom to share their economic future. Some came to believe that 
they had found such partners in the vast region of the Pacific, where the newly industrializing countries 
were only just getting underway. Here the vision of a new dynamic center of economic development 
began to unfold, capable when rationalized of bringing about a profound change in the world balance of 
power.  
     This view was conceptualized and advanced particularly by a group of economists associated with 
Saburo Okita. Okita, who was later to become president of Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 
then foreign minister under Prime Minister Ohira, and later president of the United Nations University of 
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Japan in Tokyo, was by the 1960s already one of the leading economic planners of postwar Japan. In 
1965 he had only recently left his post in the Economic Planning Agency to set up a new macro-economic 
think-tank, the Japan Economic Research Center. It was at one of the center’s first conference, held on 
November 10-13 of that year, Kojima and Kurimoto brought up the idea of PAFTA as Japan’s response to 
the EEC. In a paper that was widely distributed, Kojima argued that if the five advanced countries in the 
Pacific-Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand-were to form a free trade area 
among themselves, and then welcome as associated members with preferential treatment such developing 
countries in Asia and Latin America as wished to join, the result would be a vast Pacific trade 
expansion.189 Prime Minister Takeo Miki found it an intriguing concept and urged that it be further 
examined.190 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered financial support for such an investigation, and in 
February 1968, at its first Pacific Free Trade and Development (PAFTAD) Conference, the center laid the 
proposition before a group of largely academic economists from countries throughout the region. The 
benefits to be derived from increased economic cooperation in the Pacific was very attractive to the 
participants.  
     So did the vision which underlay Kojima’s tables and charts, that of the Pacific Basin not as a 
narrow rim of disparate countries separated by a great ocean, but as a coherent region with enormous 
underdeveloped wealth awaiting only rational formulae and the marshalling of governmental and private 
energies for its potential to be realized. The PAFTAD economists, as we may call them, quickly formed 
one of the core groups of the Pacific Basin movement. Nevertheless, coming from many different 
countries with different perspectives, these economists found it hard to accept Kojima’s specific proposal. 
The globalists from the advanced countries did not want to see the world market broken up into regional 
trading blocs. Most economists from overseas did not believe the countries would benefit equally. 
Manufactured goods exporters like the Japanese were seen to be advantaged far more than primary goods 
exporters like the Australians, and these academic views seem to have reflected the views held by 
government economists as well.191
     In 1970, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), a Foreign Ministry-related research 
organization, commissioned Okita and Kojima to head a project on the Asian-Pacific region, where the 
prospects for greater cooperation could be carefully assessed. Five senior economists from universities, 
government, and research organs joined them, and a volume of papers was published in 1971.192 In the 
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same year, the IDE, the think tank related to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
published Studies on a Pacific Economic Region, edited by Seiya Yano. 
     Moves were also made on the international front. At the first Ministerial Conference between 
Australia and Japan, held in Canberra in October 1972, the two governments agreed to finance a 
three-year project to be conducted jointly by the JERC in Tokyo and the Research School of Pacific 
Studies of the Australian National University.  It would carefully examine the economic relations 
between Australia and Japan in the context of the region. Named the Australia-Japan Economic Relations 
Research Project, it was headed by Okita and Sir John Crawford, chancellor of the university and former 
head of the Australian government’s Department of Trade and Industry. It was given research direction in 
Tokyo by Kojima and in Canberra by Peter Drysdale, reader in the Economics Department of ANU. By 
1980 the project had drawn together more than 150 economists and by its voluminous reports, and 
particularly three comprehensive assessments of the two governments, had given a powerful thrust to the 
PAFTAD.193   
     By the late 1970s these expanding research efforts had produced an influential interlocking 
international interest group of professional economists, centered around Japan and Australia, but with 
participants from most of the other countries of the western Pacific and North America. They were 
impressed by the dynamism of the region and the growing interdependence amongst its market economies. 
They had made a number of technical studies of particular problem areas they felt needed attention, such 
as trade, investment, industrial structure, and resources, and they had pretty much reached a consensus 
that some new kind of institutional arrangement was needed.  
PAFTAD was apparently conceived by Kojima and others who helped to frame it as a Japanese 
response to the European Economic Community; but it soon developed into a more truly regional 
proposal. An alternative proposal that emerged in the latter half of the 1970s seemed to be more along the 
lines of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (an organization of the leading 
developed nations, mostly European but also including the United States, Canada and Japan, the three 
leading Asia Pacific powers). This alternative proposal was for an Organization for Pacific Trade and 
Development (OPTAD). It was recommended to their respective governments in 1976 by Dr. Saburo 
Okita, and Sir John Crawford. The proposal was given more concrete and detailed form in 1979 in a 
widely discussed report by Professors Peter Drysdale of Australian National University and Hugh Patrick 
of Yale University, both of whom were active participants in PAFTAD.194
     For a time the OPTAD proposal seemed to attract more attention then PAFTAD, which was already 
assuming a loosely institutional form; but while OPTAD has not been forgotten, it has not yet led to 
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effective implementation. One of the reasons probably is that, like OECD, it would have been essentially 
an association of more developed countries of Asia and the Pacific and as such would neither satisfy the 
need for an all-regional organization nor allay the fears of the less developed nations of the region—the 
vast majority—that they would either be excluded, or if admitted would be dominated by the richer 
member states. This latter fear has been, and continues to be, one of the major handicaps for any type of 
proposed comprehensive regional organization; but OPTAD was especially open to such criticisms.    
Between January 1968 and December 1989 eighteen Pacific Trade and Development Conferences 
were held.  
     The chairmen of the International Steering Committee of PAFTAD have been Professor Kiyoshi 
Kojima (1968-83) and Dr. Saburo Okita (1983-85), both of Japanese and Professor Hugh Patrick 
(1985----) of the United States.  
     In 1984 Dr. Peter Drysdale prepared a “brief history” of the PAFTAD Conference.195 The useful 
publication contains the following comments on it purpose and contribution: 
 
     The conferences are private in the sense that economists from different Pacific countries are invited 
as individuals. Non-academic participants do not take part as representatives of their governments 
or of international organizations, but are invited in their private professional capacities. 
Participants are mainly from academic circles, although many have had considerable policy 
experience in government and elsewhere-------- The conferences are designed primarily for the 
intelligent consideration of economic policy issues of importance to Pacific countries. The 
research papers, which serve as the basis for conference discussions, are intended to meet this aim. 
The focus on policy differentiates this work somewhat from purely academic economic research, 
though a major objective of the program is to generate substantial research and analysis of the 
Pacific economy. This intellectual contribution aims to assist and complement the contributions of 
practitioners, in government and in the business world, in dealing with the challenges of Pacific 
development. An underlying assumption of the PAFTAD Conference is that the distinctive 
contributions from these three sectors are critical to effective cooperation among the nations of the 
Pacific; and the history of Pacific cooperation and development over the past several years can be 
seen as validating this assumption to a remarkable extent------A major contribution of the Pacific 
trade and development research activity over the years has been to build up in significant measure 
the network of persons and institutions involved in cooperative research and this continues to be 
an important task for the future.196  
      
2.4.2. PBEC 
In the late 1960s a number of business leaders in several Pacific Basin countries formed the 
Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC). “Conceived at a meeting of the Japan-Australia Joint Economic 
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Committee, PBEC was organized in 1967 as a private organization with five national committees: 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States (again note the leadership of the only 
highly developed countries of the Pacific Basin). It was enlarged in 1974 with a Pacific Basin Regional 
Committee, so that by the end of the 1970s it came to embrace more than three hundred influential 
businessmen throughout the Pacific Basin.”197 It has grown significantly since that time, in membership, 
activities, organization, and effectiveness. This is reflected in a brief description in late July 1989 by R. 
Sean Randolph, the international director general of PBEC:  
PBEC is an international business association composed of approximately six hundred corporations 
located in nine countries around the Pacific Basin. It was founded in 1967 as the pioneering multinational 
business forum in the region. In addition to operating as a network through which many business 
relationships has been established, PBEC seeks to encourage and develop the most favorable possible 
climate for business in the region. We do this by working with governments and international bodies such 
as the GATT to support open market polices and the lowering of barriers to trade and investment. The 
underlying philosophy of PBEC embraces active support for multinational economic cooperation in the 
Pacific region and the building the bridges between different economic communities.  
 
PBEC has established a number of important special committees,198 including those on agriculture, 
tourism, environmental science and technology, and Pacific economic cooperation. At the 1988 meeting 
in Sydney the relationship of PBEC to the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) was discussed 
at some length. PBEC, along with PAFTAD, is a full member of PECC. The delegates at Sydney 
“discussed the need for active representation of PBEC within the PECC. It was widely agreed that 
PBEC’s role should be to help focus PECC on pragmatic economic issues and to insure that the business 
aspects receive adequate emphasis within the organization.”199
     PBEC was formed primarily to promote the mutual interests of businessmen and business 
organizations in the Pacific Basin. It has also been one of the many forums for the introduction and/or 
consideration of larger proposals for Pacific economic cooperation. For example, when PBEC met in 
Sydney on May 5-8, 1980, it had before it a draft proposal for a Pacific Economic Community (PEC) 
which the Japan National Committee had drawn up, presented for discussion to the Steering Committee 
the previous October and revised to accommodate the views of other member committees to which it had 
been circulated------but it (PBEC) was not prepared to commit itself to any particular organizational 
formula for the PEC, either PAFTAD, OPTAD, or any other, and in fact did not reach a consensus on 
whether the coordinating mechanism should be at the governmental level at all.200
     The PEC concept was taken up by the PBEC’s leader, Noboru Gotoh, who had succeeded to the 
chairmanship of the Japan National Committee and was elected at that meeting as PBEC’s international 
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president as well. The energetic chairman and president of the Tokyu Corporation, which owns railways, 
hotels, and other properties in Japan and throughout the Pacific Basin, Gotoh has been backed by one of 
Japan’s most respected business strategists, Ryuzo Sejima, chairman of C. Itoh and Company, then 
serving as vice chairman of the Japan’s National Committee and one of PBEC’s international counselors. 
Former U. S. ambassador to Japan James Hodgson, later chairman of Pathfinder Mines, and Sir James 
Vernon, chairman of CSR Limited (Australian) and the succeeding international president of PBEC, were 
particularly enthusiastic. Follow-up discussions were carried on within the constituent committees, 
particularly the Japan National Committee, and at the General Meeting in Los Angeles in 1979, where 
Gotoh delivered an especially telling speech on “The Significance of the Pacific Basin and the Role of 
PBEC in the 1980s.”201
     In Japan, in addition to JERC, JIIA, and IDE already referred to, the Nomura Research Institute 
(NRI) began to involve itself. In September 1978 Kiichi Saeki, president of the institute, completed a 
report for the Japanese government on future national priorities.202 While reserved in tone and refraining 
from specifically endorsing the OPTAD proposal, Saeki placed great emphasis on the need for increased 
economic cooperation in the Pacific region. He proposed the establishment of a $20 billion Pacific 
Cooperation Fund, an expanded program of personnel exchanges, and a regular series of ministerial or 
summit conferences.203 Later that same year, on a more popular level, the executive vice president of 
Nomura and columnist for the Pacific edition of Newsweek, Jiro Tokuyama, published a widely read book 
in which he heralded the coming of what he called “the Pacific Century.” He not only championed  the 
formation of a free trade area among the advanced countries of the Pacific as in Kojima’s original scheme, 
but called for the creation of a grander Pacific Economic Sphere based on a vision of a Pacific 
Community transcending differences of economy, culture, and national identity, and including the less 
developed countries (LDCs) and particularly the PRC.204
     PBEC, like PAFTAD and PECC, has taken a cautiously supportive attitude toward the idea of a 
new all-Pacific official organization. As R. Sean Randolph stated in July 1989, “On the matter of a new 
governmental forum for the region, this is obviously a matter which the governments will decide 
themselves. PBEC has, however, supported this concept subject to a few qualifications. We are working 
to ensure that any new government process or institution has the input of the private sector, particularly 
the business community.”205
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2.4.3. PECC 
Of all the unofficial regional organizations that have emerged in Asia Pacific in recent years, the 
most comprehensive and arguably the most important has been the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conference (PECC). Although, as its title suggests, the focus is on economic cooperation, it has proved to 
be a forum, and a network, for the consideration of many other matters of common interest and concern. 
Indeed, “since its beginnings in 1980s, the PECC has grown to become the most important forum where 
all pacific nations can gather to discuss common problems and policies.”206 A brief summary of its 
evolution in the 1980s will throw much light on both the possibilities of and the obstacles in the road to 
really meaningful all-regional cooperation in the vast Asia Pacific area.  
     PECC came into being largely as a result of the initiatives of some farseeing officials and scholars 
in Japan and Australia. Masayoshi Ohira deserves special recognition and credit. When he “began his 
final (and successful) struggle to become prime minister of Japan, he picked up the Pacific Basin 
Cooperation concept as one of the bold new ideas his administration would champion.”207 In March 1979, 
shortly after he became prime minister, he “appointed as one of his personal policy-advisory task forces 
the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group, ” headed by a leading Japanese economist and politician, Dr, 
Saburo Okita, who had also been active in PAFTAD and PBEC and later (after Okita become foreign 
minister) by Professor Tsuneo of Nagoya University. This study group examined the whole concept of 
Pacific cooperation, and the advantages and disadvantages, the possibilities and prospects of moving 
ahead with more comprehensive Asia Pacific cooperation. It submitted a preliminary report in November 
1979 and a final report in the following May.  
     While the study group recommended a rather cautious approach and did not suggest any specific 
organization form, it did point to the need to consider more comprehensive regional institutionalization, 
and it recommended that an international symposium be convened to consider the whole spectrum of 
issues and possibilities. 
     This idea appealed to Ohira, and he took concrete steps to secure its implementation. In January 
1980, during a visit to Australia, where extensive interest in Pacific cooperation had also been evidenced, 
he discussed the proposal of an international seminar with the Australian Prime Minister, Sir Malcolm 
Fraser, and suggested that Australia would be an appropriate venue for the proposed seminar. The two 
prime ministers then asked Dr. Okita and Sir John Crawford, then chancellor of Australian National 
University, to arrange the conference.  
The seminar was held in Canberra in September 1980. It was attended by tripartite 
delegations—one government official, participating in a “personal capacity,” one business leader, and one 
prominent scholar----from each of eleven countries, the five Pacific members of OECD (Japan, the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), the five ASEAN nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
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Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), and the Republic of Korea. In addition, a joint delegation from the 
Pacific island states (one each from Papua New Guinea, Fuji, and Tonga) participated. Representatives of 
several regional organizations, including PAFTAD, PBEC, and ADB (the Asian Development Bank), and 
a few officials and private citizens attended as observers.  
The Canberra seminar was a highlight of a growing number of Asia Pacific exchanges and 
meetings. It launched what soon came to be known as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference 
(PECC). “The seminar focused on the rationale, the format, and the agenda of a new consultative 
system------it recommended that ‘a standing committee of about twenty-five persons be established to 
coordinate an expansion of information exchange within the region and to set up Task Forces to undertake 
major studies on number of issues for regional cooperation.’ ” 208
     The basic decision to form a new and more comprehensive regional organization in Asia and the 
Pacific was made collectively at the Canberra seminar—henceforth identified as PECC I. There was still 
some uncertainty, however, whether its initiative and recommendations would be sufficient to overcome 
doubts about the advisability of such an organization, about its format and composition, and about the 
adequacy of the support base envisioned at Canberra. 
     The decision to make PECC an unofficial rather than an official organization, and the method for 
selecting representatives----tripartite delegations----seemed to meet with surprising approval. It was a 
novel method of selection and raised the question of whether the delegates would have sufficient 
influence to successfully launch the most comprehensive regional organization in the Asia Pacific area. 
The fact that this distinctive feature of tripartite representation has continued is testimony to the 
feasibility of the practice; but the further fact that governments are not directly represented, although for 
the most part they have been supportive, has raised questions regarding the centrality of PECC in the 
evolving movement toward Asia—Pacific cooperation. At the Canberra the absence of official 
government delegations from both the countries represented by “unofficial” delegates, and also those not 
represented at all in the seminar, was keenly felt throughout the deliberations. “The recommendations of 
the Canberra conference were not implemented immediately because of an implied need for official 
governmental endorsement and commitment.”209  
     How can we explain the Japanese government's initiative action in proposing the PECC Canberra 
seminar? After all, Japan is renowned for the thoroughness of its preparatory studies and preliminary 
soundings—its nemawashi. How could it have taken up the Pacific Basin so prematurely?  
     The answer seems to be in part found in the excessive zeal of Prime Minister Ohira to make his 
mark as a dynamic statesman. Like most Japanese prime ministers before him, he wanted to be 
remembered not only as a master politician, a man who held himself in office, but also a man of vision 
who advanced his country to a significant new position in the world.210 That position would have to be, he 
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felt, in close association with the West Economic flows, cultural interchange, and security requirements. 
But geographically and emotionally, Japan was centered in Asia, and its unique role, he felt, would have 
to be found in a new relationship with the lands of Asia and the Pacific. How to formulate this against the 
backdrop of Japan’s imperialist history and the contemporary environment of vast economic disparity was 
an issue nearly every prime minister had worked over in the postwar period. In 1977, his predecessor and 
archrival, Fukuda, had launched the Manila Doctrine, a statement of Pacific concern for the countries of 
Southeast Asia. Although heralded by the Fukuda administration as the first and historic step in Japan’s 
assertion of a new regional role, the doctrine in fact defined no role except in terms of aid and goodwill. 
The field was open, Ohira believed, for a more dramatic formulation.  
     At the same time, he had had enough personal experience in the Ministry of Finance and in a 
number of cabinet posts so as not to expect such a formulation to come from the bureaucracy. Most 
officials, he knew, focused their attention on day-to-day problems. New ideas took a very long time to 
percolate up through the bureaucracy, and when they did, most were so compromised into blandness as to 
lose their political appeal. He went, therefore, outside the bureaucracy to an imaginative old friend, 
Saburo Okita, and invited him to organize a study group of the brightest young minds he could find. It 
would appear that Ohira was influenced by the success of Watanabe and his private colleagues in devising 
plans for the Asian Development Bank and possibly of other elite groups of policy-oriented individuals 
who had played significant parts in proposing a variety of domestic policies.211
     Unfortunately for Ohira, once the ideas were roughed out by the study group, they were not picked 
up as had occurred in the earlier successful examples by the relevant government agencies, where they 
could be reexamined and refined into workable government policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for 
example, was committed to trying to see things as ASEAN saw them and was reluctant to take up a cause 
the ASEAN states were not championing. MITI could not see that a new Pacific structure would do 
anything but give the LDCs an enlarged scope for making greater demands on Japan. The main policy 
lines of the ministries were set, and no bureau within these ministries was so hungry for new activity as to 
see advantage in bucking these lines; nor did any entrepreneurial leader step forward to try to devise the 
concrete policy and build the consensus that substantial bureaucratic support would have required.  
     Okita was apparently identified for the entrepreneurial role. He was a person of wide experience in 
policy initiation, but in the early stages of the issue’s life cycle he was out of government, and in the final 
stages he was removed from active leadership by being appointed foreign minister. It may seem that this 
placed him in an extraordinarily strategic position from which to manage the agenda-setting process. 
Perhaps so, but it seems to have worked the other way around. He did, after all, come to the post from the 
outside and had only a small bureaucratic base within the ministry from which to operate. In many events, 
his attention thereafter was given to a host of other issues.  
     One other force might conceivably have stirred the bureaucracy to action: the media. The various 
communities of policy professionals engaged in the Pacific movement did indeed generate a flood of 
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papers and conferences, thereby giving a vigorous shake to the growing policy network. They did begin 
to attract media attention, particular with books like Tokuyama’s which heralded The Pacific Century, but 
a full-scale media “bloom,” sufficient to compel government action, failed to occur.  
     Thus, when the issue was brought to Prime Minister Ohira’s attention, it could hardly be said to 
have reached the “national agenda”. The media and the public were not clamoring for action, and the 
officials not only were not pushing it, they had not yet decided it was a good thing. This failure to enlist 
the bureaucracy’s support and expertise goes a long way in explaining how it was that the Japanese 
government’s proposal for a Canberra seminar was so vaguely stated. The prime minister wanted 
something to happen. The bureaucracy did not know what or why. It only knew it did not want Japan to 
be out in front. Small wonder that the seminar was confused by the Japanese standpoint. If the leading 
co-sponsor did not know what it wanted, why were the others there?  
 
2.5. Japan and Functional Regionalism: ADB as a Case Study 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1965-66 under the auspices of ECAFE. It 
began operations in December 1966. Its headquarters, with a large staff of some twenty hundred people, 
are in Manila. Its largest shareholders and contributors are Japan and the United States. During most of its 
existence each of these countries made equal contributions to the Asian Development Fund, administered 
by the ADB; but from 1980s contributions by the United States have decreased, while those by Japan 
have increased. Every president of the Bank has been a Japanese financier.  
 
2.5.1. ADB: A General Introduction 
     Presently ADB has sixty-one members.212 The World Bank, the Bank’s soft-loan affiliate, the 
International Development Association, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development 
Bank provide the bulk of the multilateral development assistance extended to the poorer countries of Asia 
and the Pacific. While is carries on a wide variety of programs, the main thrust of ADB has been 
increasingly on the provision of concessional loans for hundreds of projects in the least developed 
countries of the Asia-Pacific region. “ADB has become a major catalyst in promoting the development of 
the most populous and fastest growing region in the world today------The Bank’s operations cover the 
entire spectrum of economic development, with particular emphasis placed on agriculture, rural 
development, energy and social infrastructure.”213
     While the ADB is not quite as comprehensive in its mandate and programs as ESCAP, it is about as 
comprehensive in its membership, and it provides much more substantial assistance than ESCAP for the 
economic development of the poorer countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Like ESCAP, it has a number of 
non-regional members, which provide much of the financial support and have a major role in decision 
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making.  
In many respects ADB is probably more influential in the region than ESCAP, and could therefore be 
described as the most important official all-Asia pacific organization before the establishment of APEC. 
Like ESCAP, it works closely with national governments of the region, with member states outside of the 
region, with major subregional organizations, notably ASEAN, SAARC (South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation), and the South Pacific Forum, and with international organizations. 
 Japan was the moving force behind the creation of the ADB. The original concept for the 
institution came from a study group of financial sector leaders and retired officials. After extensive 
bureaucratic maneuvering, the Japanese government proposed the Bank’s creation, assuming that Tokyo, 
as the initiator and most powerful regional actor, would become the site of the Bank’s headquarters. To 
Japan’s surprise, under Philippine leadership, the other Asian states voted to establish the ADB 
headquarters in Manila. Despite Asian acceptance of the Japanese as president of the ADB, the 
headquarters' decision made the Japanese delegation realize that other Asians were not ready to acquiesce 
to Japan’s self-appointed leadership role in Asia simply on the basis of its economic accomplishments. In 
response, Tokyo developed a leadership style within the Bank that renounced national interest criteria in 
the formulation of ADB policy.’214
 
2.5.2. ADB as a Functional Regional Institution in Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy 
The Asian Development Bank represents the most intimate of Japan’s relationship with any 
international regime. Japan was a founding member, helped shape its by-laws, supplied all its presidents, 
and today still dispatches a large number of professional staff members, and serves as its principal 
financial pillar.  
Japan played an essential role in the establishment of the ADB and made an initial contribution to 
the ADB equal to the United States’ initial contribution. Many observers assert that the ADB is little more 
than a foreign-policy tool of Japan and that it is a key component of Japan’s overall strategy to gain 
prestige in the international system. But the fact is that Japan initially hesitated in supporting the original 
proposal for the ADB until the United States committed itself to the idea. 
Throughout the first two decades of the bank’s operations, the Japanese maintained a high-profile 
policy approach in the ADB.215 Tokyo’s high profile was unavoidable, given its prominence in top 
management, its financial contributions, its presence on the staff, and its large share of project 
procurement. Japan’s low-key policy was deliberately and consciously nonpolitical, befitting its general 
belief in the maintenance of the political neutrality of multilateral banks.  
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     Japan found the ADB useful for pursuing its policy goals in Asia.216 Tokyo increasingly focused on 
the potential role of the bank in contributing to the reconstruction of Cambodia. It also played a part in the 
resumption of lending to Vietnam (halted after Hanoi’s 1979 invasion of Cambodia), in bolstering the 
Filipino government of Cory Aquino after the 1986 fall of Ferdinand Marcos and in the changing status of 
India to borrower status in the ADB.217 Dennis Yasutomo analyzed Japan’s role in the ADB218, arguing 
that four factors spurred Japan’s efforts in active participating in the ADB: the development of a clearer 
conception of the ADB as a foreign policy tool in a new debt strategy; the desire for an increased vote 
share, reflecting Japan’s burgeoning financial support for the institution; the utility of the ADB for Japan’s 
Asia policy; and concern over the impact of a new American policy toward the bank. These policies 
paralleled Japanese bilateral efforts outside the ADB to support Cambodian reconstruction, induced 
Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia and focus on its domestic economy, channelled more than $1 billion 
worth of aid to Manila through the Multilateral Aid Initiative with the United States, and improved 
relations with the subcontinent through prime ministerial (Nakasone Yasuhiro and Kaifu Toshiki) visits to 
the region. 
     Japan-China relations in the ADB have been a good case of Japan using the ADB to pursue its own 
goal in the region. Tokyo initiated aid to China in 1979, and China became the largest recipient of 
bilateral Japanese ODA in the 1980s. Japan responded to overtures from China in the early 1980s on ADB 
membership by strongly supporting ADB President Fujioka Masao’s efforts to bring China into the bank 
without ousting Taiwan. Fujioka’s memoirs mention the frequent high-level consultations with Japanese 
Finance and Foreign Ministry officials during his shuttle diplomacy.219 Fujioka consistently stopped in 
Tokyo on his way to and from Beijing and Taipei, at one point even requesting that a Foreign Ministry 
China specialist be seconded to the ADB.220
Japan’s participation in the ADB resulted in greater self-confidence and a clearer direction in the 
bank. It engaged in political activism to pursue its national interests in Asia, to preserve tranquility in the 
bank as well as to support and to moderate America’s façade for the increased politicization of Japan’s 
ADB and Asia policy. 
     “Multilateral organizations are an extension of Japan’s regional burden-sharing approach to 
international responsibilities.”221 Since Japan considers its global political reach limited beyond Asia, its 
growing weight in multilateral institutions provides opportunities to participate indirectly in a global 
agenda-setting and rule-making role. They compensate for its lack of knowledge, confidence, and 
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experience in the international politics of non-Asian corners of the world, and they supplement Japan’s 
nonmilitary diplomatic resources.  
Yasutomo also argues Japan’s ADB policy serves as its regional economic integration policy. The 
ADB provides an inviting forum for activism in numerous ways: 
     --ADB allows policy articulation and serves as a conduit for national policies. It serves as Japan’s 
sounding board and policy tool for its Asia policy and debt strategy.  
     --ADB legitimizes controversial policies, helping Japan to share the risks and the blame. It 
provided a nonpolitical cloak and the Houston G-7 summit was a multilateral cover for the controversial 
resumption of aid to China. 
     --ADB allows Japan to fulfill international responsibilities as a nonmilitary power. It only requires 
financial assistance, personal, technical assistance, and moral support and does not require Japan to 
contribute military aid.  
     --ADB enhances national resources. Japan may be the largest creditor nation, but it is still plagued 
by large national budget deficits. The ADB can, therefore, pool member nation’s resources and provide 
more bang for the buck/yen. 
     --ADB compensates for Japan’s diplomatic shortcomings. Japan may be an Asian nation, but the 
ADB fills the many gaps in policy makers’ knowledge about Asian development problems.  
     --ADB allows globalization without sacrificing Asia. Through a global division of labor and burden 
sharing, Japan can remain the predominant supporter of Asia’s bank, thus fulfilling both international as 
well as regional responsibilities.  
     --ADB allows greater independence within an American policy framework. Japan remains basically 
supportive of, but not necessarily subordinate to, American policy interests. Japan seems increasingly 
willing to follow its own course, whether challenging the U.S. through a vote share increase in the ADB.  
     --ADB enhances national prestige. It has a demonstratative effect, whereby Japan can demonstrate 
that it is a good regional and world citizen. There is no question that the ADB in general is attractive to 
Japan because of their ability to heighten the nation’s stature.  
Doner argues Japan’s policy toward the ADB, by saying that ‘two other features of Japan’s 
initiatives in regional institution merit note. One is the extensive role, in some cases the initiative, of the 
Japanese private sector. The other is the process through which Japan seems to have learned to operate as 
first among equals in a loose kind of multilateralism.  
 
2.6, Arguments on Japan in Asia Pacific Regionalism 1960s-1980s 
The 1960s and 1970s’ Japanese foreign economic policy adjustment reflected its search for a new 
role in the world and in the region. The postwar Japan foreign economic policy was marked by protection 
all most in all areas. But since the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japan’s foreign economic policies have a 
distinctly more international character than the mercantilist caste they carried in the first two decades or 
so after the war. It is essential to note that Japan’s protectionist stars have been changing very steadily. 
This adjustment was in line with regime theory: any nation’s foreign economic policy reflects an 
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interaction between domestic and international pressures—both political and economic. With the 
fluctuation of the global economic system caused by huge imbalance, the frequent use of unilateral 
measures by the United States, and the dramatic increase of FDI by Japanese enterprises in the Asian 
economies since the mid-1970s, Japan began to pay more attention to regional arrangements as 
instruments to enhance the global system, to moderate pressures from Washington, and to enhance the 
industrial infrastructure of the Asia countries. 
For Japan’s status in international regimes, Inoguchi asserts that Japan is a supporter, not a leader, 
a spoiler or free rider, although other images are no less widely held. This is a good starting-point to 
understand Japan’s role in international regimes. Inoguchi also argues that both international and 
domestic pressures and impediments exist on Japan’s role in regional economic integration and in 
international regimes. The pressures and impediments both domestically and internationally make Japan 
difficult to be a proper role in international regimes, this led Japan’s participation in international regimes 
like a zigzag course. 
Hellmann argues that the first imperative regarding Japan and the Asia Pacific  
region is to see them in a global, regional and historical context rather than a bilateral and a historical 
perspective. The second imperative is to delineate the unique economic and political legacies of the Cold 
War era. Japan emerged from the Cold War without a security policy beyond dependence on the United 
States, even while it had become the world’s largest creditor and biggest dispenser of foreign aid, world 
leader in many high technology industries, the preeminent international economic force in the world’s 
fastest growing region, and the major overseas partner of the United States.222
S Javed Maswood analyzes Japanese foreign policy and regionalism and argues that, “in the 
post-war period, Japan’s regional involvement was not extensive but this is now in a process of transition. 
Besides regional initiatives to engage Japan as an active player, Japan's foreign policy also displayed 
attempts to play a constructive regional role. This transition can be attributed to several factors, including 
the end of the Cold War, domestic political reforms within Japan and regional developments. There have 
been important developments in domestic politics within Japan, such as the decimation of the socialist left 
and resurgence of conservative political parties. Electoral and administrative reform agendas have also 
realigned the powers of the administrative elite and political leaders”.223 T.J. Pempel looks at domestic 
political changes to trace the potential impact on foreign policy. He argues that the changes reflect a 
‘regime shift’ in Japan but while he does not anticipate a major shift in foreign policy patterns, he does 
expect Japan to play an increased role in Asia subject to the constraints of global interests.224
Funabashi states Japan’s regional strategy, as ‘Japan must not delude itself into believing that its 
identity can be developed in purely regional terms, its economy sustained in the Asian bloc, and its 
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political ambitions fulfilled in integration in the area. Yet Japan must have its regional strategy. Its region 
must not be confined to Asia, particularly East Asia, but must be widened to encompass the Asia Pacific 
rim, including the United States. Its objective is to keep the region open, peaceful, and democratic. 
Regionalism thus understood can be called ‘Pacific globalism’. In the coming years, Japan’s strategy for 
Pacific globalism consists of three important pillars: 
1, To promote economic growth and development as well as liberalize and multilateralize trade 
and investment in the region. 
2, To enhance the peacekeeping and peace-building mechanism and measures in the region by 
maximizing U.S. commitment and engagement. 
3, To incorporate the rapidly changing Socialist countries (the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and 
North Korea) into the region as responsible players in the region.225   
Funabashi says that the problem for Japan’s regional strategy lies in Japan itself.226 He analyzes 
Japan’s regional purpose: as for economic liberalization in the region, Japan can sustain and reinvigorate 
U.S. global interests and position by infusing the emerging Pacific globalism (e.g., a new and strong 
interest in propelling the Uruguay Round of the APEC countries) into the aging Atlanticist globalism in 
place since the days of the Atlantic Charter. By doing so, Japan can play a constructive role in deterring 
European and North American regionalism from becoming exclusivist and can create a favorable milieu 
in which to integrate the Soviet Union and China into the region. It also can mitigate the thrusts toward 
inward-looking and nationalistic action in Asian countries as well as the call for a restrictive and close 
regional grouping.227
Funabashi also asserts that ‘restraint of regional strategy’ is one the main Japan’s regional strategy. 
He explains the reasons, by that ‘the bankruptcy of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere resulted 
in a profound political and psychological inhibition, affecting Japan’s postwar strategy. Whenever Japan 
tried to assert itself and assume leadership in the region, it was reminded of its guilt in the postwar era by 
repeated warnings from Asian leaders about Japan’s ‘new ambition’ and reference to ‘a step toward 
becoming a military giant. Japan’s reluctance and resistance to formulating a regional strategy and the 
heavy dependence of its economic expansion on the United States and world trade have made Japan one 
of the few countries in the modern world with truly global interests.228 ’ Regionalism was regarded as a 
tainted word both politically and economically. It was bad politics and bad economics because it implied 
political domination by an ambitious hegemonic power and a bloc economy that threatened to destroy the 
free trade system. Japan’s diversification of its export markets, especially its dependence on the US 
market, unlike the concentration on Asian markets in prewar days, encouraged Japan to devote itself to 
engaging in the global but US-led multilateral economic framework.  
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Ravenhill notices Japan’s contradictions in regional economic cooperation, and argues that outside 
pressure plays an important role in Japan’s policymaking toward regional economic integration--‘a 
second factor often identified as contributing to a change in governments’ attitude towards regionalism is 
the demonstration effort of regionalism elsewhere.  
On the domestic scene, Japanese politics have long been contentious. Scandals, factional 
infighting and power struggles have consumed much of the politicians’ energy. The political leadership is 
extremely vulnerable and inefficient. The country is thus left to the well-trained bureaucrats. The 
bureaucrats are good at administrative work but do not have political power. In the international arena, the 
Japanese standpoint as expressed by the politicians are, in most cases, not taken seriously.229 Drifte 
stresses the importance of Japan’s bureaucracy in Japan’s foreign policy making, by that ‘the bureaucracy 
in all advanced industrialized countries has a built-in strength accruing from its hold on specialized 
information and from its long office-holding compared with politicians and often even with business. The 
bureaucracy acquired particular strength in the postwar period because of a long tradition of state control 
and the continuity of personnel between the war-planning era and the immediate postwar economic 
catch-up era.230 In the postwar era many links developed between bureaucrats, politicians and business 
due to the skilful exploitation of social network links, provision of the jobs for bureaucrats after early 
retirement by private and public companies, frequent moves between bureaucracy and the political world, 
and a pervasive attitude of give-and-take which also provided on the negative side an ideal soil for 
corruption on a wide scale.’231
Kiichi Saeki, deputy president of the Institute for International Policy Studies gives the answer of 
Japan’s policy change in 1960s: Japanese interests.232 He lists these main interests: regional security, 
economic relations, strategic arrangement, China factor, etc.233  
 
2.7, Conclusion: Japan in Asia Pacific Regionalism 1960s-1980s 
In the 1960s, with becoming the No.2 economic power in the world, Japan found its interests in 
Asia Pacific region increasing. From then on, Japan’s foreign policy was constantly shifting, and Japan 
was searching for its role in the region.  
Japan’s policy-changes towards regional economic cooperation in the 1960s reflect its interests. 
These main interests include: regional security, economic relations, strategic arrangement, the China 
factor, etc. Japan was becoming active in Asia Pacific regionalism. 
Though many observers notice Japan’s main foreign policy makers are politicians, bureaucracy and 
the business, and argue that the complicated relations among these three policymakers resulted from lack 
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of strong political leadership. But as a matter of fact, the Japanese interests in the region are a top priority 
and there are strong bureaucrats in different ministries, and the policy-making process is very simple and 
consistent: this follows the best choice for Japanese interests.  
For Japan, 1960s-1980s was a getting active process in Asia Pacific regionalism. Before the 
establishment of APEC, between the 1960s and 1980s, the question of organizing the “Pacific 
Community” through the establishment of an official-regional organization had been much discussed in 
Japan, and with only limited results. PAFTAD, PBEC, PECC and ADB were the main organizations, and 
Japan played an important role in each. Japan was the main builder of the larger regional institutions. 
As a functional institution, ADB was built up on the cooperation of Japan and the US, and Japan 
has played a main role in ADB. Japan found the ADB useful to pursue its policy goals in Asia and the 
region, and ADB was a successful example of functional regionalism in Japan’s regional polices.  
Though “Open Regionalism” had not been brought up between 1960s and the mid-1980s, the 
Japanese defined their role in this respect as shaping a Pacific economic community in an open 
multilateral form, which would create a zone of prosperity with free trade, and rolling back the 
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Having risen as a big economic giant and experienced primary regionalism in the Asia Pacific 
region between the 1960s and 1970s, Japan was expected to have more say on international and regional 
issues in the 1980s.234
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the highest-level governmental organization in 
the Asia Pacific region, was established in 1989. From its modest beginning as an informal 
Ministerial-level dialogue group with 12 members, APEC has become a regional forum, especially with 
the introduction of the annual informal Economic Leaders Meeting in 1993.235  
APEC is even more important to Japan. As the role that the Asia-Pacific region plays in the world 
economy in the 21st century expands, Japan views APEC as the central forum for cooperation in working 
                                                  
234  Lim, 2008, p.201. 
235 These are also called APEC’s two pillars. At its beginning period, APEC expressed that it has 
three pillars—liberalization, facilitation and development. After 1996, APEC’s pillars are also 
called Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation (TILF) and Economic and Technical 
Cooperation (ECOTECH). So, someone says APEC has two pillars, while others say APEC has 
three pillars. It does not matter, because its contents are same.  
 70
towards the economic development of the Asia-Pacific region.236
The APEC process in 1980s-1990s can be divided into three periods: 1989-1992; 1993-1996; 1997 
onwards, a division which is widely accepted by scholars.237 For APEC, 1989-1992 was a period of 
searching for its individual role in regional economic cooperation. Japan was similarly searching for a 
policy towards APEC and its role in APEC. 1993-1996 was the ‘golden age of APEC’ during which Bogor 
Declaration and Osaka Agenda (OAA) issued in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Japan’s reaction towards 
Bogor Goal (The leaders of the 18 member economies of APEC gathered at Bogor Palace in Indonesia in 
November 1994 and issued the Bogor Declaration, in which they made a commitment to achieving the goal 
of free and open trade and investment by no later than 2020, even if serious conflict on this issue has taken 
place. The pace of implementation will take into account the differing levels of economic development 
among APEC economies, with the industrialized economies achieving the goal of free and open trade and 
investment no later than the year 2010 and developing economies no later than the year 2020.)238 and 
Japan’s effort to OAA were some key events of Japan’s policy towards APEC this time. After the Asian 
Crisis in 1997 and the failure of the EVSL program  in 1997-98, the APEC process was slowing down and 
APEC was losing its previous prestige.  
Between the 1980s and the 1990s, APEC was the main achievement and regional institution of Asia 
Pacific regionalism. The entire APEC process, including its establishment, structure, activities and 
principles, APEC’s two pillars-Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation (TILF) and Economic 
and Technological Cooperation (ECOTECH)239-had been heavily shaped by Japan and its interaction with 
its main partners. Thus, APEC was a very good place for reflecting every member’s strategy towards 
regional economic cooperation, including Japan’s. Japan’s participation in the APEC process hints some 
implication of its strategy towards regional economic cooperation. 
This chapter will initially review the new regionalism in the Asia Pacific region since the 1980s and 
assess Japan’s contribution in creating APEC. This will be followed by an examination of the APEC 
process and Japan’s policy toward APEC. The discussion will then focus on two specific issue—Japan’s 
commitment to APEC TILF in the context of its FTA strategy and Japan’s commitment to APEC Ecotech 
in the context of its ODA strategy. After reviewing scholars’ arguments about Japan’s role in APEC, the 
analysis will conclude with an assessment of Japan in APEC between the 1980s and the1990s.  
 
3.1, New Regionalism in the Asia Pacific and Japan’s Contribution  
to the Establishment of APEC 
                                                  
s236  Kono, Yohei, Japan’  Role in Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation, Tokyo: Speech at the  
  Japan National Press Club, July 28, 1995. 
  Kono was the then Japanese Foreign Minister. Speech available from: 
  http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/1995/index.html  
237 Pascha, Werner, ‘Japan’s Role in APEC: Wavering or Leading From Behind?’ in Jurgen 
Ruland, Eva Manske and Werner Draguhn, 2002, p.155. 
238  APEC, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994, Singapore: APEC, 1995, pp.131-133. 
239 APEC’s Two Pillars are also called Two Wheels. Sometimes, they are also divided and called 
as three pillars as trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation and ECOTH.  
 71
The growth of interdependence among the region increases the incentives for regional economic 
collaboration among governments. A rise in interdependence increases the number of problems requiring 
inter-state collaboration for efficient and successful resolution. Increased interdependence may also make 
governments more aware of the transaction costs that closer collaboration could help overcome. In the 
Asia Pacific region in the 1980s, the growth of interdependence not only changed governments’ attitudes 
towards regional collaboration but also had a profound effect on their thinking about the shape that the 
region should take.  
 
3.1.1, New Regionalism in the Asia Pacific Region 
For both theorists and practitioners the old regionalism of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s focused 
on Western Europe. This region has become the largest and most powerful “trading bloc” in the world. 
North America was also a more important participant in the regionalism in 1980s.  
From the 1980s, the Asia Pacific region was experiencing regionalism, in forms and to a degree that 
places the area in the spotlight of worldwide attention, just as Western Europe was in the spotlight when 
regionalism seemed to be an exciting development in regional cooperation and in international relations 
generally. 
The significant change in trade, investment, and assistance patterns has been under way for at least 
2 decades, and it seems to be gathering momentum. As early as 1981 “more than half the trade of East 
Asia and other Pacific economies-was with other countries of the region.”240 This interregional trade was 
assuming impressive dimensions. “Asian neighbors already export more manufactured goods to Japan 
than the U. S. does. Japan’s total trade with Asian countries, even excluding China, now exceeds that with 
America.”241
     The share of trade that Asia Pacific states conducted with other states in the region rose 
substantially in the 1980s (Table 3-1). By the end of the decade, intra-regional trade in the Asia Pacific, 
defined as the APEC 15, approached the levels prevailing in the European Community. This increase in 
trade interdependence occurred even though few preferential agreements exist to encourage trade between 
economies in the region, and none were in force throughout the region.  
 
Table 3-1 Interdependence among Asia Pacific economies*: 
                     Intra- trade as a share of total trade (%) 
 
Year      1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Share     56.9   58.9  60.1   63.0  65.3   66.4  66.6   67.5   68.0  68.5 
*Asia Pacific economies include ASEAN 6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand), Australia, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Chinese Taipei and the US.  
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Source: IMF Directions of Trade data 
Accessed through the International Economic Data Bank, ANU 
 
     Two factors contributed significantly to the increase in intra-regional trade. The first was the 
growing importance of the US market for East Asian exports during the global recession of the first half 
of the 1980s, a development encouraged by the overvaluation of the US dollar. The second was the rapid 
growth of FDI, first from Japan and then from Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan, and into Southeast 
Asia in the second half of the decade. These rapid movements were driven by the desire of companies in 
Northeast Asia to relocate some of their manufacturing activities in response to the rapid appreciation of 
their domestic currencies following the Plaza Accord, by a substantial increase in the costs of labor and 
land in the home country, and by pressures from the United States on Northeast Asian governments to 
reduce their balance of trade surpluses.  
     Moreover, the economic openness (foreign trade as a percentage of GDP) increased from the 1970s. 
As Table 3-2 shows, it increased significantly for all economies apart from Indonesia over the course of 
the 1980s, especially in the last years of the decade. Liberalization brought the desired move towards 
more export-oriented economies. Inevitably, the greater export orientation of the economies changed the 
political economy of trade policy. More locally based interests, including many of the newly established 
subsidiaries of Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese companies, supported a liberal trade regime. Their 
motives, in some instances, was not only because trade liberalization would provide access to less 
expensive components and inputs, but because companies were concerned about the access of their 
products to foreign markets, a concern heightened by the increased US resort to bilateralism in its trade 
relations with East Asian economies.  
Even the political environment has generally improved, especially because of growing regional and 
international political cooperation, the growing contacts between Communist and non-Communist 
countries, and, between political entities that have long refused to deal in any cooperative way with each 
other.    
Table 3-2 Openness of Asia Pacific economies 1970s-1980s  
(foreign trade as a percentage of GDP) 
 
                        1970      1975      1980      1985      1989      
Australia                 29        29        34        35        35     
Canada                  43        47         55        54        51      
Chile                     29        53         50       54        66       
China                     5        10         13        24        25     
Hong Kong               181       164       181       209       255     
Indonesia                 28        44        53        43        46         
Japan                    20         26        28        26        20     
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Korea                     37        64        74        67        63      
Mexico                    15        15         24       26        32      
Malaysia                  80        87        113       105        140     
New Zealand              48        55         62        64         53     
Philippines                43        48         52        46         59     
PNG                      72        86         97        95         93    
Singapore                 225       289        423       318        368    
Thailand                  34        41          54        49         72    
USA                       11        16         21         18         21     
Source: World Bank data  
Accessed through the International Economic Data Bank, ANU 
 
3.1.2, Japan’s Contribution to the Establishment of APEC 
The concept of Pacific Basin cooperation was first brought to prominence in 1979 by Japanese 
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. In his inaugural speech in November 1978 Ohira advocated “the Pacific 
Basin Cooperation Concept” as one of his basic policy directions.242  He repeated his idea in his Diet 
session speech on January 25, 1979 and elaborated it further: “I consider it my obligation to promote 
further friendly and cooperative relations with the U.S., Canada, Latin America, Australia, New Zealand, 
and other countries in the Pacific region.”243 In March 1979 Ohira appointed a special advisory group to 
study and work on “the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept.” His appointment of the chairman of this 
group, Mr. Saburo Okita, to be his foreign minister, demonstrates how much importance Mr. Ohira 
attached to his concept. Made up primarily of scholars, the group submitted a report on the theoretical 
basis and practical implications of the concept in 1980. Largely based on the report, Ohira discussed the 
concept with the Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser in the same year when he visited Australia. 
With the support of these two Pacific leaders, PECC was established in 1980.244
     Ohira’s successor, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, was more equivocal in his support for the Pacific 
Basin concept. On the one hand, it can be pointed out that in his general policy of following his 
predecessor rather faithfully, Suzuki was greatly interested in the continuation of the “Pacific Basin 
Cooperation Concept.” He sent a delegation including Professor Tsuneo Iida, successor to Mr. Okita as 
chairman of the cooperation concept study group, and others to an international seminar on the Pacific 
Basin cooperation in Canberra in September 1980, as promised by Mr. Ohira. On the other hand, Suzuki 
failed to include the term “Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept” in his Diet speech in August 1980.245 In 
an interview with Asian correspondents prior to his trip to ASEAN countries, Suzuki stated that the 
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245  Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), October 27, 1980. 
 74
“Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept” must be promoted by a voluntary rise of support for this idea.246  
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has an even ambitious policy about the concept of Pacific Basin 
Cooperation.247 He has also recognized the new Asian Pacific era by observing, in his summer 1983 
Journal of International Affairs essay, that civilizations have extended their frontiers from the 
Mediterranean to the Atlantic and from the Atlantic now to the Pacific.248
In his late January 1988 trip to Washington, Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita learned from Senate 
Majority Leader Robert Byrd and others of the keen interest brewing in the United States for a possible 
FTA with Japan and other Asian Pacific economies. Upon his return, Takeshita ordered Shinji Fukukawa, 
then MITI’s vice minister, to study the subject, setting the stage for the Study Group for Asia Pacific 
Trade Development, directed by MITI’s then-director general of the International Economic Affairs 
Department, Yoshihiro Sakamoto.  
Initially, MITI feared that a strong Japanese push for regional cooperation would stimulate a 
backlash by its Asian neighbors. The first MITI proposal for an official Asian Pacific organization came 
in early 1987 when the then MITI minister Hajime Tamura proposed a ministerial-level consultative body 
to discuss economic trends and cooperation among Japan, Australia, Canada, the United States, and New 
Zealand. Almost immediately, Tamura’s proposal encountered almost immediate opposition from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which feared that Japanese activism, given the legacy of World War II, might 
damage Japan’s image in the region. While the Tamura initiative was unsuccessful, global and regional 
development pushed MITI to reconsider the idea of Asia Pacific economic cooperation the following year. 
A strong impetus for following through with the idea came with a report from an industrial research at 
JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization). MITI official Hirokazu Okumura, based in Sydney, was one 
of MITI’s seconded ‘ninjas’ charged with traveling around Asia to collect information and assess local 
opinions. During a trip to Singapore in early 1988, Okumura learned of a US proposal to extend bilateral 
free trade agreements into the region.249 Okumura pressed MITI to move ahead with an Asia Pacific 
forum to counter these efforts and specifically urged Japan to work with Australia.  
    Sakamoto’s panel issued an interim report that recommended the creation of an Asia Pacific 
economic forum to avert the division of the world economy into competing regional blocs. The so-called 
Sakamoto Report recognized the critical state of the world economy, paying particular attention to the 
ramifications of the overriding need of the United States to complete the lengthy process of reducing its 
twin budget and trade deficits. It argued the following points: 
-----The region’s economic and trade structure should be changed from ‘development  
through US dependency’ to ‘development through role-sharing cooperation in the  
region.’ 
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-----The OECD model of rigid organization is not tenable in the Asia Pacific, which requires a forum that 
would allow for greater diversity. Any new effort toward economic cooperation must smoothly 
relate to existing regional forums such as ASEAN, operate by consensus, progress gradually, and 
remain open to other region. 
-----To promote the above ideas, Japan must expand its imports, increase its FDI in the region, and 
support regional human resources development.250  
 
Tactically, Sakamoto concluded that Japan should approach Australia about taking public leadership 
for the forum because of Australia’s non-threatening nature and interest in building broader ties with both 
Asia and North America. Sakamoto himself had stayed in Sydney on loan to JETRO where he acquired 
an appreciation for the role Australia could play in the region.251 The decision to approach Australia was 
opportune because of the country’s simultaneous reexamination of a regional economic forum.  
     MITI had difficulty persuading the MOFA to support MITI’s initiative. At that time, the MOFA 
suspected that MITI’s support for US inclusion was a ploy to strengthen MITI’s prominence within the 
bureaucracy. However, after MITI’s minister, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka became foreign minister in the new 
cabinet of Sosuke Uno in June 1989, the situation favored MITI. Mitsuzuka, a strong supporter of the 
regional initiative, was able to overcome resistance within MOFA during the critical months leading up to 
the September senior officials’ meeting (SOM) in Canberra.  
     With the United States generally hostile to the establishment of regional-wide collaboration in the 
Asia Pacific before the 1980s,252 all the major initiatives for the institutionalization of Asia Pacific 
cooperation from the mid-1960s onwards came mainly from Japanese academics, who acted in close 
association with the Japanese government, and in collaboration with their counterparts in Australia. The 
origins of this cooperation lie in the Agreement on Commerce between the Commonwealth of Australia 
and Japan, signed in Hakone on 6 July 1957. The agreement owed much to two factors that have 
consistently driven the push for closer inter-state collaboration in the Pacific. One was defensive: a fear of 
the consequences of protectionism elsewhere in the world economy. The second was the desire to manage 
the challenges of, and take advantage of the opportunities provided by increasing economic 
interdependence, in this instance driven by Japan’s rapid economic growth and reindustrialization.  
     The Australian and Japanese economists who participated in the policy-making process had various 
shared interests across the two economies, a perception shared by the two governments.253 Both feared 
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that the establishment of the European Community would raise new barriers to their exports. Australia 
faced the loss of its preferred access to its traditional major market should the United Kingdom eventually 
join the European Community. And Japan, whose exports to Europe had already been adversely affected 
by European refusal to grant Japanese goods MFN status despite Japan’s accession to GATT, faced 
additional barriers to its burgeoning exports of textiles.254 Governments in both countries saw themselves 
as ‘outsiders’ to the ‘region’, and as having the capacity to play a bridging role between East and West. 
Collaboration in the promotion of regionalism would be a means of integrating the two countries with 
Asia—and not just on the economic dimension. Mutuality of interest extended to a new division of labor 
in the Pacific based on ‘natural complementarities’. Australia would be the quarry to supply the raw 
materials to fuel Japan’s industrialization drive.  
      Australia was home to several of the most active members of the PAFTAD and PECC 
communities. The APEC proposal was consistent with ideas that had emerged from a group of influential 
economies, many of whom had combined academic and public service careers led by Stuart Harris. Their 
views were influential in the trade policy bureaucracy and shaped Australian attitudes on the form that 
APEC should take and the role it should play. 
     In August 1988, MITI presented the Sakamoto Report to Australian officials to broach the first 
official exchange of views between the two governments. The first real contact between the Japanese and 
Australian APEC initiative was in December 1988, when Muraoka met with Australia’s Minister of 
Negotiations Michael Duffy in Montreal. According to Muraoka, Duffy was receptive to Japan’s plans 
and was particularly intrigued by Japan’s offer to give Australia full credit for the initiative. Muraoka 
recalled that he answered in the affirmative when Duffy asked, ‘You recommend that Australia should 
take a lead for the meeting? Is Japan truly satisfied with its second-fiddle role?’255  
     Masakazu Toyoda, then on the MITI trade policy planning staff and the leading author of the 
Sakamoto Report, said that Australia’s fear of being unilaterally pressured into entering into a free trade 
pact made it particularly useful as a partner for Japan in developing the APEC concept.256 Australian 
diplomat Geoff Brenan shared a similar analysis of the external origins of the drive for APEC: ‘it was not 
just the idea; it was the timing of the idea.’257   
Meanwhile, the Japanese and Australian initiative to establish a wide regional organization met 
with the US’s policy change towards Pacific economic cooperation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 
the latter half of the 1980s, one significant development was the increasing resortion of the United States 
to unilateralism in its trade relations. Congresional concern about trade imbalances with Northeast Asian 
economies, and a perception that Japan, Korea and Taiwan in particular were ‘free riders’ in a liberal 
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global economy underwritten by the United States, pressured an increasingly receptive administration to 
retaliate against perceived unfair practices. By the late 1980s, the US administration appeared to have ‘an 
irrepressible propensity to place restrictions on its imports’. US unilateralism was not confined to 
protecting its domestic market, however. After 1985, using section 301 of the Trade Act and the ‘super 
301’ amendment introduced in 1988, the administration actively sought to prise open markets perceived 
as unfairly closed to US exports.  
     American administrations were slow to warm to the APEC concept. Together with Japanese 
continuous initiatives and Australian’s enthusiasm and US’s policy change with regards to the Pacific, the 
Pacific Economic Cooperation concept matured.   
    In January 1989, in a meeting in Seoul with President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea, Mr. Hawke, 
the prime minister of Australia, proposed the establishment of some structured form of regional economic 
cooperation on the governmental level. In April, Hawke’s special envoy, Richard Woolcott, visited nine 
countries—all the ASEAN 6 countries, South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand—to solicit their 
cooperation in setting up an Asia-Pacific economic organization. In May Mr. Woolcott also visited the 
United States, Canada, and China to explore the possibility of securing their agreement to join the 
proposed new organization. Australia, and possibly South Korea, might be the sponsors (Woolcott used 
the term “catalysts”). They would be more generally acceptable in this role than the economic giants of 
the Asia Pacific region, Japan and the United States.258
    After this sounding out of opinion in major Asia Pacific states, and after the leaders of the ASEAN 
countries had agreed to attend an “exploratory” meeting to discuss the Australian prime minister’s 
proposal, the government of Australia invited twelve countries to send high-level representatives to a 
conference in Canberra in early November 1989 to consider Mr. Hawke’s all-regional proposal and its 
possible implementation. The twelve countries were the six ASEAN nations, Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. Mr. Hawke had originally suggested that the 
founding members of his proposed organization be limited to East and Southeast Asia and the Southwest 
Pacific, thus excluding Canada and the United States; but Mr. Woolcott soon discovered that most of the 
countries he visited, except Thailand and Malaysia, favored the inclusion of the United and Canada, 
“largely to avoid the perception that this was the beginning of a closed bloc.”259
     All of the states invited to the Canberra conference accepted the invitation. It was, in the words of 
Daniel Sneider, a staff writer of the Christian Science Monitor, “a moment rich in historical portent.” The 
conference, formally called the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, was “the first 
Cabinet-level meeting of virtually all the major free market economies of the Pacific Rim.” Mr. Sneider 
gave a concise summary of differing evaluations and differing attitudes toward the new venture: 
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     For some, it marks the emergence of the Pacific century, the shift of the economic and political 
center of gravity in the world from Europe and the Atlantic to Asia and the Pacific.  
     For others, the gathering is a sign of growing economic rivalry, of rising protectionism, and the 
division of the world into warring economic blocs in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. 
     And there are those who dismiss the possibility of this new grouping as an impossible dream, try to 
wed nations separated by the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean and by widely diverse cultures.260
 
The ASEAN representatives at the conference made it plain that they considered the meeting an 
“exploratory” one, not involving any further commitment on their part. Obviously Prime Minister Hawke 
and some of the other sponsors had larger goals in mind. The group was so diverse that the best that could 
be hoped for was slow progress in mutually agreed-upon directions. The conference participants 
discussed the possible shape of the proposed new all-regional organization, its membership, and the 
follow-up steps that should be taken. They agreed to meet annually, at least in the initial stages. At a 
preliminary meeting in September the ASEAN representatives had offered to host the second meeting, 
sometime in 1990, and South Korea’s representatives made a similar offer for the third. The conference 
agenda also covered “several other major items, including global trade liberalization, and regional 
cooperation on issues such as investment, technology transfer, human resource development, and 
environmental protection”261—all of which had often been considered at other Asia Pacific forums of a 
less comprehensive nature.  
As Funabashi stated, APEC was born out of fear—fear of a unilateralist or isolationist America, fear 
of a balkanization of the world into competing economic blocs, and fear of the potential death of the 
GATT-centered world trading system.262 It was no coincidence that the strongest initiatives for APEC’s 
founding came from Japan and Australia. Both countries faced similar threats from the emerging forces at 
the end of the Cold War. Both nations also traditionally relied politically, militarily, and economically on 
the United States, making them especially vulnerable to an aggressive or inward-focused America. The 
two nations were highly trade-dependent as well and would share the benefits of the GATT system more 
than most of their trading partners. The fact that neither was a member of any regional bloc made the 
prospect of a failure of the GATT round even more dangerous.  
    The establishment of APEC may well be the “beginning” of “what is sure to be a long and difficult 
path toward creating a new force in the world.”263 It reflected the economic interdependence among the 
region. As discussed in chapter 2, in 1989, the interdependence among APEC economies increased from 
56.9% in 1980 to 68.5% in 1989. Moreover, the economic openness (foreign trade as a percentage of 
GDP) increased from the 1970s to 1990s, as Table 3-1 shows.  
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Table 3-3 Openness of APEC economies 1970s-1990s  
(foreign trade as a percentage of GDP) 
 
                  1970   1975   1980   1985   1989   1992   1995    
Australia            29    29     34     35     35     38      40 
Canada              43    47     55     54     51     54      71  
Chile                29    53     50     54     66     58      54  
China                5     10     13     24     25     32      40 
Hong Kong          181   164    181    209    255    281     297 
Indonesia            28    44     53     43     46     53      53      
Japan               20    26     28     26     20     18      17 
Korea               37    64     74     67     63     59      67 
Mexico              15    15     24     26     32     30      48 
Malaysia             80    87     113    105    140    154     194 
New Zealand         48    55     62     64     53     61      62 
Philippines           43    48     52     46     59     63      80  
PNG                72    86     97     95     93     94      106 
Singapore           225   289    423    318    368    324     n.a. 
Thailand             34    41     54     49     72     77      90 
USA                 11    16     21     18     21     22      24    
Source: World Bank data accessed through the International Economic Data Bank, ANU 
 
 
APEC 21 members occupied an important role in world economy, as Table 3-4 shows. 
Table 3-4 APEC member economies: basic data, 1990 
 
      GDP     Population  Real GDP  Economic Openness:   Area  Int’l Reserves 
      (US$, bn  (million)    (per capita  (trade as % GDP)      thousand   (US$ bn) 
     current)               1985 US$)                      sq km) 
Australia     282     17          14,445      34.9               7,713     19.3 
Brunei       5.5      0.3        --          --                   6       --  
Canada      548     27.8        17,173       51.3               9,976     23.5 
Chile        28.5    13.2         4,338       65.5               757      6.8 
China        356   1,140        1,324       26.8               9,561     34.5 
Hong Kong   74.8    5.7         14,849      260                1      -- 
Indonesia     109    178         1,974       49                 1,904     8.7 
Japan        2,990   124         14,331      20.6                377     87.8 
Malaysia     40.9   17.9          5,124      150.5              333     10.7 
Mexico      238    83.5         5,827       32.3               1,958     10.2 
New Zealand  41     3.4          11,513      54.1                271      4.1  
Papua New   3.1    3.8         1,425       89.6                463      0.4 
Guinea     
Peru         31.8   21.5         2,188       23.6                1,285    1.9 
Philippines   44.5   61.5         1,763       60.8                300      2.0 
Russia       578   148         3,905       36.1                17,095   -- 
Singapore    36.8   2.7         11,710      364.5                0.6     27.7 
South Korea  252    42.9         6,673       60.1                 99      14.9 
Thailand     84.6    55.6         3,580       75.5                 513     14.3 
United States  5,520   250         18,054      21.4                 9,363   173 
Vietnam     20.4*   66.2        --           59.8                 331     0.1 
Source: World Bank and Penn World Tables, accessed through the International Economic Data Band, ANU            
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3.2, APEC’s Structure, Activities and Principles 
APEC today has 21 member economies comprising some 2.5 billion people, a combined gross 
domestic product of over US$18 trillion in 2000 and over 47 percent of world trade. APEC has established 
itself as the primary regional vehicle for promoting open trade and practical economic and technical 
cooperation.264
Its goal is ‘to advance economic dynamism and sense of community within the Asia-Pacific region, 
concretely speaking, to achieve the goal of free trade and investment no later than the year 2010 and 2020, 
with the industrialized economies achieving the goal of free and open trade and investment no later than the 
year 2010 and developing economies no later than the year 2020’.265 The accesses of APEC to its goals are 
APEC’s two wheels—TILF and ECOTECH. 
Though APEC’s effectiveness is still in dispute, its importance to the members involved and to the 
regional economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific area is doubtless. For example, APEC has played an 
important role in promoting trade and investment liberalization in the region; APEC has also played a 
complementary role to the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions in 
fostering a rapid Asian economic recovery; APEC is promoting increased transparency, openness and 
predictability based on the rule of law; APEC can serve a crucial role in advancing long-term projects and 
initiatives that will assist its members to reform their economies and implement the policy changes that will 
sustain the economic recovery; APEC also promotes discussion among Leaders and undertakes programs to 
assure that the social infrastructure exists to allow APEC economies to take advantage of trade and 
investment opportunities and that economic growth translates into real social progress.   
 
3.2.1, APEC’s Structure and Significance 
The Asia Pacific region has no history of successfully institutionalized cooperation throughout the 
region, until the establishment of APEC. Indeed, the idea that the Asia Pacific might constitute a ‘region’ 
is a recent construction.  
APEC works in three broad areas to meet its goals of free and open trade and investment in the 
Asia-Pacific by 2010 for developed economies and 2020 for developing economies (These goals are often 
referred to as the ‘Bogor Goals’). The three areas in which APEC works are: 
 
• Trade and Investment Liberalization – reducing and eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and 
investment, and opening markets. 
• Business Facilitation – reducing the costs of business transactions, improving access to trade information 
and bringing into line policy and business strategies to facilitate growth, and free and open trade. 
• Economic and Technical Cooperation (ECOTECH) – assisting member economies build the necessary 
capacities to take advantage of global trade and the New Economy. 
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APEC member economies also work within a framework to meet the free and open trade goals. This 
framework comprises: 
• Actions by individual APEC economies; 
• Actions by APEC fora; and 
• APEC actions related to multilateral fora. 
 
The operational structure of APEC includes policy level and working level. The policy level includes 
Economic Leaders’ Meeting, APEC Ministerial Meeting, Sectoral Ministerial Meetings and APEC 
Business Advisory Council (ABAC). Economic Leaders’ Meetings are held once a year in the APEC host 
economy. Declarations from these meetings set the policy agenda for APEC. Annual APEC Ministerial 
Meetings of foreign and economic/trade ministers are held immediately prior to Economic Leaders’ 
Meetings. Ministers take stock of the year’s activities and provide recommendations for Economic 
Leaders’ consideration. Sectoral Ministerial Meetings are held regularly covering areas such as education, 
energy, environment and sustainable development, finance, human resource development, regional 
science and technology cooperation, small and medium enterprises, telecommunications and information 
industry, tourism, trade, transportation and women’s affairs. ABAC provides APEC Economic Leaders 
with a business perspective on APEC issues through an annual meeting and report to Leaders. The annual 
report contains recommendations to improve the business and investment environment in the APEC 
region. ABAC also meets four times per year and a representative attends Ministerial Meetings.  
     On a working level, APEC has Senior Official Meeting (SOM), Committee on Trade and 
Investment (CTI), SOM Committee on ECOTECH, Economic Committee (EC), Budget and Management 
Committee (BMC) and 11 working groups comprised of Agricultural Technical Cooperation; Energy; 
Fisheries; Human Resources Development; Industrial Science and technology; Marine Resources 
Conservation; Small and Medium Enterprises; Telecommunications and Information; Tourism; Trade 
Promotion; and Transportation.  
 
3.2.2, APEC’s Main Activities in 1980s and 1990s 
After APEC begins as an informal ministerial dialogue in 1989 with 12 member economies, 
Canberra, the past APEC meetings have achieved the following progress: 
Canberra, 1989. APEC holds its first ministerial meeting. Twelve economies—Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United 
States—are represented. Ministers agree that it is premature to set up an organization structure for APEC, 
but do set out some core principles: recognition of regional diversity, a commitment to consensus-building, 
and the goal of promoting economic growth through enhancing regional interdependence.  
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Singapore, 1990. Twelve economic ministers issue the ‘APEC Declaration on the Uruguay Round,’ 
expressing the ‘grave concern’ at the slow progress of global negotiations in the GATT.  
Seoul, 1991. China, Hong Kong and Taiwan join in discussions at the third APEC ministerial meeting. 
Ministers issue the ‘Seoul Declaration,’ which for the first time elucidates APEC’s objectives (economic 
growth, liberalization, and multilateralism); scope of activity; mode of operation, rules for participation; 
and organizational structure.  
Bangkok, 1992. Ministers agree to establish an APEC Secretariat in Singapore and to form an Eminent 
Persons Group (EPG) ‘to enunciated a vision for trade in the Asia-Pacific region to the year 2000.’ 
Blake Island, 1993. APEC Economic Leaders met for the first time in November, 1993, when they held 
informal discussions at Blake Island near Seattle. They envisioned a community of Asia-Pacific economies, 
based on the spirit of openness and partnership, which would make cooperative efforts to address the 
challenges of: change; promotion the free exchange of goods, services and investment; and work towards 
broadly-based economic growth, higher living and educational standards and sustainable growth that 
respects the natural environment. In subsequent annual meetings, APEC Ministers and Leaders further 
refined this vision and launched mechanisms to translate it into action.  
Bogor, 1994. In 1994 in Bogor, the vision of an open trading system became the very ambitious goal of " 
free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for developed member economies and 2020 
for developing ones ".  
Osaka, 1995. In Osaka, APEC Leaders adopted the Osaka Action Agenda (OAA), which firmly established 
the three pillars of APEC activities: trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation, and economic 
and technical cooperation.  
Manila, 1996. The Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA), adopted by the APEC Leaders in November 
1996, compiled members’ initial individual action plans to achieve the objectives outlined in Bogor. APEC 
Leaders also instructed that high priority be given to the following six areas of economic and technical 
cooperation: developing human capital; fostering safe and efficient capital markets; strengthening 
economic infrastructure; harnessing technologies of the future; promoting environmentally sustainable 
growth; and encouraging the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises.  
Vancouver, 1997. In Vancouver APEC Leaders recognized members’ efforts to improve the commitments 
in their Individual Action Plans (IAPs) and reaffirmed their intention to update these annually. APEC 
Leaders endorsed their Ministers’ agreement that action should be taken with respect to early voluntary 
sectoral liberalization (EVSL) in 15 sectors, with nine to be advanced throughout 1998 and implementation 
to begin in 1999. APEC Leaders welcomed the progress of APEC fora in involving business, academics 
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and other experts, women and youth and encouraged them to continue these efforts. APEC Leaders 
endorsed the Vancouver Framework for Enhanced Public-Private Partnership for Infrastructure 
Development.  
Kuala Lumpur, 1998. In Kuala Lumpur APEC Leaders reaffirmed their confidence in the strong economic 
fundamentals and prospects for recovery of the economies of the Asia-Pacific. They agreed to pursue a 
cooperative growth strategy to end the financial crisis. They pledged efforts to strengthen: social safety 
nets; financial systems; trade and investment flows; the scientific and technological base; human resources 
development; economic infrastructure; and business and commercial links, so as to provide the base and set 
the pace for sustained growth into the 21st century. APEC Leaders also welcomed the Ministers’ decision to 
seek an EVSL agreement with non-APEC members at the World Trade Organization. The APEC Leaders 
adopted the Kuala Lumpur Action Program on Skills Development with the objective of contributing 
towards sustainable growth and equitable development while reducing economic disparities and improving 
the social well-being of the people, through skills upgrading/improvement.  
Auckland, 1999. At their meeting in September 1999 in Auckland, APEC Leaders agreed that the 
performance and prospects of the APEC economies had improved, but they were not complacent about the 
risks to recovery. Accordingly they pledged to strengthen markets and improve the international framework 
governing trade and investment flows. APEC Leaders also put people and their prosperity at the forefront 
of their discussions, welcoming the more active participation of women and the business sector in APEC’s 
work.  
Bandar Seri Begawan, 2000. In Bandar Seri Begawan in November 2000, APEC Leaders mapped out ways 
of preserving, strengthening and further opening markets as well as sustaining economic recovery in APEC. 
Aiming to deliver on the various agreements, to the people and the diverse communities that APEC serves, 
they decided to address the challenges of the New Economy. APEC also establishes an electronic 
Individual Action Plan (e-IAP) system, providing IAPs online and commits to the Action Plan for the New 
Economy, which, amongst other objectives, aims to triple Internet access throughout the APEC region by 
2005. 
 
3.2.3 APEC’s Principles, Open Regionalism as Mantra and APEC’s Ambiguities 
The APEC Canberra meeting produced ‘a studiously vague statement of intent’.266 The ministers 
recorded that it was premature to decide on any particular structure for the new body, or on a design for 
support mechanisms. 
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In order to meet APEC's Bogor Goals for free and open trade and investment in Asia-Pacific, APEC 
Member Economies follow the strategic roadmap as agreed by APEC Economic Leaders in Osaka, Japan in 
1995. This roadmap is known as the Osaka Action Agenda. 
 
The Osaka Action Agenda provides a framework for meeting the 'Bogor Goals' through trade and 
investment liberalization, business facilitation and sectoral activities, underpinned by policy dialogues and 
economic and technical cooperation. As part of this framework, General Principles have been defined for 
Member Economies as they proceed through the APEC liberalization and facilitation process.  
 
The following General Principles are provided in the Osaka Action Agenda and are applied to the 
entire APEC liberalization and facilitation process -  
 Comprehensiveness - addressing all impediments to achieving the long-term goal of 
free and open trade.  
 WTO-consistency - measures undertaken in the context of the APEC Action Agenda 
are consistent with the principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
 Comparability - APEC Member Economies endeavor to have comparable trade and 
investment liberalization and facilitation, taking into account the general levels achieved by 
each APEC economy.  
 Non-discrimination - reductions in barriers to trade achieved through APEC are 
available to all APEC Member Economies and non-APEC economies.  
 Transparency - the laws, regulations and administrative procedures in all APEC 
Member Economies which affect the flow of goods, services and capital among APEC 
Member Economies are transparent.  
 Standstill - APEC Member Economies do not take measures which have the effect of 
increasing levels of protection.  
 Simultaneous start, continuous process and differentiated timetables - APEC Member 
Economies simultaneously began the process of liberalization, facilitation and cooperation, 
and continuously contribute to the long-term goal of free and open trade and investment.  
 Flexibility - APEC Member Economies deal with the liberalization and facilitation 
process in a flexible manner, taking into account differing levels of economic development.  
 Cooperation - Economic and technical cooperation contributing to liberalization and 
facilitation is actively pursued.  
 
Open regionalism was the term that defined APEC’s aspirations in the early ministerial meetings in 
Canberra (1989) and Seoul (1991), and set the scene for the first Leaders’ summit in Seattle (1993) and 
the commitment to free and open trade and investment in Bogor (1994) 
 85
     Open Regionalism is the mantra of APEC267 which was “invented” by Peter Drysdale and Ross 
Garnaut in the late 1980s and becomes mainstream of theory of Asia Pacific economic cooperation after 
1992. Drysdale and Garnaut have for some years expounded a concept of “open regionalism” which 
differs from NAFTA and other RTAs in being non-discriminatory, essentially aimed at regional economic 
cooperation by Pacific Rim countries for reduction of barriers to trade, both official, such as tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and others such as transport and transaction costs, and in this and other ways 
at the maintenance of an open world trading system in the pure GATT spirit. They see the APEC forum as 
embodying this notion of regionalism.268  
     But the concept of ‘open regionalism’ first appeared in a report of a study group appointed by 
Japanese Prime Minister Ohira in 1979: 
 
     A regionalism that is open to the world, not one that is exclusive and closed, is the first 
characteristic of our concept. We are fully aware that a regional community without a perspective 
for a global community, a regionalism that excludes globalism, has no possibility of development 
and prosperity. Nonetheless, not a few problems that confront us today could be most suitably 
handled by first attempting regional cooperation and then developing this into global 
cooperation.269    
 
From 1992, Open Regionalism became well-known in the Asia Pacific area as well as in the world 
and became the driven-theory of APEC. In that year, the IIE's (Institute of International Economics) 
director, C. Fred Bergsten, became chairman of APEC's intellectual task force, the Eminent Persons 
Group (EPG)(The EPG was charged by APEC to create a Vision for APEC. The vision they constructed 
was wholeheartedly approved by APEC in 1993). The IIE was in a powerful position to guide APEC and 
in 1992 they hosted a conference on the Pacific Rim to discuss APEC's future. This conference, like the 
one in 1988, was focused on the issue of regionalism vs. multilateralism, but involved a smaller audience, 
attended almost exclusively by academics and researchers from other Non-Governmental Regional 
Organizations (NGROs). This conference was a brainstorming session for the IIE rather than an attempt 
to directly influence policy-makers. It also signified the IIE's more serious interest in Free Trade Areas 
(FTAs). 
The most influential article that emerged from this conference came from Drysdale and Garnaut. 
They presented the same open regionalist proposal as they did in 1988, supplemented with a massive 
amount of empirical evidence. But in 1992 they are even more pessimistic about the future of the world 
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trading system. NAFTA poses a serious threat to the GATT, as does the disappointing results of the 
Uruguay Round (UR). They propose that open regionalism might be able to mitigate this threat, because 
it can divert the FTA flood towards the cause of multilateralism. But they have very modest hopes: "at 
best (APEC under open regionalism) could become a substantial agent of expanding Asia-Pacific trade 
and economic welfare."270 They have no illusions that an open regionalist APEC would even resemble a 
true FTA, given the current climate. They end with a warning: "the whole framework of open regionalism 
would fail unless (nondiscrimination is adhered to because discriminatory liberalization) ... would 
entrench the European-Pacific trade tensions and division that they were designed partially to avoid."271  
Through the boom-box of the IIE, the term and concept of open regionalism found its way outside 
the Academy and into the U.S. public sphere. The news release for “Pacific Dynamism” focused on 
Drysdale and Garnaut's ideas and specifically mentioned the term "open regionalism." It argued that open 
regionalism offers a good way to avoid a world of trading blocs. After 1992, the theory of open 
regionalism began to appear in a wide variety of forums in the U.S.. Harry Harding, at the Brookings 
Institution, supported their ideas in an article in “Foreign Policy.”272 The “Economist” magazine reported 
on it. President Clinton himself used the term open regionalism to describe the Bogor Declaration in 1994. 
Before 1992, open regionalism, as a theory and a term, was unheard of in the U.S., though open 
regionalism was aired in an IIE conference in 1988 but nothing happened. It was only after 1992, and 
after the IIE became interested in supporting FTAs, that the theory of open regionalism was spread far 
and wide, demonstrating the crucial importance of NGROs in turning economic theories into reality. 
Indeed, open regionalism is an oxymoron if the term regionalism is confined by its most prominent 
historical usage----in relation to discriminatory free trade areas and customs unions in the style of the 
North American Free Trade Area and the Europe Union. So, what is Open Regionalism? According to his 
father, Ross Garnaut, “open regionalism has a precise meaning: regional economic integration without 
discrimination against outsiders.”273  
     Garnaut stated, “the concept Open Regionalism has emerged from and has helped to shape the 
practice of economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. The concept and the term were descriptive of 
an emerging reality of regional economic integration in the Asia Pacific region in the 1970s. Open 
Regionalism was spoken of at the first Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) in Canberra in 
1980, and at the first Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial Meeting in Canberra in 
1989, as an ideal for the future development of economic relations in the Asia Pacific region. The concept 
has been further elaborated and its essential elements defined more precisely over time, including within 
PECC (1992) and APEC (1992).274
                                                  
e c
r r t
270 Drysdale, P. and Garnaut, R., The Pacific: An Application of a Gen ral Theory of Economi  
Integration , p. 220. 
271 Ibid., p. 220. 
272  Harding, Harry, ‘Asia Policy to the Brink’, in Foreign Policy , Fall 1994. 
273 Garnaut, Ross, Open Regionalism and T ade Libe aliza ion, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1996, p. 1. 
274  Ibid., p. 17. 
 87
     What is the point of a regional arrangement if it does not discriminate in favor of members over 
non-members? If there is no favoring of members over non-members, what is to be gained above each 
country pressing on with unilateral liberalization? Garnaut answers these questions, “Three separate 
elements can be identified. One is regional co-operation in multilateral and other extra-regional trade 
negotiations to secure non-discriminatory trade liberalization at home and abroad. The second is 
co-operation to promote non-discriminatory liberalization in a number of regional economies, to 
strengthen political support for and economic gains from liberalization in each one of them. The third is 
agreement to secure non-discriminatory liberalization of trade in sectors in which export expansion 
deriving from the liberalization is concentrated with the region. ”275  
In answering why the discussion of Asia Pacific regional trade liberalization has been concerned to 
avoid discrimination, Garnaut explains, “there are three types of reasons. The first is highly piratical, and 
in the Asia-Pacific has been compelling. If a region is committed to working within the rules of the GATT 
and WTO, a discriminatory free trade area must, for good reason, meet a number of demanding 
conditions. It must establish substantially free trade over a specified period (now held to be ten years). It 
must define a schedule and a timetable for achievement of substantially free trade. None of these 
conditions have been thought to be practically attainable for free trade within the Asia-Pacific since 
APEC was established in 1989----not in the United States, not in China, not in ASEAN, and not in Japan. 
If regional trade liberalization were to be secured through a conventional tree trade area, progress would 
have to await an indefinite time while divisive negotiations explored the possibility of meeting the 
GATT/WTO conditions. The second is that the crucial trading interests of Asia Pacific economies extend 
outside APEC---to Europe, to other developing and transitional economies, notably in Indochina and 
South Asia, and to neighboring Russia. A conventional free trade area would introduce unwelcome 
tensions into trade relations with these economies, and deter internationally-oriented reform and growth 
in the developing and transitional economies. The third comes out of straightforward economic analysis. 
Trade discrimination introduces unnecessary costs of trade diversion.” 276 For all three of these reasons, 
trade liberalization without discrimination----open regionalism----has played a central part in the 
discussion of Asia Pacific economic cooperation since the early days.  
Renato Ruggiero, the inaugural Director-General of the World Trade Organization noted Open 
Regionalism’s strategic role: 
 
The trading system is now moving forward on two tracks----regional and multilateral. Regional 
trade initiatives are expanding and have ambitions to expand further. It would be wrong to assume 
that multilateral system is in a period of dormancy---- where we are perhaps lacking, however, is in 
showing a level of ambition at least equivalent to that of the major regional systems. ------ Open 
Regionalism is the one I hear from a number of governments who are members of APEC or 
MERCOSUR. In this scenario, the gradual elimination internal barriers to trade within a regional 
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grouping will be implemented at more or less the same rate and on the same timetable as the 
lowering of barriers towards non-members. This would mean that regional liberalization would be 
generally consistent not only with the rules of the WTO but also----and this is very 
important------with the MFN principle.  
------The second alternative, on the other hand, points towards the gradual convergence on the basis 
of shared rules and principles of all the major regional groups. Each one of the existing and 
emerging regional groupings has to contribute with vision and determination to ensure that at the 
end of the process both regional and multilateral approaches will have contributed to full 
liberalization in a free global market. 277
 
But as an interregional regime, the APEC felt ambiguous on Open Regionalism. The ambiguity 
finally led the failure of APEC EVSL and APEC process’s slowing down, which will be discussed later.  
The provisions of GATT (Article XXIV) relating to the conditions under which exemptions from 
the MFN requirement are granted to regional agreements provide an excellent example of ambiguous 
terminology in a trade treaty. Article XXIV allows an exemption from the non-discrimination requirement 
of Article I provided that the regional agreement applies to ‘substantially all’ trade between the parties 
and that ‘on average’ the agreement does not raise barriers to third country trade. The ambiguity of these 
criteria allowed political considerations to dominate in contracting parties’ determinations of whether the 
provisions of regional agreements actually complied with the Article.  
The same can be said of the APEC’s provisions. Ambiguities are present in all international 
agreements and treaties, but APEC compounds ambiguities over how its goals might best be realized with 
further ambiguities over what the goals themselves should be. Cooperation in APEC rests on three 
“pillars”: the liberalization of trade and investment, the facilitation of trade, and economic and technical 
cooperation. Among the member economies tension has always existed over which of the three pillars 
should receive priority. 
 
3.3, Japan’s Policy towards APEC and its APEC Policy-making 
APEC is even more important to Japan. As the role that the Asia-Pacific region plays in the world 
economy in the 21st century expands, Japan views APEC as the central forum for cooperation toward the 
economic development of the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the remarkable pace of dynamic economic 
development being witnessed in recent 20 years in this region as a whole, taking the lead in the economic 
cooperation of the Asia-Pacific region and accurately grasping the direction of the development of the 
region are of vital importance to the future of Japan.  
As argued by Ōgita, APEC is important for Japan from the viewpoints of both the international 
environment and the domestic situation.278 From the former external point view, APEC is capable of 
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securing the open and liberal global trading system. The system is vital for Japan as a ‘trade-dependent 
country’ but became fragile because: 
-----the United States lost its hegemonic economic power and willingness to maintain the system alone; is 
likely to opt for unilateral retaliation against so-called ‘unfair’ trade partners; and created a free trade with 
Canada and Mexico by the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, while the European 
Community countries integrated their markets in 1992 and formed the European Union (EU) in 1994; and  
-----the end of the Cold War diminished the incentive to avoid economic and other conflicts within the 
‘Western/Capitalist’ world, which might disrupt the Western alliance system; this led the emergence of the 
tripolar world formed with North American, Europe and East Asia, which is a potential source of conflicts 
among the regions; and raised the question of how to accommodate socialist and former socialist 
economies in the system.279  
     From the latter internal point view, APEC is to drive the domestic industrial adjustment or economic 
reform including deregulation, which is necessary for Japan to adapt itself to the new stage of development 
after the catch-up stage, but is going on only slow and incrementally. A significant reason why APEC can 
drive the adjustment/reform is that the institution has not only liberalization but also facilitation, which 
treads non-border measures related to deregulation, in its agenda.  
     In Japan, such importance of APEC is supposed to be recognized somewhat widely by the 
bureaucrats and the political leaders who are committed to the APEC policy-making inside the Government 
as well as by businesspersons, scholars and citizens who are interested in the institution outside the 
Government. For example, MITI’s Hidehiro Konno, who substantially headed the APEC policy-making in 
the ministry as the Director-General of the Economic Cooperation Department, said that APEC is the only 
card for Japan to influence the rule-making of the global trading system, in which regional groups are more 
influential as EC was so in UR; and it is also to stimulate not only liberalization but also economic reform 
of each member.280
 
3.3.1, Japan’s Policy towards APEC-A General Portrait 
Although Tokyo has recited the APEC mantra that the grouping’s collaboration rests on three 
pillars—trade liberalization, trade facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation—it has never 
placed emphasis on the first of these pillars. ‘The Americans are wrong to regard APEC as being 
primarily about trade’ was the blunt comment of Isao Kubota, a senior official in Japan’s Ministry of 
Finance. Similarly, Makoto Kuroda, a former vice-minister of MITI and former executive vice-president 
of Mitsubishi, told a meeting at the Brookings Institution that APEC was wasting its time in debating how 
comprehensive trade liberalization should be; instead it should focus on trade facilitation and economic 
and technical cooperation.281 Whatever the other divisions between MOFA and MITI, they shared the 
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view that APEC’s principal purpose should be to facilitate growth in the less developed economies of the 
region—primarily those in Southeast Asia, though China became of increasing interest with the dramatic 
surge of Japanese investment there in the early 1990s. Emphasis within APEC was therefore placed on the 
contribution the grouping might make to the strengthening of local institutions through economic and 
technical cooperation, consistent with Japan’s interest in the export of its development model to other 
parts of Asia, and its sponsorship of the World Bank’s study, the East Asian Miracle.282
     Japan’s antipathy towards the use of APEC to promote trade liberalization has taken various forms. 
Elements of the Japanese government initially opposed the introduction of APEC leaders’ meetings, 
fearing that this high-level forum would only generate more pressure on Tokyo for trade liberalization. 
The government has consistently attempted to exempt agriculture from APEC plans for trade 
liberalization. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries argued in meetings of APEC officials 
that agricultural products should be given the status of ‘non-tradeable goods’.283 In conjunction with 
MOFA and MITI, it lobbied the Indonesian government in 1994 to exclude agriculture from the trade 
agenda in the upcoming leaders’ meeting that Jakarta was to host. Members of the agricultural ‘policy 
tribes’ in the Japanese Diet also visited Southeast Asia that year in an attempt to persuade local leaders to 
exempt agriculture from APEC’s liberalization agenda.  
     Having failed in this effort, the Japanese government again sought to exclude agriculture from the 
agenda at the Osaka Leaders’ Meeting in the following year. Moreover, it gave every impression that it 
used its chairmanship of APEC that year to attempt to slow the momentum on trade liberalization. Indeed, 
in the first half of the year, the Japanese government appeared to be distancing itself not only from 
comprehensive trade liberalization but from the very concept of free trade in the region, thereby 
undermining the agreement reached at the previous year’s Leaders’ Meeting in Bogor. Only after 
sustained pressure from other APEC members, particularly Australia and the United States, did the 
Japanese government adopt an agenda that had some potential for moving the cause of trade liberalization 
forwards rather than backwards. Whereas in the previous year the Indonesian government had bypassed 
senior officials and worked directly with other leaders to establish for the Bogor meeting what became 
quite a radical agenda, for the Osaka meeting the Japanese government relied almost exclusively on 
meetings of senior officials to set a (much more modest) agenda—a process very much in accord with 
customary procedures of policy-making in Japan.284 Senior officials have consistently been more 
conservative in their approach to APEC than have the heads of government. 
     Finally, when APEC attempted liberalization on a sectoral basis at the Vancouver Leaders’ Meeting 
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in 1997 (Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization, EVSL), the Japanese government effectively torpedoed 
the process by refusing to agree to liberalization in forestry and fisheries. 
     The Japanese government’s lack of interest in trade liberalization was evident in other behavior. 
One of the reasons, commentators believed, for Tokyo’s enthusiasm for Russian membership in APEC, 
agreed at the Vancouver Leaders’ Meeting in 1997, was that the even greater diversity in APEC 
membership would greatly complicate the grouping’s trade liberalization agenda. (Russian membership 
had other attractions for Tokyo: it was seen as part of a package deal to tempt Moscow into agreeing to a 
resolution of the Kurile Islands [Northern Territories] dispute. Japan is also particularly interested in 
gaining access to the rich energy and mineral deposits of the Russian Far East.) Another illustration of 
Japan’s view on freeing trade occurred when Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited 
Australia, whose governments have consistently been among the most enthusiastic proponents of trade 
liberalization within APEC. Hashimoto warned the Australian Prime Minister against plans to introduce 
further cuts in tariffs protection to the domestic automobile industry (in which Japanese 
firms—Mitsubishi and Toyota—have a significant stake). The irony of one APEC member government 
warning another against engaging in tariff-cutting was not picked up by local commentators.285
     Japan’s desire to avoid trade liberalization dominating the APEC agenda stems from a number of 
overlapping factors. Of paramount importance was the fear of a domestic political backlash should further 
pressure be brought to bear on sensitive sectors.286 But a policy of resisting trade liberalization served 
other purposes. It enabled Japan to side with the vast majority of other Asian members of the grouping 
that were also resentful of US efforts to use APEC to promote more rapid liberalization. And by placing 
emphasis not on trade liberalization but on trade facilitation and on economic and technical cooperation, 
both domestic and foreign policy interests were promoted. These were the issues of most interest to the 
less developed economies of the region, and Japan was able consistently to claim to be their champion in 
APEC forums.  
     At the Osaka meeting, Japan was successful in gaining acceptance from other APEC leaders for its 
proposed ‘Partners for Progress’ scheme. This was to provide 10 billion yen (approximately US$100 
million) to APEC’s central budget to promote economic and technical cooperation initiatives. The scheme 
agreed on, however, was considerably watered down from that originally proposed by the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Yohei Kono, at a Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
wanted to establish a separate ‘Partners for Progress Center’ within the APEC Secretariat. The proposal 
was opposed by the US government for several reasons: it did not wish to see an enlargement of the 
Secretariat. The scheme was also opposed from within the Japanese government—by MITI and by the 
Ministry of Finance. Even though the proposal was watered down, Japan did gain kudos from the less 
developed economies in the grouping for the initiative. Moreover, the program provides an ongoing 
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publicity bonus for Tokyo when APEC meetings are financed by ‘Partners for Progress’ funds.287  
     The Japanese government shared the view of the less developed countries in APEC that economic 
and technical cooperation were essential to help these economies make the necessary adjustments so that 
trade liberalization could proceed. APEC’s economic and technical cooperation activities also served 
another purpose: they were often beneficial to Japanese companies (including their subsidiaries in 
Southeast Asia). Upgrading the skills of companies in Southeast Asia facilitated the development of 
Japanese production networks in the region.288
     If trade liberalization was to occur within APEC, the Japanese government was determined that it 
should take place through a voluntary process of unilateral measures that would be applied to members 
and non-members alike in a non-discriminatory manner.289 Tokyo generally did not share Washington’s 
concerns about European free riding on APEC trade liberalization. More troubling was the possibility that 
discriminatory liberalization in the Asia Pacific would encourage a fragmentation of the global economy 
into rival trading blocs. APEC should therefore proceed through a process of ‘open regionalism’. 
Washington’s pressure for legally binding measures within APEC risked undermining Tokyo’s delicate 
diplomacy of courting other Asian governments: a leading Japanese newspaper warned that the Western 
approach to APEC ‘is a challenge to Japan’s very policy toward Asia and the Pacific’.290
     Under pressure from other member economies to retreat from its refusal to participate in two of the 
sectors the grouping had identified for liberalization in its EVSL program, the Japanese government again 
emphasized the voluntary nature of APEC commitments. Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura 
stated bluntly in a press conference at the Kuala Lumpur APEC meetings in 1998, when the EVSL 
approach broke down: ‘Although I am not very familiar with the English language, I understand that the 
V in EVSL stands for voluntary, which means this is not a process for negotiation’.291 Japanese officials 
were reported to have warned other APEC governments at the Kuala Lumpur meetings that Tokyo would 
withdraw its offer of a substantial aid package in the wake of the Asian financial crises should it be forced 
to cut tariffs in the fish and forestry sectors.292
     Japan’s other principal concern was to ensure that APEC continued to operate according to the 
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principles laid down at the Canberra meeting. The Japanese government was alarmed at President 
Clinton’s use of the phrase ‘Pacific Community’ at the Seattle meetings, with its possible implication that 
APEC would evolve towards a more institutionalized grouping akin to the European Community. The 
Japanese government has consistently stressed the importance of markets rather than the construction of 
supranational institutions for the regions development. ‘Organic economic integration guided by market 
mechanisms’ was Japan’s belief on the appropriate mode for economic cooperation in the region.293 In 
response to Clinton’s proposal for a ‘Pacific Community’, Tsutomu Hata, Japanese Foreign Minister and 
soon to be Prime Minister, proposed at Seattle that all members should respect five basic principles of 
APEC cooperation: due attention to the different stages of development of members and the diversity 
within the grouping; gradualism based on consensus and consultation rather than negotiation; consistency 
with GATT; open regionalism and unconditional extension of APEC liberalization on an MFN basis; and 
intensive consultation and dialogue with non-members.294 His summary characterization of APEC 
operations was ‘creeping incremental gradualism by consensus’.295 The consistent Japanese emphasis 
within APEC on unilateralism consensus was very much in accord with the views of other Asian 
governments on how APEC should proceed. 
 
3.3.2, Japan’s APEC Policy-making 
 The Japanese government had been the first to express an interest in the construction of a Pan-Pacific 
inter-governmental organization. It had worked, together with others, especially Australia, for more than 
three decades to realize this goal.  
     Commentators have frequently observed that bureaucratic divisions have prevented Japanese 
governments from pursuing a coherent, activist foreign policy.296 Certainly, bureaucratic politics was 
much in evidence in Tokyo’s policies towards the Pacific. In discussing the failure of the Japanese 
government to support the UN Economic Commission for Asia, and the Far East’s proposal in 1962 for an 
Organization for Asian Economic Cooperation, even in these early years of postwar diplomacy ‘various 
departments in the Japanese government were hopelessly divided on the issue’.297 These divisions were to 
re-emerge in APEC. As reported, in the months following Hawke’s Seoul launch of the APEC initiative, 
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly lobbied Asian governments to reject the proposal, which it 
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associated with its rival, MITI. And, in the early years of APEC, other governments faced the 
extraordinary spectacle of MOFA and MITI demanding separate consultations and representation in 
APEC meetings. The dispute was a classic fight over bureaucratic turf, which MOFA concerned that a 
new regional economic organization would give greater prominence to economics rather than foreign 
affairs ministers in regional relations, and that APEC would overshadow PECC, in which MOFA had 
played a prominent role. MOFA was also worried that a Japanese initiative would revive fears that a 
western push to institutionalize APEC would alienate ASEAN and force the Japanese government into 
choices it wished to avoid. These ministerial disunity and rivalry may need a concrete analysis of Japan’s 
APEC policy-making.    
    When I interviewed Mr. Hidetaka Saeki, the Deputy Director-General in charge of economic 
cooperation of Trade Policy Bureau, MITI, on Japan’s APEC policy-making, I was impressed that Mr. 
Saeki strongly denied that there was conflict and rivalry between MITI and MOFA on Japan’s APEC 
policy-making.  He said, there may be some differing views on APEC between the two Ministries, but 
these differences were exaggerated by outsiders. He said, when APEC came in to being in 1989, the two 
ministries did not have a clear division of APEC affairs, and they lacked a strong structure to coordinate 
APEC affairs in the Japanese government. But this situation changed after Japan hosted the APEC 1995 
Osaka meetings, and the relationship between the two ministries on APEC affairs was generally 
cooperative, not one of rivals. It can be said that MITI, MOFA and related ministries and agencies form a 
single mechanism for APEC policy-making.298   
     In Japan, generally speaking, there are a variety of actors, both inside and outside government, 
participating in policy-making processes to pursue their own interests. These actors include political 
leaders and Diet members as individuals; Cabinet, Diet and political parties as institutions; 
ministries/agencies and their officials in the bureaucracy; interest groups including business groups and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs); mass media; and the citizens as the sovereigns.299  
     But the APEC policy-making process in Japan was mostly confined to the Government and, 
especially to the bureaucracy, because, actors outside the Government have fewer interests in foreign 
policies than in domestic policies; and political leaders, Diet members and political parties are also less 
interested in being active in foreign policy-making which does not attract votes from their constituencies.  
     In the bureaucracy of the Japanese government, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI: Tsusho Sangyo-sho) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA: Gaimu-sho) should jointly take 
charge of the APEC policy-making. MITI actively committed itself to the APEC process since the 
Australian proposal to establish the institution even as, according to a MITI official, the virtual 
co-proposer with Robert Hawke, then Australian Primer Minister, who launched the proposal during his 
stay in Korea at the end of January 1989.300 MOFA as a rule takes the dominant charge in affairs related 
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to international institutions, but the APEC case is unusual in the sense that MITI officially shares it as the 
equal partner of MOFA. MITI’s unusually large contribution to the APEC affairs is symbolically shown 
by: 
--the co-representation, and the co-chairmanship in 1995, in the MMs and the SOMs by ministers and 
officials from both ministries; and  
--the way of sharing the Japanese subscription to APEC, 45 is borne by MITI and 40 by MOFA with the 
remaining balance by the Ministry of Finance (MOF: Okura-sho).301
     In MITI, there was an APEC Preparation Office and an International Economic Affairs Division, 
both of which are under International Trade Policy Bureau in charge of APEC affairs. The draft policies 
worked out by this office and this division were passed on to: (1) the Deputy Director-General 
(Shingikan) for Trade and Economic Affairs of the International Policy Bureau; (2) the Director-General 
of the Economic Cooperation Department (Keizai Kyoryoku-bucho) in the Bureau; (3) the 
Director-General of the Bureau (Tsusho Seisaku-kyokucho), in that order. Draft policies in the form of 
whole texts were examined in no latter stage than the Director-General of the Department, and the 
Director-General of the Bureau usually examined only their main points. In this sense, the 
Director-General of the Department headed the APEC policy-making in MITI. The Administrative 
Vice-Minister (Jimu-jikan) and the Minister of International Trade and Industry (Trade Minister) could 
also come into the line when draft policies need to be sent to the Prime Minister.302
In MOFA, the main section responsible for the APEC affairs is the Developing Economic Division 
(Kaihatsu Tojo Chiiki-ka) in the Economic Affairs Bureau (Keizai-Kyoku). The line for the APEC 
policy-making in MOFA is: (1) the Developing Economic Division; (2) senior officials in the Economic 
Affairs Bureau including the Deputy Director-General(Sanjikan) and the Director-General (Kyokucho); 
(3) the Ambassador for International Economic Affairs; and (4) the Ambassador in charge of APEC, in 
that order. The two ambassadors were formally on the same rank, but the reason why the APEC 
ambassador was ranked higher than the Ambassador for International Economic Affairs in the line was 
simply that the former, Mr. Seki, was more senior than the latter, Mr. Uchida. Also, the Administrative 
Vice-Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Minister) could occasionally examine draft 
policies, but only on its main points.303
     As Ogita discussed, in the APEC policy-making, MITI and MOFA were mutually cooperative. 
They do not make the policies separately.304 A single draft policy is repeatedly passed from one to the 
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other, like ‘playing catch’, from the early stage of the policy-making, and it is finalized by the Japanese 
government, not MITI’s nor MOFA’s.  
     There are some divisions of role between the two ministries. Generally speaking, MITI as the 
economic organization is in charge of concrete and detailed economic matters. On the other hand, MOFA 
as the diplomatic organization is in charge of general and political matters, such as the question of the 
membership of APEC or the participation of Chinese Taipei’s President in the LMs. In the words of an 
American official: ‘MITI’s Hidehiro Konno [Director-General, Economic Cooperation Department] takes 
care of the substance while Gaimusho’s [MOFA’s] Hiromoto Seki [Ambassador in charge of APEC] 
manages the process.’305 In this sense, while the two ministries are theoretically equal, MITI plays a more 
substantial role than MOFA in the policy-making. An American official depicts this relationship in the 
following words: ‘I think Gaimusho [MOFA] is still in the driver’s seat, but I think MITI has got its hands 
firmly on the map and is saying, ‘No, we need to go this way. No, make a right turn here.’’306 Such 
superiority of MITI is not only due to the divisions of responsibility, but also to its having had more 
experience in its longer commitment to the APEC affairs and larger staff in charge of them.  
     Regarding the views on APEC, it can be said that while MITI stands on the economic viewpoint 
concerning trade promotion and so on, MOFA stands on the diplomatic viewpoint concerning the 
inclusion of the United States and China to the Asia Pacific regionalism and so on. However, they share 
the common view that APEC itself should be an economy-oriented institution. 
     But sometimes, MITI is still suspicious about MOFA, which used disagree with APEC, for 
example: 
-----APEC was against the PFP initiated by MOFA because MITI perceived that MOFA was plotting to 
gain power in the APEC affairs, so that MITI pointed out that the initiative was ambiguous, poor in 
contents, and against APEC’s principle of equality;307 and 
-----during the Jakarta/Bogor Meetings in 1994, MITI built up its own devices to communicate with 
Tokyo without having to depend on MOFA’s devices available at the Japanese Embassy at Jakarta.  
In spite of such rivalry, both ministries’ charge of the APEC affairs and their general  
cooperative relation will continue for the time being.    
     Besides MOFA and MITI, there are also some other ministries and agencies involved in the APEC 
policy-making: 
-----the Ministry of Finance (Okura-sho, MOF), in APEC Custom Procedure Sub-Committee in the 
Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI), the Trade and Investment Data Review WG and the 
Financial Ministers Meetings. 
-----the Ministry of Education (Mombu-sho), in the HRD WG, the APEC Study Centers, and the 
Education Ministerial Meeting; 
-----the Ministry of Labor (Rodo-sho), in the HRD WG and the Ministerial Meeting on HRD; 
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-----the Fisheries Agency (Suisan-cho) attached to MAFF, in the Marine Resource Conservation WG and 
the Fisheries WG; 
-----the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (Yusei-sho), in the Telecommunications WG and the 
Ministerial Meeting on Telecommunications and Information Industry; 
-----The Ministry of Transportation (Unyu-sho), in the transportation WG, the Tourism WG and the 
Transportation Ministerial Meeting; and  
-----The Economic Planning Agency (Keizai kikaku-cho) attached to the Prime Minister’s Office (Sori-fu), 
in the Economic Committee. 
     According to MITI and MOFA officials, the relationship between MITI, MOFA and the 
ministries/agencies listed above is generally cooperative. In fact, there are some who held uncooperative 
attitudes, as well as rivalry and conflicts between them.308  
     Among all Japanese governmental ministries and agencies, the most negative actor for APEC in the 
bureaucracy is MAFF, which always resists liberalization of the agricultural market. Especially in the 
APEC case, MAFF is very cautious of making concessions in agriculture liberalization, while reminding 
listeners that at the GATT Uruguay Round (UR) Japan made a ‘big’ concession by giving up the 
long-standing prohibition against rice import. Before the Jakarta/Bogor Meetings in 1994, the next year of 
the UR conclusion, MAFF repeatedly warned MOFA that agricultural products should be treated as 
‘nontradable products’ in the APEC liberalization, whose target year was supposed to be declared at 
Bogor, and strongly pressured then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama to appeal for the necessity of 
careful treatment of agricultural products in the liberalization at the LM (in fact, Murayama did so).309 
Also, before the Osaka Meetings at which the Action Agenda for implementing the liberalization was to 
be adopted, MAFF actively maneuvered for the exclusion of the agricultural sector from the scope of the 
liberalization by appealing not only to domestic actors such as other ministries an ruling parties, but also 
to foreign governments which were also against the agricultural liberalization. Finally, the Ministry ended 
up being satisfied with the finalized Action Agenda which included the ‘Flexibility Principle’ even though 
its expression of sectoral exclusion was more softened and ambiguous than the preceding drafts.310
     In the APEC policy-making, neither MITI nor MOFA can be an authoritative supervisor. As 
Funabashi says, ‘the different sectors of Japan’s bureaucracy seem to exercise veto power against each 
other, especially when they lack strong direction from the political leadership.’311 Such difficult policy 
coordination, mediation and supervision as on the APEC affairs can not and should not be carried out 
within the bureaucracy. It should be done by the Cabinet and ministers.  
     As Ogita stated, in Japan’s APEC policy-making, the Cabinet does not commit itself to the APEC 
affairs actively and is used by relevant bureaucrats just to authorize the policies they make.312 The 
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Cabinet and ministers of Japan do not take an initiative or leadership in the APEC policy-making—they 
did not do so even in the year of the Japanese chair for APEC. After MOFA blew its own horn after the 
Osaka MM, the APEC affairs were mainly and substantially managed by bureaucrats in Japan. It is 
certain that the lack of political initiative, coordination, direction, supervision, and leadership to 
overcome the bureaucratic muddle was the main cause of Japan's awkward chairmanship in 1995. 
Meanwhile, the Diet’s decision has never been needed because none of the decisions in APEC have 
needed domestic legislation or ratification in the APEC policy-making, and few interest groups used to 
participate in the APEC policy-making process because APEC did not bring them any concrete interests 
or harm.  
In sum, it can be concluded that Japan’s APEC policy-making mainly takes place at a bureaucratic 
level among MOFA and MITI, and other related ministries/agencies. Political leadership of ministers, the 
Prime Minister, Diet and its member in the APEC  is very weak.  
But despite this ministerial disunity, and despite complaints that the Japanese government failed to 
play a leadership role when it hosted the grouping’s annual meetings in 1995,313 Tokyo’s strategy towards 
APEC has in reality been a model of consistency. Tokyo may not have led APEC in a direction desired by 
its Western members; it certainly failed to give leadership to APEC’s trade liberalization agenda.314 But 
this approach was entirely consistent with Japanese views on what the grouping should do and the means 
it should use to achieve its objectives. Moreover, this consistency has paid off: APEC is now much closer 
to the institution envisaged by Tokyo than that which Washington attempted to construct, namely, APEC 
should be a forum, not a negotiating body in regional economic integration. 
 
3.4. Japan’s Policy towards APEC TILF in the context of its FTA Strategy 
APEC has defined goals in terms of two pillars: TILF and ECOTECH. Each is equally important to 
APEC’s process, and, indeed, substantial progress has already been made in the areas of trade and 
investment.  
‘Trade liberalization’ is very easy to understand, namely, free trade by zero tariff rates, but the 
concept of ‘trade facilitation’ should be clarified. According to APEC, ‘trade facilitation’ can be defined as 
an effort to purse greater ‘convenience’ in international trade through the simplification of economic 
activities such as the movement of goods and services across border. (Three main areas of trade facilitation 
are customs, standards and conformance, and mobility of business people). In a broad sense it can be 
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defined as the lowering or elimination of non-tariff barriers. More specifically, it is an attempt to lower the 
costs of administration, standardization, technology, information, transaction, labor, communication, 
insurance, and financing, as well as reduce the time costs related to these procedures. The administration 
costs arise during customs procedures, the technology costs are involved during standard procedures, and 
the information costs arise while importing or exporting goods and services. These costs result in the loss 
of economic efficiency and reduce gains from trade.315  
APEC hold trade facilitation as important as trade liberalization, because APEC holds that tariffs and 
non-tariff measures (NTMs) are barriers impeding international trade. The NTMs can be classified as direct 
barriers (i.e., import quotas) and indirect barriers (e.g. complex customs procedures). These barriers, along 
with transportation, insurance and other physical transaction costs, affect the price of domestically 
produced goods and imports, thereby restricting the flow of international transactions. The restrictions 
result in a loss of efficiency in terms of resource allocation, social welfare and economic development.316    
As Fumio Yoshino argued, APEC is ‘a touchstone for Japan to examine its trade, investment, ODA, 
human resource exchange with the region.’317 So, Japan’s policy towards APEC TILF is important to 
research its strategy towards regional economic cooperation.  
 
3.4.1. APEC’s Trade and Investment Liberalization and Facilitation (TILF) 
     APEC’s liberalization objective is succinctly defined in the Bogor Declarations which issued by 
APEC leaders in Bogor in 1994.  Despite deep divides existing318, the 18 APEC leaders finally agreed the 
Bogor Declaration. The Declaration includes the following points: 
-----APEC will strive to achieve the long-term goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia 
Pacific. 
-----APEC will complete this goal by the year 2010 for advanced economies and by 2020 for developing 
members. 
-----APEC liberalization will be open to nonmembers as well in order to discourage economic regionalism. 
-----To complement this process, APEC members agreed to expand and accelerate APEC’s trade and 
investment facilitation programs. 
-----Members are also committed to intensifying development cooperation in the areas of human resources 
development, the creation of APEC study centers, cooperation in science and technology (including 
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technology transfer), the promotion of small- and medium-sized industries, and steps to improve 
economic infrastructure.319  
 
The Declaration offers a clear yardstick for evaluating progress in liberation: it suggests that the policy 
of APEC members should be judged by whether they are ‘on track’ toward the Bogor target. This yardstick 
is preferable, say, to assessments of APEC based on its value added, that is, whether APEC has induced 
policies that countries would not have undertaken otherwise.  
The Bogor Declaration left many important details unresolved. Following the Leaders’ agreement to 
expand intra-regional trade and investment to achieve the Bogor goals, the APEC Ministers instructed their 
Senior Officials to develop concrete actions and measures to prepare the APEC TILF principles as a 
complementary way to achieve these goals. 
     Before the Osaka summit in 1995, APEC members worked hard to find a compromise that would 
ensure that the meeting would make a substial contribution toward realizing the goals laid out at Bogor. 
Prior to Sapporo SOM meeting, then Japanese Prime Minister Murayama sent a personal letter to the other 
APEC leaders in which he emphasized that to ‘enhance the credibility of the liberalization efforts of APEC, 
we should all bring to Osaka a package of concrete initial actions.’ Specially, he pointed out the need for 
progress on the ‘acceleration of the implementation of our respective UR commitments and the broadening 
and deepening of UR outcomes.’ Murayama also requested the personal ‘involvement and commitment of 
each leader’ and expressed his hope that each ‘will instruct their senior officials to contribute constructively 
to the meeting.’320
     Subsequently, the Osaka Action Agenda (OAA) issued in 1995 established that the commitments are 
‘comprehensive’ (sensitive sectors like agriculture are included) and began to translate the Bogor targets 
into smaller, operational components. It offered action guidelines in 15 policy areas: tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, services, investment, standards and conformance, customs procedures, intellectual property 
rights, competition policy, government procurement, deregulation, rules of origin, dispute mediation, 
mobility of business people, implementation of the Uruguay outcomes, and information gathering and 
analysis. Four of 14 areas, tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, and investment, were directly linked to the 
Bogor Declaration’s language of ‘free and open trade investment.’321
     But both Bogor Declaration and OAA, which were important official guidelines to APEC’s TILF, 
have critical ambiguities. In OAA, it introduced the new, ill-defined concept of ‘flexibility.’ In the case of 
tariffs, the OAA stated that ‘APEC economies will achieve free and open trade in the Asia Pacific region 
by: (a) progressively reducing tariffs; and (b) ensuring the transparency of APEC economies’ respective 
tariff regimes.’322 This can be read to mean that tariffs will go to zero, but encouraged by the absence of the 
word zero, some argue that flexibility is the governing concept. For example, in the ASEAN Free Trade 
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Area (AFTA), free trade is evidently being interpreted to mean tariffs no larger than 5 percent. Indeed, 
because it is difficult to imagine the complete elimination of impediments in some policy area, some de 
minimus limits could well become part of the ultimate target.  
     Those interventions consistent with ‘free and open trade and investment’ also must be clearly 
identified. The ‘free and open’ concept presumably covers more than border measures, as suggested by 
the breadth of the OAA’s 15 policy areas. But since only four policy areas---covering primarily border 
measures on trade and investment---are explicitly tied to the Bogor language, APEC still needs to 
establish guidelines for what other measures are understood to be part of the Bogor target.  
     As Petri argued, policy targets have to be detailed enough so that one can tell whether or not an 
economy is cooperating. This means specifying which policies are of interest and which policy settings 
are acceptable.323  
     Unfortunately, APEC launched its new approaches, without detailing this policy target .   
     The ITA (Informal Technology Agreement) was a successful sector of APEC. Because more than 
80 per cent of global information technology trade occurs within APEC economies, the US chose to 
promote this sector for liberalization after initial Quad discussions by presenting the original ITA proposal 
at the annual APEC summit in Manila in 1996. With a strong US business presence in the Asia Pacific 
and a well-coordinated lobbying strategy, APEC Ministers unanimously endorsed the agreement as an 
important example of regionally-driven, sectoral, market-opening action. In fact, many argue that the 
1996 AEPC Leaders’ ITA declaration successfully pushed other countries into signing the ITA at the 
WTO’s December 1996 Singapore Ministerial meeting. The final multilateral agreement called for the 
phasing out of tariffs on several categories of equipment by the year 2000, including computers, selected 
telecommunications equipment, software, semiconductors, and printed circuit boards. This effort can be 
seen as using sectoralism regionally to pursue sectoral liberalization globally.  
     In 1996, APEC leaders adopted the Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA) in which all APEC 
members submitted their Individual Action Plans (IAPs) for achieving trade liberalization by 2010 and 
2020. The IAPs will determine the commitment level of leaders and ministers toward achieving the Bogor 
target.  
The IAPs use the major points of the Osaka Action Agenda as their guidelines. First, the OAA has 
comprehensive coverage of 15 areas, including border and domestic measures, with liberalization 
commitments taking different forms among them. Second, although the 18 APEC members greatly differ 
in their levels of trade and investment barriers, in 1997 all members started liberalizing toward the 2010 
and 2020 goals for developed and developing members respectively. Third, the OAA is uniquely 
structured to reflect APEC members’ unilateral announcement of liberalization commitment.324  
     On APEC’s IAP, Yamazawa assessed each APEC members’ IAP against the common formant of 
IAPs in a matrix of areas within three timeframes---short-, intermediate-, and long-term. As he stated, 
three types of responses are also identified: (a) some members agree to apply concrete measures within a 
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definitive time frame, while others either just state their intentions (b) their intention to achieve the Bogor 
target or (c) their willingness to examine their current measures for possible amendment. By and large, 
many members (a) commit to apply concrete measures in the short term while (b) intention and (c) 
reexamination prevail in intermediate-and long-term measures. Indeed, detailed implementation plans 
covering 15 to 25 years can not be expected.325 Yamazawa attempted the quantitative assessment of 
individual member’s progress toward the Bogor target, based on the 1996 IAPs and 1997 IAPs and 
collective action plans (CAPs). The Osaka Action Agenda defined the Bogor target in fifteen TILF areas. 
He scored individual economies’ current state and future commitment in thirteen areas. His assessment 
conveys mixed result. Generally speaking, with regard to liberalization, many economies committed 
themselves to liberalization in concrete figures only for a short period (up to 2000); their commitments 
are characterized as ‘UR agreement + α’. However, ‘α’ turned out to be small in many economies and 
areas. On the other hand, the prospects are brighter in the area of facilitation. Finally, Yamazawa 
concluded that, the test is best illustrated with tariff reduction. Most members indicate that their plans for 
tariff reduction will be presented within the next few years. Some members attach time schedules, while 
others offer sectoral details. Many members also commit to measures based on the Uruguay Round plus 
alpha, but a significant difference between members is apparent. Generally speaking, while developed 
members agreed to tariff reductions based upon the Uruguay Round plus a small alpha, they were still 
short of the Bogor target. In contrast, developing members agreed to reductions based upon the Uruguay 
Round plus an alpha, sufficient for them to achieve their Bogor target.326     
 
3.4.2, Japan’s Policy towards APEC TILF      
At Seattle meeting, Japanese foreign minister Tsutomu Hata made a remark containing the five basic 
principles to be respected by all the members. They were: (1) due attention to the different stage of 
development and diversity of each member; (2) gradualism with consensus and consultation rather than 
negotiation; (3) consistency with GATT; (4) open regionalism and unconditional provision on an MFN 
basis; and (5) intensive consultation and dialogue with nonmembers.327
Yohei Kono, Minister of MOFA when Japan hosted APEC meeting in1995, emphasizes the 
importance of flexibility and voluntarism.  ‘On the principle of comprehensiveness, I would like to make 
it very clear that Japan supports the principle that the APEC liberalization and facilitation process should 
address all sectors and measures. At the same time, we also recognized that there are diverse 
circumstances among the APEC member economies such as different levels of economic development, 
socio-economic systems and naturally each member encounters different kinds of difficulties in 
promoting liberalization. Therefore, it is realistic that flexibility will be available in the liberalization and 
facilitation process. I believe that all APEC members realize this, and acknowledging this clearly 
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enhances the credibility of the Action Agenda. I am of the view that flexibility will be available not only 
with regard to the pace but also the ways, modalities and so forth of liberalization and facilitation. Next, 
on the principle of comparability, I would like to point out that the basic thrust of APEC is how best to 
strengthen the momentum for voluntary liberalization in the region. For this purpose, we have adopted the 
approach of concerting members’ voluntary efforts on the basis of mutual trust. We believe this approach 
is highly effective for the Asia-Pacific region and we would like to nurture this approach. Because of this, 
the APEC liberalization and facilitation should be implemented not by an excessively negotiation-like 
framework.’  He adds, ‘Japan attaches importance to the principle of WTO-consistency. Japan is strongly 
committed to maintaining and strengthening the multilateral free trading system, and strongly supports 
the development of APEC as a framework for open regional cooperation which is consistent with the 
WTO Agreement.’328
By the middle of the 1990s, the euphoria generated by the leaders’ meetings in Seattle and Bogor had 
largely evaporated. Although the Osaka meeting had produced an ‘action plan’, the obvious contradiction 
between its simultaneous emphases on comprehensiveness and on flexibility did not bode well for APEC’s 
trade liberalization agenda. The unambitious ‘individual action plans’ that governments drew up as part of 
the Osaka agenda reinforced the skepticism of many observes that APEC could not deliver on trade 
liberalization.  
     The Osaka Action Agenda had committed governments to identify industries where they supported 
early liberalization; APEC’s Western members now used this commitment to promote sectoral approaches 
to move the trade liberalization agenda forward. 
     Following the May 1997 trade ministers’ meeting in Montreal, governments were asked to nominate 
sectors for possible inclusion in the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) program. Over sixty 
proposals covering more than thirty sectors were received (including nominations from Mexico and Chile, 
both of which later declined to participate in the program). Senior officials then faced the task of 
consolidating the proposals and determining priorities, a process that inevitably involved negotiation to 
ensure that all members stood to gain something from the final package deal. Member economies were 
polled to determine the sectors for which liberalization proposals enjoyed most support, a process that 
culled the list of sectors to fifteen, nine of which were designated priority sectors for immediate 
liberalization.  
     At the May Ministerial Meeting, agreement had been reached that the EVSL program would contain 
not just timetables for liberalization but also a package of economic and technical cooperation elements and 
trade facilitation elements: all three pillars of APEC were thus to be represented in the program, a gesture 
towards the concerns of the less developed economies. The EVSL program did not propose uniform 
treatment across all sectors: in some, the emphasis was on mutual recognition of standards rather than on 
tariff elimination. 
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APEC leaders endorsed the EVSL program at their meeting in Vancouver in November 1997. It soon 
became apparent, however, that the in-principle endorsement provided by the leaders left many questions 
unanswered. Familiar problems from APEC’s earlier debates on trade liberalization reappeared. Indeed, the 
meaning of each of the four words in ‘early voluntary sectoral liberalization’ remained contested.  
For some governments, mainly the Western participants, ‘voluntary’ was taken to refer to the 
willingness of members to take a decision to move forward rapidly on the specified sectors: in other words, 
governments had already chosen, and had exercised their choice voluntarily. The program had to be 
implemented as a complete package otherwise the balance that had been laboriously negotiated would be 
undone. Others did not share this view. Some saw the voluntary component as enabling them to choose 
when they would commence their obligations under the program. Some believed that the voluntary nature 
of the exercise would allow them to liberalize trade in some of the specified sectors but not others. Some 
asserted that the voluntary nature of the exercise would allow them to participate in some elements in some 
sectors of the program, such as the economic and technical cooperation dimension, but not require them to 
partake of other elements, notably the trade liberalization components. 
Disagreements came to a head at the trade ministers’ meeting in Kuching, Malaysia, in June 1998. 
The Japanese government refused to accept that the package should be treated in a unitary manner, arguing 
that voluntarism and flexibility were more important than comprehensiveness. Because of pressure from 
domestic interests, represented in government through the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 
Japan refused to agree to participate in two sectors in the program: fish and fish products, and forestry 
products. Other countries with similar interests in maintaining domestic protection in these sectors, most 
notably Korea, were happy to hide behind Japan’s veto.  
Contrary to the principle of consensus, however, the program was not dropped at the Kuching 
meeting but instead referred to the upcoming Leaders’ Meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Other member 
governments (the Western Four plus Hong Kong and Singapore) subjected Tokyo to considerable pressure 
in the intervening months to attempt to change its mind. Tokyo meanwhile sent ministerial missions to 
other APEC economies to seek support for its position. It may no have been a coincidence that Japan at this 
time launch its New Miyazawa initiative, under which it pledged US$30 billion to assist recovery in the 
Asian economies subject to economic crisis in 1997-98. Certainly, by the time of the Leaders’ Meeting in 
Kuala Lumpur, Japanese efforts appeared to have been successful: other Asian governments were also 
expressing reservations about the program: China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia all refused to support 
it. With the host of the meeting, Malaysian government, being the APEC member most insistent on the 
principle that the grouping should operate through consensual decision-making, the meeting seemed 
doomed to fail. Leaders were unable to agree on the packages; in an attempt to save face, they decided to 
send it to the WTO—a move described by the chairman of PBEC as a ‘fig-leaf to save embarrassment all 
around’.329 Attempts by the New Zealand government to revive interest in the package in the run-up to the 
Auckland Leaders’ Meeting went nowhere, though working parties continued to implement trade 
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facilitation measures in some of the sectors.330
The abortive negotiations over the EVSL program demonstrated clearly that the obstacles to trade 
collaboration in APEC were no different from those in other parts of the global economy. Governments 
‘defected’ from the program not because they were willfully ignorant of its possible benefits but because 
they were unable to overcome the opposition of domestic groups, including their own ministries, that 
opposed further liberalization in politically sensitive sectors.331 Trade continues to be a mixed motive game, 
one that contains powerful incentives to defect. 
APEC’s modus operandi was ill-equipped to deal with these problems—and, indeed, may have 
contributed to them. For the process of voluntary, unilateral trade liberalization that had been prevalent 
among some Western Pacific economies over the previous two decades had left the most politically 
sensitive and hence heavily protected sectors largely untouched. APEC’s institutional weaknesses stemmed 
not from an oversight but from conscious design. 
Some observers also argue that, Japan’s political instability prevents it from taking a strong initiative 
and playing a more significant role in liberalizing its markets, particularly agriculture. Its agricultural 
constituencies, long protected and politically powerful, have also been resistant to the rationalization and 
restructuring of the rice sector that would make it more competitive. As this vicious circle has progressed, 
the Japanese government has remained unable to formulate a new agricultural policy in the 10 years since 
the Punta del Este meeting, which kicked off the Uruguay Round, even though it has known well enough 
the inevitability of liberalization. The case of rice is symbolic, for it revealed Japan’s inability to reform 
or rejuvenate itself; such complacency in stalemate situations may be increasingly common in the coming 
years. APEC, in this sense, tests Japan’s political will and ability to reinvigorate its economy and market. 
Levin argues ‘it is hard to argue, however, that they suggest any fundamental change in Japan’s national 
strategy. ---- in politically sensitive sectors like agriculture, Japan has limited itself to allowing increased 
levels of imports rather than agreeing to liberalization. Japan’s decision in late 1990 to align itself with 
the European Community rather than support a U.S.-led effort to reduce agricultural trade barriers and 
subsidies—despite its awareness that EC opposition would doom the effort in any event—reinforced the 
perception that Japan is not a force for trade liberalization.’  
Japan’s Policy towards APEC’s EVSL was a key signal of Japan’s policy towards APEC. Ogita 
described Japan’s policy to EVSL as ‘tetteikōsen’ (complete objection).332 He also regarded this is a very 
rare case of Japanese action in APEC, that in APEC history Japan essentially opposed APEC process.333. 
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He explained this as “no political leadership in APEC policy-making process in this matter.”334 But I think, 
what Japan opposed is not only APEC’s EVSL, but also APEC’s breakthrough--Japan was afraid that if 
EVSL could be successful, APEC would have a breakthrough which may lead APEC to a negotiating body 
in regional institutionalization. Though Japan’s opposition to EVSL uses the principles of ‘flexibility’ and 
‘voluntarism’ of APEC, we may recall that these principles were mainly led into APEC by Japan in Osaka 
meeting.  
     
3.4.3 Japan’s Free Trade Arrangements (FTA) Strategy 
As Yamamoto and Kikuchi argued, Japanese trade and investment liberalization has been pursued at 
two levels: (1) the multilateral level through GATT; and (2) the bilateral level, especially through relations 
with the United States under strong pressure from Washington. In this context, the provision of the benefits 
of liberalization measures to all countries (not exclusively to the United States) in a nondiscriminatory way 
reflects Japan’s firm commitment to the non discrimination principle of GATT/WTO.335
Tokyo’s stance had previously been grounded in fears that as an economy with an unusually diverse 
range of export markets, it would be particularly vulnerable to discriminatory regional trade arrangement 
(and officials in Tokyo would recall that other countries continued to discriminate against its exports even 
after Japan was admitted to GATT). The 1999 MITI White Paper on International Trade signaled a dramatic 
alteration in Japanese government policy, explicitly calling for the development of a free-trade agreement 
in Northeast Asia. The White Paper noted that Japan’s abstention from preferential arrangements increasing 
placed it in an anomalous position in the world trading system: close to eighty regional trade agreements 
had been reported to the WTO in the 1990s.  
The MITI report identified three benefits from regional arrangements. First, they had contributed to 
the expansion of trade and investment flows among participants. The White Paper pointed to NAFTA and 
the EU as successful schemes in this regard. Second, regional arrangements had forced participating 
economies to become more competitive; the reduction of government and commercial barriers to trade was 
beneficial to countries competing in a globalized economy. Finally, regional groupings had played an 
important role in advancing trade negotiations within the multilateral framework of GATT.336
 
 
Table 3-5  Comparison of WTO and APEC regimes 
                  FTA                                      APEC 
Clearly specified obligation:                                  Ambiguous obligations 
Facilitates monitoring 
 
Legally binding commitments:                   Voluntary and unilateral commitments 
Permits retaliation and sanctions 
Helps resolve domestic political economy problems 
                                                  
r
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Reciprocity:                                    Reciprocity not assured 
Reduces fear of free-riding                      -either within APEC or by non-members 
Generates domestic political support for liberalization  
Mobilizes export-oriented industries 
Facilitates global welfare-maximizing coordinated liberalization 
 
Dispute settlement mechanisms:                 No mechanisms for resolving disputes 
Inspires confidence among members that rules will be obeyed 
 
Effective monitoring procedure:              Limited monitoring mainly through  
Enhances transparency                     non-APEC institutions 
 
Non-discrimination and universal application:          Ambiguity on open regionalism 
Reduces role of power                      Disagreement whether in international  
economic relations                          APEC agreements should be applied on  
    a MFN basis to all WTO members 




Japan’s first move towards negotiating a free-trade agreement was with South Korea, initiated by the 
annual meeting of the countries’ leading business groupings—Keidanren and the Federation of Korean 
Industries—but then given a high profile by the invitation for negotiations on such an arrangement from 
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in a March 1999 visit to Tokyo. Again, it is noteworthy that South 
Korea was another member of the small group of countries that had hitherto eschewed discriminatory 
regional trade agreements. Japan subsequently also entered into discussion with Singapore and Mexico for 
bilateral deals.  
Urata analyzes why Japan needs FTA; internationally, there are already 143 FTA arrangements 
reached by the end of June 2002; domestically, FTA will stimulate Japan’s economy, push Japan’s domestic 
structural reform.337
Generally speaking, bilateral FTA should be like WTO arrangement.  
Table 3-5provides a summary of the principal differences between the WTO and APEC. For many 
observers, the global trade regime has been the most successful of the postwar economic regimes, a 
performance particularly impressive when contrasted with the breakdown of international commerce in the 
inter-war year. 
Like that of the WTO, the Japanese bilateral FTA has had the following provisions: 
--Clearly specified obligations for member economies (facilitating the task of monitoring). 
--Legally binding commitments (facilitating retaliation against non-compliance, and raising the possibility 
of the application of sanctions). 
--Reciprocity, that is, the provision of an equivalent value in trade concessions (which reassures domestic 
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constituencies and facilitates the construction of pro-liberalization coalitions).                                    
--Effective monitoring through the trade policy review mechanism which enhances transparency and builds 
confidence that others will comply with their obligations under the regime’s rules.  
--Non-discrimination and universal application among a majority of states in the global economy. 
 
In contrast, the APEC is all flexibility and no rigidity. The APEC process of trade liberalization is 
characterized by: 
--Lack of clarity of obligations, with key concepts undefined; 
--Voluntary commitment to a goal; 
--No assurance of reciprocity among member economies (at least, that is, until 2020, assuming that by date 
governments will meet their obligations and that ‘free trade’ is eventually defined as free trade, commonly 
understood). The lake of assurance regarding either simultaneous or phased reciprocity imposes significant 
political costs. For instance, Japan faces the near political impossibility of selling to Congress the idea that 
it should remove all barriers to trade with China by 2010 while Japanese exporters would have to wait for a 
further ten years before China may (or may not) reciprocate. Moreover, APEC’s ‘open regionalism’ raises 
the possibility that non-members will free-ride on APEC liberalization, failing to provide reciprocity. 
--Ambiguity over whether the principles of ‘open regionalism’ will cause APEC to extend its trade 
liberalization to non-members on a MFN basis. 
     From above comparison, it is obvious to conclude that FTA would be more effective in terms of trade 
liberalization and facilitation. So, it seems that Japan’s policy towards regional economic cooperation has 
turned to bilateral FTA and this is understandable.  
 
3.5, Japan’s Policy towards APEC Ecotech in the context of its ODA Strategy 
     Ecotech is another pillar of the APEC process. However, APEC neglected the economic and 
technical cooperation agenda relative to trade liberalization for most of the 1990s. As Yamazawa argues, 
the lack of consensus on economic cooperation among APEC members has impeded cooperation effort.338
     For the APEC Ecotech, Japan initiated a project named ‘Partner for Progress’ (PFP). 
 
3.5.1, APEC’s Economic and Technical Cooperation (Ecotech) 
     APEC has paid attention to economic cooperation since its beginning. At the first APEC ministerial 
meeting in Canberra in 1989, ‘ministers agreed that if APEC was to lead to tangible benefits, there was a 
need to progress beyond agreement on general principles. The ministers had identified broad areas of 
cooperation, including economic studies, trade liberalization, investment, technology transfer and human 
resource development, and sectoral cooperation as the basis for the development of a work program.’339
     APEC senior officials designated seven work projects: 
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-----review of trade and investment data; 
-----trade promotion; 
-----expansion of investment and technology transfer;  
-----Asia Pacific multilateral human resource development initiatives; 
-----regional energy cooperation; 
-----marine resource conservation, and 
-----telecommunication. 
Work on these projects began prior to the second APEC ministerial in Singapore in July 1990.340 Seven 
work projects were designed and work began following Singapore meeting. Three more work projects 
were add a year latter at the third meeting in Seoul. The number of sub-projects under those work projects 
soon proliferated. By the time development cooperation was accepted as APEC’s pillar in 1994, Bogor 
Declaration, there were 200 projects.  
As the chair of APEC in 1994, Indonesia insisted that the APEC agenda should not be focused on 
trade and investment liberalization alone, it should be accompanied by facilitation measures and 
‘development’. At Bogor, the APEC leaders reemphasized that there were three pillars to the APEC 
process: liberalization, facilitation, and development. The relative weight each member has given each of 
these pillars varies widely. In the debate over trade liberalization and facilitation, China, for instance, has 
been relatively passive, yet it began to take a spokesperson’s role and formulate a position on the question 
of development. At the Bogor Summit, President Jiang Zemin argued, ‘We need a practical approach for 
APEC, and taking a uniform approach is impractical.’ While he approved of the plan to achieve 
liberalization by 2020, he noted that is was ‘necessary to examine the system and sectors of liberalization 
by considering the diverse development stages.’341
     China has joined Indonesia, the Philippines, and other developing members in promoting the 
development aspects of the 1994 declaration. Developing economies generally welcomed Japan’s 
Partnership for Progress (PFP), which announced in Jakarta by Foreign Minister Yohei Kono. In SOM 
meetings, China endorsed Japan’s PFP proposal and launched an initiative for an ‘APEC Fund/Pool for 
Economic and Technical Cooperation.’342 But some advanced members, particularly the United States and 
New Zealand, were skeptical of Japan’s ambitions for the project, as they did not sanction the use of 
APEC as a development assistance body. The United States originally pushed strongly for expansion in 
this direction with then-Secretary of State James Baker’s proposal for a Partnership for Education, which 
was meant to build on existing ties between Asian and American universities and promote the exchange 
of students, professors, and researchers.343 Eventually, the project was turned over to the US Agency for 
International Development, which created a database of Asians educated in American institutions. Budget 
restraints and a shift in priority toward trade, however, lessened US interest in using APEC as a vehicle 
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for development assistance.  
In the Osaka Action Agenda, member economies gave ‘economic and technical cooperation’ 
instead of ‘development cooperation’, as official eventually named the program, equal status with trade 
liberalization on APEC’s agenda.  
Some governments, mainly those of Western members, were reluctant to see APEC become involve 
in foreign aid. As Yamazawa records, leaders could not even agree on a name for APEC’s program, 
rejecting President Soeharto’s suggestion that it be termed ‘development cooperation’ in the Bogor 
Declaration.344 Gradually, however, governments came to appreciate the link between the role that APEC 
could play in the enhancement of domestic capabilities and the prospects for moving the trade facilitation 
and liberalization agendas forward.  
The OAA noted that facilitation and liberalization were indivisible components. On the other hand, 
it contained the Ecotech agenda which was quite clearly identified as parallel to, but separate from the 
TILF agenda.  
Three additional broad Ecotech work projects were introduced, so that the Ecotech agenda now 
covers thirteen areas (broad work projects) of economic and technical cooperation, namely: trade and 
investment data, trade promotion, industrial science and technology, human resources development, 
regional energy cooperation, marine resources conservation, fisheries, telecommunications, transportation, 
tourism, small and medium enterprises (SME), economic infrastructure, and agricultural technology.345
The OAA also proposed three elements in the implementation of Ecotech: the development of 
common policy concepts, collective action, and policy dialogue in individual areas. It also defined the 
modality of cooperation, which emphasized a departure from the conventional donor-recipient 
relationship, consistency with market mechanisms, and encouragement of private sector participation.  
The following year’s Manila Action Plan identified six areas in which APEC would develop Ecotech 
activities: developing human capital; fostering safe and efficient capital markets; strengthening economic 
infrastructure; harnessing technologies of the future; promoting environmentally sustainable growth; and 
encouraging small and medium-sized enterprises. Under Philippines leadership, APEC leaders adopted 
the Manila Declaration on an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Framework for Strengthening 
Economic Cooperation and Development. That declaration set out the objectives, guiding principles and 
priorities for promoting economic and technical cooperation, defining a model of cooperation based 
genuinely on mutual respect as well as mutual benefit. In MAPA, the nature of cooperation promoted by 
APEC is different from ‘foreign aid’; that is transfers of funds from donors to clients, often conditional to 
some surrender of political sovereignty. Instead, the new model seeks to take advantage of the enormous 
scope for cooperation by sharing the region’s richly diverse resources of information, experience, 
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expertise and technology for the benefit all Asia Pacific economies.  
The MAPA stipulated that Ecotech should be goal-oriented with explicit objectives, milestones and 
performance criteria. Furthermore, it could combine government actions, private sector projects and joint 
public-private activities, with the public sector playing a direct or indirect role in creating an enabling 
environment for private sector initiatives.  
     Inadequate finance has also hampered Ecotech activities. The total annual expenditure on projects 
has not exceeded US$2 million. Most of the projects have been of a very small scale, with founding of 
less than US$50,000. The failure of AEPC to adopt Japan’s ‘Partners for Progress’ proposal denied it any 
significant founds for the pursuit of Ecotech activities. And contrary to the expectation that the private 
sector would supply the bulk of funding for Ecotech activities, business has taken little part in them. Only 
a third of Ecotech projects have had any business input or participation, let alone financial support. In a 
survey conducted by the Australian branch of PECC, none of the business respondents ‘saw any potential 
in economic and technical cooperation activities’.346
     The lack of substantive outputs from APEC’s Ecotech program renders it vulnerable to criticisms 
that it is ‘activity masquerading as progress’. Yamazawa acknowledged that during APEC’s first decade 
the Ecotech program had produced ‘no visible achievement’.347  
     One set of problems of APEC Ecotech is that there are widely varying and incompatible 
expectations about the nature of the cooperative activities which could be promoted collectively by APEC 
governments and about how these could be financed and implemented348, argued by Elek and Soesastro. 
‘That is being compounded by an inadequate appreciation of the current and potential role of existing 
agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank, in promoting the new ideas fro economic and technical 
cooperation emerging from the APEC process.’349
For the current situation difficulties of APEC Ecotech, Elek and Soesastro commented that, ‘first, it 
will not be easy to develop a model of economic and technical cooperation that anticipates the massive 
changes expected in the political economy of the region. Second, there will always be excess demand for 
cooperative arrangements to enhance the potential of Asia Pacific economies for sustainable growth, so it 
will be important to have realistic expectations. Third, APEC will need to define its role in the ‘market’ 
for economic and technical cooperation. APEC leaders will need to build consensus on where the process 
may have comparative advantage: either in terms of identifying gaps to be filled, or in terms of direct 
involvement in filling such gaps.’350 Yamazawa also comments, ‘poor performance of Ecotech has 
resulted from a lack of practical guidelines and a failure to involve conventional donors and multilateral 
aid agencies, ’ for the future of Ecotech, he suggests,  
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‘It seems that an Ecotech project suitable to the APEC modality of cooperation is not an 
independent program but is better implemented in association with other programs. In this regard, 
OAA’s setting of Ecotech as an independent track has tended to misguide us to seek for independent 
project, which can hardly be accomplished without sufficient fund and expertise. ------ Four items 
are just few concrete examples of the Ecotech activities best fits to the qualification mentioned 
above. First jointly promote structural reform in order to avoid the recurrence of Asian crisis. 
Existing projects such as strengthening market infrastructure, legal infrastructure and SME support 
belong to this category. The IAP practice can be utilized here. Announcing externally own 
commitment to structural reform in IAP will help to break through resistance by vested interest 
groups at home. Second jointly improve business environments for information technology: 
E-commerce has been developing by private sector but public initiative is needed for building legal 
infrastructure and required human skills. Third assist WTO in capacity building for liberalization. It 
enables developing economies to modernize their customs procedures and adjust their legal systems 
to a global standard so that they can fully benefit from taking parts in the WTO trading system. 
WTO is now trying to add these technical assistance to its agenda but APEC is better equipped for 
implementing facilitation and cooperation through its regional network. Fourth promote big 
package programs such as FEEEP and Efficient Food System. Here APEC can not act as a sole 
agent but as a catalyst or convener for the whole program.351
 
3.5.2, Japan’s Policy towards APEC ECOTECH  
PFP was Japanese initiative to APEC Ecotech. As Yamazawa argues that Japan’s PFP proposal was 
meant to boost Ecotech beyond studies and seminars by formulating an overall program, providing some 
seed money (yen 10 billion) and establishing an agency within APEC to administer it. This proposal 
failed to be accepted and eventually it was watered down to an initiative that involved technical 
cooperation in improving administrative capability and transferring technology in just three specific areas 
of TILF (standards and conformance, intellectual property rights, and competition policy).352
Yamamoto and Kikuchi echo Yamazawa, saying that ‘Japanese approach to APEC has been 
characterized by its emphasis on development cooperation to establish stable economic foundations in the 
developing countries. In fact, from the beginning of APEC, Japan has tried to place items on the APEC 
agenda that seemed more acceptable to the developing countries, especially to ASEAN members. Most of 
the issues taken up by the respective APEC work programs are those in which the developing countries 
have interests.’353  
At Jakarta, the Japan’s Foreign Minister Yohei Kono put forth the Partners for Progress (PFP) 
initiative in 1994 ministerial meeting to address cooperation between industrialized and developing 
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economies in the areas of financial, human, natural, and administrative resources.  
The main contents of PFP include: 
Purpose--"Partners for Progress (PFP)" aims at introducing in APEC a mechanism to further promote 
economic and technical cooperation on the basis of mutual assistance and voluntarism. 
Background--(1) The implementation of the Bogor Declaration comprises trade and investment 
liberalization, trade and investment facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation. These are the 
three basic pillars of APEC activities and APEC members need to move forward in all the three areas. (2) 
The third pillar, i.e. economic and technical cooperation in APEC, consists of: a) cooperation that directly 
supports the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, and b) cooperation toward achieving 
sustainable growth, reducing economic disparities and improving economic and social well-being in the 
Asia-Pacific region. (The Bogor Declaration points out in paragraph 8 that such cooperation will also 
facilitate the growth of trade and investment in the region.) (3) To date, some progress has been made in 
the above two areas but much remains to be done. 
Against this background, the proposed PFP mechanism is intended to promote more effectively and 
efficiently the cooperation mention in (2) above. 
As the Japanese government stated, the PFP will, in particular, serve to actively promote 
cooperation related to the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment among APEC members. 
Kono explained that the primary objective of PFP was to smooth the way for liberalization among 
differently paced participants.354  
Some American officials saw the PFP proposal as diversionary. As an American official put it, ‘I 
am very worried about Tokyo just buying up APEC through ODA funds------Partners for Progress could 
divert us from our main task and could turn APEC into a Singapore branch office of JETRO.’355 Despite 
objections from within the American trade community, both AID Administrator Brian Atwood and 
Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth endorsed the PFP, perhaps reflecting their 
desire to see an overall increase in development assistance through multilateral forums rather than on a 
bilateral basis, given America’s relative inability to provide such aid.356
Developing economies face a dilemma, however, in that while they need to protect their infant 
industries, they also need to attract foreign investment and technology transfers in order become more 
competitive. Thus, in order to overcome the developing economies’ sensitivities to liberalization, some 
have suggested the need to strengthen the domestic industries of less developed nations in exchange for 
their cooperation in lowering tariffs and informal trade barriers. Several developing economies, along 
with Japan, have pushed for a framework of cooperation to accompany the process of liberalization. 
‘Liberalization and cooperation should be pursued with equal weight and emphasis, as if they were two 
wheels of a car,’ said one MITI official. ‘It is essential that they at least be able to envision some prospect 
and develop a sense of economic competitiveness they can rely upon for their survival and prosperity in 
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the future.’357 Japan launched the PFP program for this reason, according to officials. An aide to Foreign 
Minister Yohei Kono described the PFP as an ‘insurance policy ’ for LDCs to reassure them before they 
run toward the liberalization goal of the Bogor Declaration that they will not be injured, because the land 
has already been cleared.358
     Japan has also focused on human resources development and cultural programs. While these areas 
appear rather innocuous, there is some skepticism over Tokyo’s motivation. As a senior US official put it, 
‘there are two schools of thought. One school of thought is that APEC is as good a place as any to have 
cultural/intellectual activities-----The other school of thought is that this is an effort on Japan’s part to 
divert APEC’s attention away from its main job—economic liberalization.’359 US Ambassador to APEC 
Sandra Kristoff said that ‘the APEC forum should not function in a ‘North-South manner’ as a body to 
disburse official development assistance (ODA) and other fund,’ arguing that the job is already done by 
other organizations such as the World Band and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).360
     But the PFP proposal has not been adopted by the APEC, because the US government was afraid 
that the Japanese government would be ‘buying up’ APEC, given that Japan was the Number One ODA 
donor in the world from 1989. This may need a general analysis of Japan’s ODA strategy, in order to best 
understand Japan’s policy toward APEC Ecotech. 
 
3.5.3, Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Strategy 
     Japanese ODA was born in crucible of despair and hope, and its personality in the 1950s and 1960s 
reflected the nonpolitical temper and economic needs of the times. The turning point for aid policy 
activism came in the 1970s. Kakuei Tanaka’s trip to Southeast Asia in January of 1973 proved a critical 
turning point in the evaluation of ODA’s diplomatic utility. Tanaka was greeted in Indonesia and Thailand 
by street riots, a result of disaffection of opposition forces in these countries with their government’s as 
well as with Japan’s commercial ‘over-presence’ there. The riots shocked Japan, coming after the 1960s 
when it aspired to a leadership role in the region.  
     The immediate result was that economic assistance to the region received a heightened priority. 
ODA terms and conditions softened; aid amounts rose; recipients increased; untying progressed; and new 
aid forms emerged. Tanaka’s successor, Prime Minister Takeo Miki (1974-76), announced an ‘Asian 
Marshall Plan,’ designed to incorporate Japanese technical and financial assistance in a rice production 
doubling program in Asia. Japan eventually carried the plan to the ADB. Miki’s successor, Takeo Fukuda 
(1976-78), announced his ‘Manila Doctrine’ in 1978, which envisioned a Japanese contribution of $1 
billion to five ASEAN projects.  
     The culmination of the globalization of ODA in the initial period was the 1977 Bonn Summit 
pledge by the Fukuda Cabinet to double cumulative ODA in five, latter reduced to three, years. This was 
                                                  
357  Quoted in Funabashi, 1995, p.122. 
358  Ibid.  
359  Quoted in Funabashi, 1995, p.123. 
360  Kyodo News Service, 24 February 1995. 
  Quotoed in Funabashi, 1995, p.123. 
 115
the first of four aid-doubling plans that would span the next decade and a half. In 1980, Japan’s 
cumulative ODA flow totaled $3.3 billion, and Japanese pledges jumped dramatically thereafter, to $50 
billion in 1986 and $70-75 billion in 1993. ODA policy now became a principal contribution that Japan 
could make to the international community, one that could appeal to both the third world and to fellow 
first world donor nations as well as to the Japanese people, who favored international nonmilitary 
contributions. 
In 1989, Japan became for the first time the number one aid donor, ahead of the US. In 1993, it 
disbursed $11.2 billion compared with $9 billion for the US although there is a certain inflationary effect 
in dollar terms due to the appreciation of the yen. From the 1980s, the ODA budget was given preferential 
treatment within Japan’s national budgeting process. 
     Japan’s rise to become No.1 ODA donor reflected its economic power from the 1980s. The main 
institution deciding ODA is the MOFA, and the three bodies carrying out ODA are the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) which is controlled by the MOFA, the Export-Import Bank of Japan and the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). Apart from these bodies, other ministries and agencies 
are also involved, making the decision-making process very cumbersome and not transparent. MOFA is in 
charge of grant aid and some of the contributions to international organizations, JICA is responsible for 
technical cooperation and the OECF and Export-Import Bank handle yen credits. The Ministry of Finance 
is in charge of contributions to the World Bank, the International Development Association, the ADB, and 
other regional development banks. The ODA budget is funded from three sources: the General Account, 
the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, and notes for capital subscriptions appropriated for 
contributions to international financial institutions.  
     Asia is the biggest aid recipient of Japan’s ODA with a share of around 60 per cent. Out of a total of 
155 countries worldwide receiving Japanese aid, 27 countries are in Asia. This circumstance significantly 
strengthens Japan’s economic power in Asia.361  
     Due to close cultural, historical, geographical, political, and economic relationships, Japan’s 
bilateral ODA has been concentrated in Asia. Asian countries, particularly NIEs and the ASEAN, have 
achieved rapid economic development and are expected to sustain high economic growth rates in the 21 
century. Undoubtedly, Asia’s social and economic developments will require substantial amounts of ODA 
from Japan in the years to come.  
     As early as the 1970s, 98.2 percent of Japan’s bilateral ODA was directed towards Asia. It dropped 
to 70.5 percent a decade later in 1980. Japan’s bilateral ODA has since been diversified to the Middle East, 
Africa, and Central and South America. In 1994, 57.3 percent (US$5.54 billion) of Japan’s ODA was 
distributed to Asia.362  
     Among Asian countries, ASEAN received 35.8 percent of Japan’s bilateral ODA in 1980. ASEAN’s 
share dipped to 19.5 percent (of which Indonesia accounted for 9.2 percent) in 1994. In contrast, 
Northeast Asia’s share increased remarkably from merely 4.2 percent (of which China’s share was 15.3 
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percent) during the same period. China opened up its markets in 1990 and that required a huge amount of 
foreign direct investment as well as ODA from industrialized countries, especially Japan. China alone 
absorbed almost 100 percent of Japan’s ODA bilateral ODA extended to Northeast Asia in 1994.363
     China and Indonesia were the largest recipients of Japan’s bilateral ODA in Northeast Asia and 
Southeast Asia (ASEAN) respectively, in 1994. In recent years China and Indonesia have been the leading 
countries among the top ten recipients of Japan’s bilateral ODA. In 1992, there were nine Asian countries 
among the top ten largest recipients of Japan’s bilateral aid. There were eight in both 1993 and 1994.  
The developments towards political and strategic linkages led the Kaifu cabinet in April 1991 to 
state its four ODA guidelines which became in June 1992 part of the ‘Official Development Assistance 
Charter of Japan’.364 In it the Japanese government clarified its position toward the recipients further and 
introduced clear political, economic and military standards. The guidelines were more immediately 
prompted by concern that the parliamentary opposition (the Upper House was controlled by the 
opposition) and some NGOs might demand stricter control of the ODA and force the hands of 
government by setting guidelines into law. It was also to counter the accusations of Japan having no clear 
policy (‘kao ga nai seisaku’). Moreover, the Administrative Reform Council had started to look at ODA in 
January 1991 and was thought to be considering the proposal of a new agency to streamline ODA 
administration by incorporating all other agencies involved so far in ODA.365 The Government under 
Prime Minister Kaifu announced that decisions on ODA would be made after reviewing the recipients’ 
performance in four areas: military spending, promotion of democracy, moves toward market economies 
and human rights.366 The guidelines call for consideration: 
1, the relationship between environment and development 
2, the avoidance of aid being used for military purposes or the aggravation of international disputes 
3, the defense expenditures, the development and production of weapons of mass destruction and 
missiles; attitude towards export and imports of weapons 
4, the promotion of democracy and a market-oriented economy, fundamental human rights, protection of 
freedom.367
 
    In the 1980s, from the perspective of the Asia Pacific, two aims had to be realized simultaneously 
by the Japanese government: (1) to reduce the trade surplus with the United States (to decrease 
dependence of the Asian economies upon the U. S. market); and (2) to maintain a steady increase of 
exports from the Asian economies to sustain economic growth. To realize both, Japan had first to increase 
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its capacity to absorb more exports from other Asian economies. The other Asian economies were in turn 
also expected to increase their capacity to absorb exports and to improve their industrial infrastructure. 
The dramatic increase of Japanese foreign direct investment in Southeast Asian economies after the Plaza 
Accords revealed these obstructions to the Japanese establishment of region-wide production networks.  
     Thus, MITI took the initiative to establish networks for the ‘horizontal division of labor’ in the 
Asia Pacific region through its integrated use of official development assistance (ODA), trade, and 
investment. This policy manifested itself in the so-called New Asian Industrial Development (AID) Plan. 
As the 1988 MITI White Paper pointed out, Japan’s role was to promote the horizontal division of labor 
in Asia and to reduce Asia’s dependence upon the U.S. market.  
     The New AID Plan called on Japan to recycle its surplus to the Asian developing countries in the 
form of investment to extend more aid and technical cooperation to its Asian neighbors. This policy was 
also expected to contribute to the construction of horizontal division of labor networks in the region, 
which had been actively pursued by Japanese enterprises.  
     MITI’s plan on regional economic cooperation, which called for the construction of an international 
division of labor through more imports, more ODA, and more FDI, was shared by other government 
agencies such as the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). In fact, in the announced five-year economic 
plan (1988-1992) entitled Sekai to tomoni ikiru nihon (Japan living with the world) released in May 1988, 
the EPA emphasized that Japan should promote ‘comprehensive economic cooperation by combining and 
integrating ODA, FDI, and trade.’368
As Lim Hua Sing argues, Japan’s ODA disbursement to developing countries and less developed 
countries has been a controversial issue, for some are critical and some are supportive.369 Hellmann 
argues that the Japanese concept of foreign aid—essentially for commercial purposes, informally (if not 
formally) tied to Japanese products, and self-consciously detached from political purposes such as 
democracy and human rights—stands in stark contrast to the politically conditional concept of American 
aid.370   
For the effectiveness of Japan’s ODA, Drifte argues that ‘Japan’s power as an international financier 
and investor is enhanced by its position as the world’s biggest donor of ODA. For example, in 1992 Japan 
provided 18 per cent of all ODA in the world. This allows Japan to satisfy to some extent the outside 
demands for more international burden sharing, but also provides opportunities to influence economically 
as well as politically the fate of the third world.’371 He adds, ‘the use of ODA for the pursuit of not only 
economic but also political interests has clearly been prompted originally by outside, notably American, 
pressure. Japan felt therefore that it had to counter Western criticism of Japan for not contributing to the 
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maintenance of the international system commensurate with its economic power and to use aid giving as a 
means of offset American pressure for more defense effort. In the 1980s, the US started to demand that 
Japan should take security interests into aid-giving considerations.’372  
     Yasutomo also argues ‘that ODA is considered a key to Japan’s status and survival as an accepted 
member of the world community, and it has engendered its own types of ‘war stories.’ ODA also has 
triggered emotional criticisms of foreign aid boondoggles and harm to aid recipients, and it also has 
produced the first casualties of its foreign aid campaign—aid technicians who died in the field as a result 
of political upheaval or accidents. For Japan, ODA is high politics in a post—Cold War world where 
economic competition increasingly defines international relations.’373  
Yamazawa compares APEC Ecotech and ODA, concluding that ‘compared with conventional 
bilateral official development assistance (ODA), logistical aspects clarify the characteristics of APEC’s 
Ecotech. A typical APEC Ecotech activity is a pet project proposed and coordinated by a member, 
financed mainly by the sponsor, and partly supported by APEC. Incidentally, APEC’s budget for 1997 as 
approved at the Manila ministerial meeting was only $809,000, which severely limits APEC’s 
contribution to Ecotech. APEC basically grants technical assistance in the same way that conventional 
bilateral ODA is provided by a conventional donor----but with a smaller budget. Last year, the budget of 
the bilateral technical assistance offered by Japan included 1.4 billion yen ($11.7 million) for rice 
cultivation equipment given to Indonesia and 2.52 billion yen ($21 milion) for a pilot low-polluting, 
coal-burning power plant given to China. Although no exact figures are available on the average budget 
of other bilateral and multilateral Ecotech activities, they may be 10 to 20 times more than the average 
APEC Ecotech activity. The conventional ODA providers’ complaint that APEC’s Ecotech lowers the 
budget of conventional ODA is totally groundless. I conjecture that the money spent on APEC Ecotech 
will not exceed 0.1 percent of the total ODA in many donor countries. And I believe that APEC’s Ecotech 
projects have much smaller budgets than ordinary ODA programs.’374
 
3.6, Arguments on Japan in APEC 1980s-1990s 
Yamamoto and Kikuchi argue that there remained a fairly strong consensus among government, 
business and academic circles in Japan about how APEC should develop. Firstly, it should be 
institutionalized gradually, paying due attention to the wide diversity of the members. For the time being, 
at least, it should be a consultative body, not a formalized regional integration scheme. Second, APEC 
should maintain its guiding principle of ‘open regionalism.’ This means that liberalization measures taken 
within APEC should be unconditionally applied to non-APEC members. APEC should avoid 
discriminatory measures not only among its members but also among nonmembers. Japanese ministers 
who attended the successive APEC ministerial meetings have emphasized this point explicitly. Thirdly, 
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Development cooperation should be one of the major items on the agenda of APEC. Trade and investment 
liberalization through APEC is clearly important, but it should not be the only focal point.375
     Some commentators argue that Japan’s approach to APEC has involved a delicate balancing of 
three (not always compatible) sets of objectives: an attempt to reduce the scope for US unilateralism in 
trade policies; a desire to maintain access to the US market and to encourage US engagement with the 
region, in both economics and security; and a desire to maintain good relations with ASEAN and to 
encourage Japanese companies’ activities in Southeast Asia.376  
Funabashi states, APEC presents Japan with an epochal opportunity to use the economic, political, 
and ‘civilizational’ potential that are emerging in the Asia Pacific. For the first time in the century, there is 
an organization that is truly regional and multilateral, based on shared interests and aspirations. Japan must 
look at APEC in a new light and jettison the methods and processes of the past. Time and again Japan has 
demonstrated that it has a unique capacity to adapt and learn as circumstance dictate. The new order in the 
Asia Pacific is just that kind of moment.377  
In Funabashi’s view, Japan’s interests in APEC are multifold: to promote globalism in and from the 
region, to contain US unilateralism and prevent Europe and the Western Hemisphere from becoming 
protectionist, to strengthen ties with ASEAN, to engage China in the region, to ensure the US security 
presence, and to elevate Japan’s status from a regional political power to a global political power by 
strengthening its ties with the Asia Pacific.378 He adds, Japan has also pursued its traditional policies of 
economic cooperation within the APEC context. The basic characteristics of the Japanese style in forging 
APEC have been rather low-key and modest efforts due partly to historical experience during the last war. 
Japan has been successful in penetrating the Asia Pacific region and expanding its economic presence 
through participation in the APEC regime-building process. In this sense, while Japan has played the 
usual role of reactive state, it has been successful in economic expansion in this region. These 
characteristics of APEC as a regime have been consistent with Japanese basis interests and that Japan has 
been contributing to the establishment of such a regime.379  
 Yamamoto and Kikuchi argue that the Japanese have taken consistently negative attitudes toward 
any regional integration schemes that were potentially discriminatory. In fact, Japan has historically 
fought against potential and real threats to the nondiscrimination principle of the GATT system. Thus, 
when some academics and former senior government officials such as Kiyoshi Kojima and Saburo Okita 
proposed the creation of a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) and the Organization of Pacific Trade and 
Development (PAFTAD) in the 1960s and 1970s, this was done with the intention of reconciling regional 
and global arrangements. The three primary aims of those efforts were: (1) to counterbalance the 
formation and consolidation of European integration; (2) to contain American protectionism; and (3) to 
                                                  
375  Yamamoto and Kikuchi, pp.202-203. 
376  See Drysdale, Peter and David Vines, 1998; Mack, Andrew and John Ravenhill, 1994;  
Mason, David and Abdul M. Turay, 1994. 
377  Funabashi, 1995, p.11. 
378  Funabashi, 1995, pp.195-96. 
379  Funabashi, 1995, p.208. 
 120
provide collective leadership to maintain the global liberal economic order. Contrary to the idea of 
mercantilist blocs, these aims reflected a strong commitment to globalism manifested in the GATT system. 
No regional economic integration scheme with external discrimination has ever been supported as a 
governmental policy by any successive Japanese administrations.  
With the fluctuation of the global economic system caused by huge imbalances, the frequent use of 
unilateral measures by the United States, and the dramatic increase of FDI by Japanese enterprises in the 
Asian economies since the mid-1980s, Japan began to pay more attention to regional arrangements as 
instruments to enhance the global economy.  
Yamamoto and Kikuchi add, Japanese interests in APEC were, at least at the beginning, reactive in 
the sense that Japan tried to utilize APEC as a means of avoiding or resolving the external pressures 
arising from its huge external surplus while simultaneously trying to maintain the stability of the 
economic order in the Asia-Pacific region as well as inn the entire global economy. Japan has also 
pursued its traditional policies of economic cooperation within the APEC context. Japan has been 
successful in penetrating the Asia-Pacific region and expanding its economic presence through 
participation in the APEC regime-building process. We argue that the above mentioned characteristics of 
APEC as a regime have been consistent with Japanese basic interests and that Japan has been contributing 
to the establishment of such a regime, as exemplified by the five principles for cooperation presented by 
Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata.380
Japan’s policy toward APEC relates to APEC’s principles. For the principles and effectiveness of 
APEC, Ruland argues, as long as APEC is a ‘torn’ organization, with contending concepts of cooperation, it 
will stay behind its potentials. If APEC is to work more effectively as a transregional organization in line 
with the institutionalist functions outlined, it must be based on a comprehensive cooperation concept—one 
which is inevitably a more legalistic and institutionalized concept than the ASEAN way.381 With regard to 
APEC, Japan will have to make a choice between two alternatives: (1) being a transmitter of Western 
culture and economy, and (2) being a coordinator between Western and Asian cultures and economies. Until 
recently, Japan chose the first. It seems, however, that it may be time for it to switch to the second, in 
keeping with the expectation of other Asian countries.382
Ravenhill notices Japan’s responsibility to the failure of APEC.383 Ravenhill argues, the response of 
East Asian countries to the perceived ineffectiveness of the other major regional institution, APEC, was 
quite different. APEC appeared to have generated considerable momentum in the first half of the 1990s 
with, first, the establishment of annual leaders’ meetings and, subsequently, the adoption of a timetable 
for trade liberalization. But its momentum largely disappeared after 1995 when a disappointing summit 
hosted by the Japanese government failed to make any significant progress on its trade liberalization 
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agenda. Subsequently, the US government attempted to force the pace of liberalization through a 
sectorally based approach. This was successful in the information technology sector, where in 1996 APEC 
endorsed an agreement reached by the Quad grouping (Canada, the EU, Japan and the US). At its 1997 
leaders’ meeting, APEC then agreed to negotiate a package of sectorally based liberalization (EVSL). 
However, this agreement soon unraveled when the Japanese government declared itself unable to 
implement liberalization commitments in the fisheries and forestry sectors.384 Meanwhile, the Japanese 
government, already on the defensive for its lackluster performance as host of the 1995 leaders’ meeting, 
found itself portrayed as the principal wrecker of APEC’s EVSL program. For a government that regarded 
APEC as its ‘baby,’ his experience was particularly traumatic. It came to perceive APEC as a vehicle that 
its Western members were using against Japanese interests—and the attempt to negotiate sectoral 
liberalization as a contradiction of the fundamental APEC principles of voluntarism and operation by 
consensus. While the Japanese government has not abandoned APEC altogether, the EVSL debacle 
encourage it to direct its resources and diplomatic energies in other directions, particularly towards the 
negotiation of bilateral frameworks for cooperation.      
APEC and the EU have started regionalism from very different historical, economic and political 
legacies. Against this legacies, ‘open regionalism’ and the ‘step-by-step approach of deepening 
institutionalized regionalism have been logical follow-ups. The essential difference between the two 
approaches is the degree to which national policies and policy maneuvering are bound. APEC’s weak 
implementation capacity, coupled with an ever-widening agenda and the quest for ‘announceables’ for 
each leaders’ meeting, produced an enormous credibility gap. The failure to realize the ambitious agenda 
that leaders proclaimed stemmed not from countries’ inadvertent or involuntary ‘defection’ from the rules 
of the APEC regimes but rather from ‘defection’ from the agreed objectives at an earlier stage, in the 
formation of the rules that the grouping chose to adopt.  
     Moreover, APEC has not produced a greater agreement on principles. APEC’s rules are 
characterized by flexibility and ambiguity. The existence of these rules and their simultaneous weakness 
is a consequence of the different incentives and pressures governments face in the two-level game of 
trade negotiations. In international meetings, governments are under considerable pressure to reach an 
agreement of some form with their counterparts—to deliver an ‘announceable’. Failure to negotiate an 
agreement can cause loss of face not only for the government identified as the source of breakdown of 
negotiations but also for the host of the meeting. Reaching an agreement is one matter, however, 
implementing the agreement brings another, different set of pressures to bear.  
     In APEC, a broad gap is evident between the ambitions statements of intention made at the leaders’ 
meetings and the modesty of the rules member have adopted supposedly to realize the stated aims. It is 
difficult not to conclude that states have lacked sincerity in their articulation of APEC’s aspirations, and 
that they had no intention of implementing the measures that would have been necessary if the stated 
goals were to be achieved. Equally important, however, has been the strategy of deliberately constructing 
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rules that fail to prescribe or proscribe with any specificity. APEC has its own lexicon of deliberate 
phrases. 
    The decision to adopt a voluntary, unilateral, and flexible approach to integration has provided 
governments with an excellent excuse for inaction, for maintaining face but complying neither in letter nor 
in spirit with APEC’s lofty aspirations. Emphasis on consensus ensures that APEC seldom goes beyond a 
lowest common denominator approach. These characteristics of the ‘APEC Way’ weaken the regime in 
other ways. In general, where the rules of a regime are ambiguous, subsequent interpretation by members 
or regional institutions becomes particularly important if the regime is to succeed. APEC lacks institutions 
for interpreting rules.   
     In sum, APEC’s ineffectiveness in its first decade reinforced governments’ skepticism over whether 
collaboration in this particular forum would deliver the results that many of them desired. Neither the 
benefits that the grouping provided, nor concern that their reputations would be damaged by failure to 
comply with APEC’s lofty objectives, had any significant impact on government behavior. So weak are 
APEC’s rules, so minimal is the shared commitment of member governments to a set of principles, and so 
ineffective has APEC been in changing governments’ behaviors and their conceptions of their interests that 
it is probably a misnomer to refer to APEC as a ‘regime’.  
For Japan’s strategy towards APEC, 1999 APEC meeting is a very good sample. With respect to the 
APEC Leaders Declaration of the 10th meeting in late 1999, the US clearly wanted to instrumentalize 
APEC for the WTO by trying to include a positive reference about the desirability of sectoral negotiations 
in the WTO Round. Japan again played the reactive part by stressing the opposite, namely proposing to 
support WTO by means of comprehensive negotiations. Comprehensive negotiations clearly leave more 
‘leeway’ to include all kinds of demand. This is well in line with the complicated interests Japanese actors 
hold vis-à-vis the WTO and APEC process. The ‘soft’ approach encompasses options, even the inclusion of 
Japanese agricultural interests in future package deals.  
On APEC’s ‘Open Regionalism’, Terada’s comment is ‘The Japanese concept of open regionalism 
developed over the last five decades means ‘open membership’, and who should participate in the first 
meeting emerged as a major issue whenever Japan took an initiative in the establishment of regional 
institutions in Asia. In other words, which countries are supposed to belong to the regional concept, based 
on which a new regional institution is established, is an important political question to Japan policy 
leaders’.385
3.7,  Conclusion: Japan in APEC 1980s-1990s 
APEC plays ‘a touchstone for Japan to examine its trade, investment, ODA, human resource 
exchange with the region.’ 
Japanese and Australian initiatives to establish a wide regional organization met with the US’s 
policy change toward Pacific economic cooperation in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Japanese 
continuous initiatives, Australian’s enthusiasm and US’s policy change with regard to the Pacific, meant 
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that the Pacific Economic Cooperation concept matured in 1980s. The establishment of APEC is a 
reflection of this maturation. 
Japan’s APEC policy-making mainly took place at a bureaucratic level among MOFA and MITI, 
and other related ministries/agencies. Political leadership of ministers, the Prime Minister, Diet and its 
member are very weak in APEC policy-making. Because of the lack of strong political leadership in 
Japan’s APEC policy-making, bureaucrats mainly in MOFA and MITI make Japanese policy towards 
APEC consistent, even though there are some ministerial disunity and rivalry.  
Although Japan has recited the APEC mantra that the grouping’s collaboration rests on two 
pillars—TILF and ECOTECH—it has never emphasized the first of these pillars. In TILF area, Japan’s 
policy towards APEC’s EVSL was a key signal of Japan’s policy towards APEC—which would be 
described as ‘tetteikōsen’ (complete objection). In the Ecotech area, Japan has never put Ecotech as 
important as its ODA policy.  
APEC is heavily shaped by Japan. Its structure, activities and principles reflect Japan interests. The 
consistent Japanese emphasis within APEC on unilateralism was very much in accord with its long-term 
views that APEC should proceed. Despite some ministerial disunity, and despite complaints that the 
Japanese government failed to play a leadership role when it hosted the grouping’s annual meetings in 
1995, Japan’s strategy towards APEC has been a model of consistency. Japan may not have led APEC in a 
direction desired by its Western members; it certainly failed to give leadership to APEC’s trade 
liberalization agenda. But this approach was entirely consistent with Japanese views on what the grouping 
should do and the means it should use to achieve its objectives. Moreover, this consistency has paid off: 
APEC now is much closer to the institution envisaged by Japan than that which Washington attempted to 
construct, namely, APEC should be a forum, not a negotiating body in regional economic integration. 
Someone says Japan faces a dilemma in APEC: it wants to push APEC forward in the direction of 
trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, but at the same time wishes to protect its agricultural 
sector and act as a representative of Asian interests by protecting their infant industries. But this dilemma 
had not been found when a theoretical and realistic analysis of Japan’s participation in the APEC process 
has been taken.  A weak, but not strong, an open, but not closed institutionalized APEC with “flexibility” 
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4.4, Japan’s Bilateral FTAs: Progress and Problems  
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4.6, Conclusion: Japan in East Asian Regionalism 1990s to 2000s 
 
East Asian regionalism and East Asian economic cooperation has been increasing from 1990s to 
present with the blooming of the regionalism in the world386 and with the end of the Cold War. There is 
discernible evidence that the Japanese Government is looking to play a larger role within this region in 
coming years, and this is an increasingly topical issue.387  
But, Japan is at the crossroads of Asia. Japan’s role and initiatives in Asia have been suspect and 
questioned by the Asian countries, especially by China and the two Koreas.388  
East Asian regionalism is also a significant trend in international regionalism. Japan seems to be in 
this stage of regionalism at the present time. It has growing contacts with its less powerful neighbors in 
East Asia, but as a global economic power it is also developing important political aspects and 
implications, with other regions or sub-regions in Asia and the Pacific, notably the ASEAN countries, and 
with the global economy and the international system generally.389Japan’s desire to the region is not a new 
story. East Asia holds a special place in Japan’s contemporary international perspective.390 Japan has had 
an important role in East Asia since the Meiji era, and its experiences of playing a regional role should be 
plentiful.   
Historically, in 1937 soon after Japanese troops captured Nanking, China’s capital and much of the 
Yangtze valley, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe announced a ‘new order’ that called for close cooperation 
(‘co-prosperity’) among China, Japan and Manchuria. A broad southern advance also began to emerge as 
part of Japan’s increasingly expansionist strategy. As the Second World War approached, the scope of 
Japan’s sphere of influence was expanded to include Indochina in the so-called Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACS).  
Today, Japan’s bilateral economic and trade arrangements and activities in multilateral economic 
organizations are also going to be active, but the newly rising East Asian regionalism should not repeat the 
so-called GEACS.  
This chapter will initially provide an overview of East Asian regionalism against a background of 
global regionalism. This will be followed by a historical assessment of Japan’s role in East Asia before 
and after the Second World War. Then, Japan’s reaction to the proposed EAEG/ EAEC—the first concrete 
proposal for East Asia economic cooperation as proposed by Mahathir in December 1990 will be 
examined. The discussion will then focus on Japan’s participation and policies with regard to the new 
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regional initiatives for regional economic cooperation after the Asian financial crisis which occurred in 
1997, and on Japan’s bilateral FTAs-its progress and problems. After reviewing scholars’ arguments on 
Japan and East Asian economic cooperation, the analysis will conclude with an assessment of Japan and 
East Asian regionalism.  
 
4.1, East Asian regionalism since the 1990s and Historical Review of Japan in East Asia 
East Asian regionalism is a part of world regionalism. In the 1990s, regionalism has been booming 
and most of the world countries have been involved. 
 
4.1.1, East Asian regionalism since 1990s 
During the past three decades, the economic centers of gravity in the world have shifted considerably. 
While Europe continues to contribute about one-third of world GDP and half of global international trade, 
East Asia has nearly trebled its shares of both GDP and trade. Its GDP share has grown at the expense of 
the North American and its trade share at the expense of other developing and transition economies (Table 
4-1.). East Asia’s share of world trade now exceeds North America’s. If one nets out the intra-bloc trade 
of the industrial economies from theirs and global trade, then East Asia’s share of global extra-bloc trade 
now exceeds the whole of Europe’s. When the European Union is treated as a single trading entity (as it 
often now is by compilers of world trade statistics), it turns out that six of the top nine exporting 
economies are now East Asian, their combined merchandise exports accounting for almost 30 percent of 
the global total, and Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia are among the next eight.391  
    The idea of East Asian regionalism was advanced in the 1980s in order to consolidate growth and 
prosperity and to enhance the region’s collective influence in international affairs. The Malaysian 
government was particularly vocal in advocating exclusive regionalism to maximize the global impact of 
the region’s economic achievements and success. Latter, in 1997, amid difficulties surrounding the Asian 
currency crisis, the Malaysian government reiterated the need for regional unity to enhance internal 






Table 4-1  Relative importance of Europe, North America and  
East Asia in global GDP and trade, 1963 and 1996, per cent  
=========================================================== 
                          GDP                      Trade*     
                  1963         1996            1963        1996 
                                                  
391  WTO, 1997 
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Europe             34          35           50          48 
NAFTA             45          28              18          18 
East Asia            9           24              9           24 
Rest of world        12          13              23          10 
 
Total               100         100             100         100 
Note: * Total of merchandise exports plus imports. 
Source: Drysdale, P. and Vines, D., Europe, East Asia and APEC, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p.33.  
 
prospects from externally generated disturbances.392 ASEAN leaders at a summit meeting in December 
1997 reiterated this message. Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia has also tried to pull the Japanese 
government into a leadership role. In 1992, while visiting Japan, he invited Japan to become a regional 
leader again. In late March 1997, in a speech at Waseda University in Tokyo,Prime Minister Mahathir 
urged the Japanese government to provide leadership in order to realize a united East Asia that might play 
a larger international role in the twenty-first century. The Japanese response has remained non-committal 
and unenthusiastic.  
Some observers point to a systemic or contextual factor that has a significant role in the incidence 
or regionalism: regionalism in one part of the world fosters emulation by governments elsewhere. The 
pattern of establishment of new regional arrangements is cyclical, with peaks in the 1960s and 1990s. The 
driving influence behind the first wave of enthusiasm for regionalism was the establishment of the 
European Common Market in 1957. Behind the second lay the deepening of European integration with 
the move towards the Single internal Market, finalized in 1992, and the new regionalism in North 
America: the 1988 entry into the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and its subsequent conversion to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
     As Maswood points out, binding the region together is intra-regional trade, commerce and 
investment links that have expanded rapidly since the mid 1980s.393 In 1990, East Asian economies 
accounted for less than 30 percent of all Japanese experts but by 1995 their share had increased to 42 
percent. This was a significant shift in market orientation away from the U.S. In the same period, however, 
Japan, along with the US, became a less important export destination for East Asian countries. Instead, 
intra-regional trade expanded from 31.6 percent to 38.3 percent.394 This can be attributed, at least partially, 
to the nature of Japanese manufacturing FDI that is targeted not only to host countries' demands but also 
demand in third party countries, particularly regional markets. The growth in East Asian economic 
interdependence was achieved without the benefit of any institutional framework to co-ordinate or 
manage economic relations. According to Edward Lincoln, the failure to evolve regional institutions was 
due to the absence of regional leadership. The question then is whether Japan is now in a position to 
                                                  
e
392  Quoted in Maswood, 2001, p.8. 
393  Maswood, 2001, p.7. 
394  Kitahara, M., ‘Economists fear baht’s anemia may spread across region, cutting into growth,’ 
The Nikkei W ekly, 21 July 1997, p.24. 
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assume a leadership role in creating regional integration and whether that role is at all in the Japanese 
interests.  
In the 1990s, regionalism has been booming, and WTO members (as, previously, GATT contracting 
parties) are bound to notify the regional trade agreements (RTAs) in which they participate. Nearly all of 
the WTO's Members have notified participation in one or more RTAs (some Members are party to ten or 
more). Notifications may also refer to the accession of new parties to an agreement that already exists, e.g. 
the notification of the accession of  
        
 Table 4-2    FTA numbers and contents (by June 2002) 
 
Year  FTA Custom Union Others Total 
1950-59  1  1 
1960-69 1 1 1 3 
1970-79 10 3 2 15 
1980-89 2  5 7 
1990-94 22 2 6 30 
1995-99 56 2 2 60 
2000- 2-  2 22 
Total 114 9 20 143 
Source: Urata, 2002, p.16. 
 
Bulgaria to the CEFTA Agreement. In the period 1948-1994, the GATT received 124 notifications of 
RTAs (relating to trade in goods), and since the creation of the WTO in 1995, over 100 additional 
arrangements covering trade in goods or services have been notified. Not all RTAs notified in the last half 
century are still in force today. Many of the discontinued RTAs have, however, been superseded by 
redesigned agreements among the same signatories.  
As Table 4-2 shows, there are 143 FTAs by the end of June 2002, among which 112 were signed in 
1990s. 







Table 4-3, FTA, by region 
 










1950-59 1      
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1960-69 1    1 1 
1970-79 11 2   1 1 
1980-89 1 2   3 2 
1990-94 19 3 6 1 1  
1995-99 31 1 23 1 2 2 
2000- 10 2 6 2 1 5 
Total 74 10 35 4 9 11 
Source: Urata, 2002, p.17. 
 
Since the 1990s, there has been a rapid increase in intraregional trade in East Asia. Intra-regional 
trade in East Asia increased 2.19 times in ten years from 1995-2005, while world trade expanded only 
twofold. As a result, the East Asia's share in East Asia’s overall exports and imports increased from 47.4 
and 54.7 percent in 1995 to 49.9 and 59.1 respectively.395  
Kōichi Ishikawa argues that FTA in East Asia was focused on APEC before middle of 1990s, and 
after the mid-1990s, discussion focused on ASEAN plus three (Japan, China, and Korea), and bilateral 
arrangements. He analyzes the reasons, and explains that Asian financial crisis, China’s growth in the 
region and Japan’s economic stagnancy are three main reasons of East Asian regionalism after 1997.396  
 
4.1.2, Historical Review: Failure of Japan’s GEACS in East Asia 
East Asia has a long history of economic relations, dating back to Arab and Chinese trade among 
East Asian countries and with Europe. The tradition of East Asian trade in general, and of East Asian 
intra-trade as well, appears to have gained momentum with the stepped-up involvement of European 
powers in the nineteenth century. Subsequently, the expansion of Japan’s economic sphere of influence 
became the main force driving interdependence.  
Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, prompted by British leadership, a wave of 
liberalization spread through Europe. British sought similar objectives in East Asia: it abolished the 
monopoly of the the East India Company and moved aggressively to obtain free access to the Chinese 
market. A surge of trade ensued, both regionally with East Asia, and with Europe. The profitability of this 




Table 4-4, FTA /EPA initiatives in East Asia  (as of September 2004) 
In effect  Under official negotiation  Under consultation/study  
Bangkok Treaty (1976) China–ASEAN China–New Zealand 
                                                  
s395 Urata, Shujiro, ‘An Economic Analysis of Competitive Regionalism in East A ia’, GIARI 
Working Paper, 2008-E-15, Waseda University Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration. 
396 Ishikawa, Kōichi, ‘Higashi ajia ni okeru FTA no chōryū ’(FTA trend in East Asia), in Kimura, 
2003, pp.9-17.  
 129
In effect  Under official negotiation  Under consultation/study  
Laos–Thailand (1991) Hong Kong–New Zealand China–Australia 
ASEAN FTA (1992) Japan–Mexico (signed in September 2004) Japan–Australia 
Singapore–New Zealand (January 
2001) Japan–Korea Japan–ASEAN 
Japan–Singapore (November 
2002) Japan–Thailand Japan–Indonesia 
Singapore–Australia (2003) Japan–Philippines (almost concluded) Japan–China–Korea 
Singapore–EFTA (January 2003) Japan–Malaysia Japan–Chile 
Singapore–USA (January 2004) Korea–Singapore (concluded) Korea–ASEAN 
China–Hong Kong (January 2004) Singapore–Canada Korea–Mexico 
China–Macao (January 2004) Singapore–Mexico Singapore–Taiwan 
Korea–Chile (April 2004) Singapore-P3 (Aus, Chile, NZ) ASEAN–CER (Aus, NZ)
Taiwan–Panama (2004) Singapore–India ASEAN–EU 
Thailand–Australia (January 2005) Singapore–Jordan ASEAN (bilateral)–USA 
 Thailand–Bahrain  
 Thailand–India  
 Thailand–USA  
 Thailand–Peru  
 ASEAN–India  
Notes: The shaded arrangements are those within East Asia (ASEAN + 3, Taiwan and Hong Kong). Source: 
Table 1.7 in Fukasaku, Kawai, Plummer and Trzeciak-Duval (2005). 
Japan, and, following Matthew C. Perry’s landing, eventually concluded a treaty in 1858. Russia, the 
Netherlands, Britain and France followed with similar treaties of their own. Japan’s early trade thus came 
to be orientated towards the West: silk, tea and coal were exported to France, Italy, and the United States, 
while textiles, weapons and machinery were imported from Britain and the United States.  
     Thus, by the turn of the twentieth century, when relatively comprehensive regional trade data 
became available, the level of East Asia regional interdependence was already high. As Table 4-5 shows, 
by 1913, about 42 percent of the region’s trade was intra-regional, compared with 46 percent in 1938 and 
47 percent in 1990.  
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Japan’s industrialization and expanding economic influence intensified regional ties. By the end of 
the nineteenth century Japan had established a role parallel to or surpassing those of others in Korea and 
China. It continued to gain economic and military power in the early twentieth century, and began to 
displace to exports of European powers in their own colonies. 
Table 4-5  East Asian trade as a share of total trade for different 
                     countries/regions (exports plus imports) 
 
                            1913       1925      1938      1955     1990 
China                        0.53        0.46      0.70       0.43     0.59 
Indonesia                     0.32        0.38      0.26       0.32     0.60 
Taiwan                                           0.99       0.50     0.42 
Japan                        0.41        0.47      0.70       0.22     0.29 
Korea                                            1.00       0.35     0.40 
Malaysia                     0.44        0.39      0.35       0.30     0.37 
Philippines                   0.18        0.15      0.11       0.17     0.43 
Thailand                     0.62        0.71      0.65       0.52     0.51 
Simple average                0.42        0.43      0.59       0.35     0.45 
   Excluding Korea, Taiwan     0.42        0.43      0.46       0.33     0.47 
   Excluding Korea, Taiwan,    0.42        0.42      0.41       0.35     0.50 
   and Japan 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: League of Nations, Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan 
 
   Despite the strained political circumstances, the sphere of influence established at the turn of the 
century resulted in a sharp increase in Japan’s regional role. By the late 1920s Japan had essentially 
caught up with Western interests in China, and by 1931 the stock of Japanese investments in China 
equaled those of Great Britain and exceeded those of all other countries combined.397  Japanese 
investments reached deep into Manchuria; for example, by the end of the First World War, the 
Hanyehping Coal and Iron Company supplied 60 percent of Yawata Steel’s iron ore requirements.398 This 
period of the so-called Shidehara diplomacy was characterized by frequent Japanese-Western clashes, 
repeated concessions on both military and trade rights, yet considerable economic gains.  
     The era of political compromise ended in 1931. This turn of events was hastened by Chinese 
resistance to Japan’s economic advance and by world depression. Subsequently, Japan’s economic 
strategy dramatically changed. The colonial-style exchange of manufactured for raw materials gave way 
to a concerted effort to develop independent bases of industrial strength in several parts of Japan’s 
economic empire. The new strategy led to substantial industrial investments outside of Japan proper, and 
                                                  
397  Beasley, W.G., Japanese Imperialism: 1894-1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p.133 
398  Ibid., p. 137. 
 131
eventually gave rise to increasingly sophisticated economic linkages among Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and 
eventually China.  
     Towards the end of the 1930’s Japan’s expansion into China became increasingly ominous and 
continued to accelerate. In 1937 soon after Japanese troops captured Nanking and much of the Yangtze 
valley, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe announced a ‘new order’ that called for close cooperation 
(‘co-prosperity’) among China, Japan and Manchuria.  
     A broad southern advance also began to emerge as part of Japan’s increasingly expansionist 
strategy. In 1939, the Showa Research Institute developed an extensive plan for an East Asian Economic 
Bloc,399 which would be self-sufficient by relying on tin, rubber, bauxite, tungsten, nickel and chromium 
from Thailand, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and Malaya.400
     As the Second World War approached, the scope of Japan’s sphere of influence was expanded to 
include Indochina in the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACS). In the event, not 
much economic integration took place during the GEACS period, aside from the diversion of some raw 
materials to Japan, because the sea-lanes were not safe to permit large-scale transport. Instead, the region 
suffered a deep economic decline as its trade with the West's collapse.  
     The GEACS expanded Japan’s influence into Southeast Asia, overshadowed by the imperatives of 
war. The notion of a large regional bloc that would also include Southeast Asia does not appear to have 
been a part of Japan’s strategy until 1939. Prime Minister Konoe’s 1938 announcement made no mention 
of southern areas, and the inclusion of Southeast Asia did not arise until the fall of France. By that time, 
the GEACS was clearly designed to obtain raw materials needed for war. As Peattie has argued, the 
GEACS is best seen as a response to a ‘sudden turn in international events ------ rather than the 
consequence of long-considered for widely-held interest in the co-prosperity of Asian people’.401
 
4.1.3, Japan in Post-War East Asia Economic Cooperation: before the 1990s 
     The Second World War thoroughly disrupted the trade patterns established in the pre-war years. 
Trade flows shifted towards the United States, now the leading military power in the Pacific and the only 
country with its economy largely intact. Links between Japan and Taiwan and Korea were sharply 
curtailed. China’s trade also collapsed as the country sank into civil war. Insurrections also erupted in 
Indonesia, Indochina, and Malaysia. As a result, trade flows declined sharply throughout the Pacific, 
especially among China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the ‘core economies’ of the GEACS.  
As Hellmann states, Japan’s postwar outlook constitutes a radical break with the premises and 
actions of its prewar diplomacy. At that time, Japan was deeply caught up in imperialist power politics in 
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East Asia in a manner more in keeping with the continental European tradition, with its emphasis on 
compelling and impersonal forces that shape relations between states, the pervasive and continuous 
presence of conflict, and the necessity for substantial military capacities to carry out successful 
diplomacy.402 Hellmann adds, during the 1950’s, Japan’s policy toward the East Asia region was 
conditioned by internal weaknesses and uncertainties and by highly fluid international conditions. Japan, 
living under the cloud of the past war, deeply dependent on the United States in a bipolar world, and still 
a relatively poor nation, had only limited policy alternatives. Throughout these years, normalization of 
political relations and a new base for economic (i.e., commercial) ties were the two topics around which 
Asian policy revolved.403
     Japan’s policy towards East Asia concentrated on what Foreign Minister Shigemitsu called 
‘economic diplomacy,’ that is, promoting trade and economic cooperation in order to ‘stabilize’ the region. 
Entry into the Colombo Plan aid program and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE) added a multilateral dimension to regional economic activities, but the scope of cooperation 
never extended much beyond reparations and commercial transactions. Both the spirit and the limitations 
of this economic diplomacy are exemplified by the aid scheme Prime Minister Kishi promoted during his 
first tour of Southeast Asia. Japan was to provide large-scale technical and industrial assistance-but the 
funds for the project were to be provided by the United States.404    
     Post-war US policy recognized that this sharp dislocation in trade patterns would undermine the 
prospects for economic recovery in all of the countries that once formed the Japanese empire. The 
influential Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), for example, concluded at its 1947 conference on the 
reconstruction of East Asia that, for the sake of Japan and the rest of the region, ‘Japan must be actively 
helped to regain something of her old position as the mainspring of the Far Eastern economy as a 
whole’.405 The US occupation authorities in turn began to use the leverage provided by their influence 
over aid and Japanese reparations to China, Korea and Taiwan, as well as in Southeast Asia, to revive 
these countries’ trade with Japan.  
     The data show the magnitude of this challenge. Japan’s two-way trade with East Asia fell from 73 
per cent of trade around 1940 to only about 31 percent in 1951. At the same time, the partner composition 
of this East Asian trade shifted from the ‘core economies’ of the GEACS to Southeast Asia. The decline in 
the importance of the East Asian countries in general, and of the core partners in particular, can be traced 
almost entirely to the general decline of their economies, rather than to a decline in the intensity of their 
trade linkages with Japan. The analysis of intensity indexes suggests that regional biases within East 
Asian trade remained as essentially the same high level in 1955 as they were in 1938. While East Asian 
linkages remained strong, they were now driven not by Japanese policy but by economic structures 
inherited from the pre-war period and by US policies designed to restart this group of highly 
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interdependent economies.  
     The Subsequent story of East Asian economic growth is well known and has been recently 
reviewed by Kuznets, Noland, Wade and others.406 What is of interest here is that the spectacular growth 
of the region’s economies was accompanied by a substantial decline in their regional trade bias. As shown 
in Table 4-6, the intensity indexes of East Asian trade, which survived the Second World War at relatively 
high levels, fell steadily in the following years. This pattern of decline is similar for most East Asian 
countries, and the few anomalies that do occur (an unusually rapid decline in the case of China and an 
unusual increase in the case of the Philippines) can be understood in terms of major political changes in 
the countries involved.  
      
Table 4-6 Trade intensity indexes of different countries 
 and regions with East Asia 
                            1938    1955    1969     1979     1985    1990   
Japan                        4.66     3.13     2.07     2.02     1.46    1.50 
North American               0.90     1.16     1.48     1.53     1.48    1.44 
Australia, New Zealand        0.53     1.35     2.70     2.85     2.24    2.11 
Taiwan                      6.63     7.15     4.83     2.82     1.72    2.14 
Korea                       6.68     4.92     4.83     2.91     1.96    2.04 
Hong Kong                   3.96     7.55     3.72     3.22     3.09    2.96 
Malaysia, Singapore           2.31     4.22     3.34     3.11     2.05    1.88 
Thailand                     4.34     7.36     5.38     3.64     2.69    2.61 
Philippines                   0.70     2.45     4.58     3.17     2.54    2.22 
Indonesia                    1.76     4.60      5.52     4.89     3.34    3.10 
China                        4.70     6.13     2.91     2.76     3.23    3.03 
Western Europe                0.26     0.49     0.33     0.34     0.31    0.36 
Middle East                   0.46     1.05     1.39     1.84     1.36    1.33 
Rest of world                  0.30     0.67     0.81     0.62     0.70    0.76 
    Total imports             1.00     1.00     1.00     1.00     1.00    1.00 
        East Asia             4.48     4.45     2.97     2.64     2.05    2.09  
        Pacific Rim           2.61     1.95     2.05     2.08     1.77    1.80 
    Average                  2.72     3.51      2.93     2.44     1.94   1.91 
_______________________________________________________________________________  
Source: Petri, Peter A., ‘The East Asian trading bloc: an analytical history’, in Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles 
Kahler, eds., Regionalism and the United States in Pacific Asia, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993, p.32. 
  
Equally remarkable is a parallel decline in the dispersion of intensity indexes (that is, in variations in the 
intensity of linkages across different trade partners) in the region. As shown in Table 4-6 the standard 
deviations of the intensity indexes of most East Asian countries fell steadily during the post-war period. 
                                                  
r e
o
406  Kuznets, Paul, ‘An East Asian Model of economic development: Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1988, 36 (3), pp.11-43; Noland, Marcus, 
Pacific Basin Developing Countries: P osp cts for the Future, Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 1990; Wade, Robert, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and 
the R le of Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990.  
 134
In effect, each country’s bilateral trade pattern came to look more and more like the world’s trade 
pattern----the importance of any particular partner to given country came to resemble the importance of 
that partner in world trade as a whole. (If each partner’s share of a country’s trade was equal to that 
partner’s share in world trade, then all intensity indexes would be one.) Country-specific biases became 
less and less important in explaining the distribution of East Asian trade, both between East Asia and 
other regions and across different East Asian partners.  
 
Table 4-7   Dispersion of trade intensity indexes, by country and over time 
                           (standard deviations) 
 
                            1938    1955    1969    1979    1985    1990   
Japan                        5.55     4.25    2.50     1.75     1.26    1.22 
North American               1.41     0.85    0.62     0.50     0.55    0.47 
Australia, New Zealand        0.65     0.66    0.94     1.19     0.97    1.23 
Taiwan                       4.08     4.51    2.60     1.53     1.07    1.13 
Korea                        4.18     5.45    2.01     1.19     0.91    0.97      
Hong Kong                   6.81     10.22   2.79     2.61     3.36    4.02 
Malaysia, Singapore          9.25     4.21    3.78    2.74     1.95     1.24 
Thailand                     9.59     4.92    3.14     2.28     1.80     1.26 
Philippines                   1.52     1.42    1.96     1.19     1.23     0.88 
Indonesia                    3.11     3.53    3.45     2.58     1.49     1.30 
China                       6.15     9.51    2.77     2.57     3.47     4.09 
Western Europe               0.56     0.43    0.33     0.32     0.36     0.33 
Middle East                  1.12     0.68    0.74     0.63     0.41     0.49 
Rest of world                 0.41     0.38    0.58     0.48     0.37     0.37 
    Total imports             0.00     0.00    0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 
        East Asia             2.28     2.52    1.68     1.15     0.88     0.80 
        Pacific Rim           0.97     0.76    0.77     0.64     0.49     0.46 
    Average                  3.39     3.19    1.80     1.37     1.21     1.19 
_______________________________________________________________________________  
Source: Petri, Peter A., ‘The East Asian trading bloc: an analytical history’, p.33. 
 
     Three types of factors help to explain the diversification and homogenization of the region’s 
trade. The first was the general integration of the global economy during most of the post-war period, 
which was spurred by several successful rounds of trade negotiations, steady progress towards 
convertibility, and considerable improvements in international communications and transport. All of these 
factors worked to pull East Asia’s trade (as well as the trade of all other countries) away from its regional 
partners towards more global sources and destinations. A second important factor was the rapid 
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development of the region’s economies. The expansion of each economy’s overall trade provided the 
scale needed to justify investments in trading linkages with an increasingly large number of countries. A 
third factor driving East Asia’s diversification was the similarity of the East Asian development pattern. 
Each country rapidly shifted its output from raw materials to manufactured goods, and within 
manufacturing from labor-intensive to more capital and technology-intensive sectors. These patterns have 
been described as the ‘flying geese pattern’ of development by the Japanese economists407 and are 
consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin explanations of how trade patterns are likely to change with the 
accumulations of human and physical capital.  
    The large exchange rate adjustments of 1985 and 1986 affected interdependence in a complex way. 
Initially, the appreciation of the yen was not matched by other East Asian currencies; thus other countries 
became more competitive against Japan in both the US and Japanese markets. For a while, East Asian 
imports surged in both markets, and Korea, Taiwan and other countries began to run substantial trade 
surpluses. These export surges also led to accelerating imports from Japan and Singapore. As a result, 
East Asian interdependence intensified; intra-regional trade expanded very rapidly, and the long-term 
decline of the region’s intensity indexes ceased.  
     Many observers assumed at that time that the trade flow adjustments described above represented 
the beginning of a new historical trend towards the greater integration of the East Asian economy. This 
may still be the case, but the events of 1985 to 1988 were for the greater part driven by the staggered 
adjustment of exchange rates in different East Asian countries. By the late 1980s the second phase of the 
exchange rates adjustments took hold, as most of the region’s currencies appreciated to close the gap that 
had opened between them and the yen in the mid-1980s. These corrections slowed the surge of Japanese 
imports from East Asia and stopped the increase in the region’s intensity indexes. To be sure, the absolute 
volume of East Asian trade continued to expand at a rapid pace due to the high growth of the region’s 
economies.  
     The more significant impact of the appreciation of the yen was a sharp increase in regional 
investment flows (see Table 4-8). Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia had two-thirds as much investment in 
1988-89 alone as in all previous years until then. The cause of this wave is widely accepted; the exchange 
rate changes of the late 1980s reduced the competitiveness of Japanese firms and led firms to shift some 
production activities closer to markets and to countries with lower labor costs. While most of these 
investments went into the United States and other developed countries, a substantial amount also occurred 
in East Asia.  
     By the late 1980s, as the NIEs also adjusted their exchange rates and began to face competitive 
strains similar to Japan’s, they too joined Japan as major players in East Asia. Thus an entirely new 
channel of interdependence began to operate; cross-investments among a large number of East Asian 
countries. This is a natural result of the region’s prosperity; it recalls patterns of integration that have 
evolved in Europe, and partly led to the blooming of regionalism in Asia Pacific in late 1980s and 1990s.  
                                                  
f407  Akamatsu, Kaname, A theory o  unbalanced growth in the world economy, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 86 (2), 1960. 
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Table 4-8  Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia (million US dollars) 
 
                                   United                  Hong 
Host/source          Total    Japan   States   Korea   Taiwan  Kong     Singapore 
Thailand 
  Up to 1987        11536    2773    1910     9      675     445     351 
  1988-89           7868     4431    570     66     530     278     408 
Malaysia              
  Up to 1987         4200    1741     202     0      34      262     594 
  1988-89            3690    967      179    49     1314    138     231 
Indonesia           
Up to 1987         17284    5928    1244   222     144    1876     299 
  1988-89            11159   1304     783    728    1126    867      489 
Philippines 
Up to 1987          2830     377    1620 
  1988-89            275       71     98 
Korea  
  1984-88            3648     1857    876 
Taiwan  
  1984-88            4170     1343    1251 
Singapore             
1984-88            6529     2200    2814 
Sum(Thailand, Malay 
-sia, Indonesia only) 
Up to 1987          33020    10442    3356    231    853     2583   1244 
  1988-89            22717     6702    1532    843     2970   1283    1128   
Shares of Sum 
 1987               1.000     0.316    0.102   0.007   0.026   0.078   0.038 
  1988-89            1.000     0.295     0.067   0.037   0.131   0.056   0.050 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Petri, Peter A., ‘The East Asian trading bloc: an analytical history’, p.35. 
  
The investment wave of the late 1980s differed from earlier investments in developing country 
production facilities not just in magnitude and origin but also in structure. Japan’s investments in East 
Asia in the 1970s , for example, were primarily focused on local markets, often encouraged by policies 
that sought to increase local participation in industry; for example, through the importation of automobile 
kits instead of assembled automobiles. The recent wave of investments, by contrast, is the product of new, 
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global strategies by regional firms. Nearly all firms have adopted such strategies, and some have gone to 
some length to plan a comprehensive distribution of their activities across different regional markets.  
     Since the recent investment wave has been driven by production strategy rather than by market 
considerations, it has included a larger share of export-oriented industries. More so than in the past, the 
firms established in foreign locations have also been intended to serve home (for instance, Japanese) 
markets. At the same time, since these investments were closely tied to Japanese technologies and 
suppliers that have remained at home, they have typically required a higher ratio of imported inputs than 
earlier investment flows, and this has helped to intensify regional links by facilitating exports into Japan 
and other regional markets and by spreading technologies that require regional inputs and capital goods. 
     The market forces that have helped to intensify regional links through trade and investment have 
also been supported by government aid policy. Japan’s aid program has always been orientated towards 
Asia, but its growing scale has made it an important factor in recent economic links. Japanese aid flows to 
East Asia have been substantial compared to private investment flows. These flows have helped to 
finance the infrastructure that supports private investment.  
     The volume of intra-regional investment has slackened somewhat but is likely to remain relatively 
high compared with historical levels. Some of the reasons for the slowdown are permanent: the 
investment wave of the late 1980s represented, in part, a one-time adjustment in corporate sourcing 
policies, triggered by the appreciation of the yen and the NIEs’ currencies. But other reasons are 
temporary. As a result of the rapid inflow of capital, infrastructure bottlenecks developed in several of the 
receiving economies, especially Thailand, and labor and real estate costs rose sharply due to the 
overheated economy. At the same time, the accumulation of Japanese firms has contributed to the 
development of an economic infrastructure—consisting of suppliers and service companies—that will 
make it easier for other firms to invest in the future.   
   Japan’s investment in Asia has to be seen in relation to and in the context of the size of Asia’s 
economies, their development stage, and their link to other Japanese flows such as trade, ODA and 
technology. Firstly, Japan is the most important trading partner of most Asian countries. For example, 
Japan’s total trade in 2002 amounted to US$7548 billion, of which US$3266 billion was with Asia, so 
about 43%.408 Secondly, Japan’s trade with Asia is intimately linked with its investment pattern in the 
region. East Asia has generally become very attractive to foreign investment and it more than doubled its 
share of global investment stock from 6.2 per cent to 13.6 percent during the 1980s. The reason for Japan’s 
continuing interest in investing in Asia and greater shift to Asia in its global investment pattern is to cope 
with the appreciation of the yen and the rising production costs in Japan. Asia provides the best 
opportunities, as mentioned before. In addition, the average return on Japanese investment in Asia is 3 per 
cent, compared to 1 per cent in Europe and -0.1 per cent in the US. The differences are even starker when 
looking only at the return on manufacturing investment, which is reckoned to be 5 per cent in Asia, 3 per 
                                                  
408  METI, Japan trade data, available from: 
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/trade_db/html/f_y2002_all.html  
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cent in Europe and -0.9 per cent in the US.409  
In sum, we can find that Japan’s trade and FDI with/in the East Asia region fosters regional 
economic interdependence and facilitates regional economic cooperation. 
 
4.2, Japan’s Reaction to the Proposed EAEG and EAEC 
Regionalism has not been a major feature of Asian economic relations during the second half of the 
twentieth century; even the more formalized regional trading arrangements such as the ASEAN or those 
between Australia and New Zealand had little impact on trade flows. The EC 92 program, the Canada-US 
Free Trade Agreement and the initiation of negotiations to expand the latter to include Mexico stimulated 
a re-evaluation of this situation. Asian reactions to this challenge were three-fold: the strengthening of 
regional trading arrangement, the creation of umbrella regional organizations, and renewed commitment 
to multilateralism. 
As Drysdale argues, for East Asian policy makers the key issue in international commercial 
diplomacy during the late 1980s and early 1990s was how to react to the specter of regional trading blocs 
in Europe and in the Americas.410  
 
4.2.1, Mahathir’s Initiative: from EAEG to EAEC  
     ASEAN is the most prominent regional trading arrangement in Asia. Since the early 1980s, some of 
the ASEAN members (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia) have been among the fastest 
growing economies in the world. The rapid growth has been based on outwardly-oriented development 
strategies, but the trade policies have been essentially non-discriminatory. Attempts to promote 
intra-ASEAN trade during the late 1970s through preferential tariffs and joint industrial policies had little 
impact, and the trade expansion during the 1980s was mainly with partners outside Southeast Asia.  
     The most immediate Asian reaction to the perceived threat of large trading blocs in Europe and the 
Americas was the formation of the APEC forum and the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC). Initially, 
both were essentially defensive reactions and lacked a positive agenda, but their conceptions differed on 
membership and content. The Malaysian-sponsored EAEC defined East Asia to include the ASEAN 
members, China, Japan, and the northeast Asian newly industrializing economies (NIEs), while APEC 
took a wider geographical view to include Australia and countries of the eastern Pacific. The EAEC 
became identified with a more discriminatory outlook favoring intra-Asian trade as a counterpart to the 
European Union or the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), while APEC was promoted as 
a non-discriminatory association, and considerable effort went into defining the concept of ‘open 
regionalism.’ 
     ASEAN has been an important place for Japan’s foreign policy since 1960s. As Wolf Mendl argues, 
Japanese attitudes towards the Southeast Asia region were ambivalent. On the one hand, Japan was 
primarily interested in economic ties with individual countries, especially those which could supply it 
                                                  
409  Data quoted in Drifte, 1996, pp.101-102. 
410  Drysdale, 1998, p.56. 
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with sources of energy and raw materials, and it was suspicious of any attempt by the Southeast Asian 
nations to form a bloc which might improve their collective economic bargaining power. On the other 
hand, Japan sought to establish a forum in which it would have a major voice.411 It became clear that in 
their search for a distinctive international role, successive Japanese governments saw an opportunity in 
cultivating relations with Southeast Asia. Such a policy was reinforced by the personal ambitions of 
successive prime and foreign ministers. For example, Prime Minister Kishi’s had an Asian tour in 1957, 
prior to his first official visit to Washington. He sought to exploit Japan’s Asian connection to establish a 
more equal partnership with the United States and eventually to create a triangular relationship in which, 
no doubt, he envisaged a pivotal role for Japan.412
Since the 1970s, several countries in East Asia have launched official polities of taking Japan as an 
economic model. In 1978 Singapore adopted an official policy of ‘Learn from Japan’. In 1978, a Filipino 
cabinet minister stated he wanted the Philippines to be like ‘Japan Incorporated’.413 An example of the 
positive acceptance of Japan as a model is the Malaysian Prime Minister’s campaign ‘Look East’ in 1981 
which made reference to Japan. Malaysia is in other ways an interesting example because it is the country 
to have now achieved NIEs status, having a Muslim majority but with a substantial Chinese minority. 
When Mahathir devised a ‘Look East’ policy, it was to encourage Malaysia to emulate its East Asian 
neighbors, especially Japan. An avowed ‘Japan fan,’ Mahathir cultivated business links between Malaysia 
and Japan, especially in the electrical and automotive sectors. Thus, in December 1990, when Mahathir 
proposed an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) as a trade bloc to counteract block formation in Europe 
and North America, he naturally envisaged a leadership role for Japan. Mahathir reworked his proposal in 
October 1991 to be more palatable to Japan and Malaysia’s ASEAN partners by transforming his 
bloc-forming ‘group’ into a pressure-asserting ’caucus.’ He also made a strong pitch to Prime Minister 
Kiichi Miyazawa in January 1993 that Japan’s representation of Asian interests at the G-7 summit in 
Tokyo in July would be enhanced if there was a meeting of the East Asian countries to develop a 
consensual stand.414
Mahathir’s motivation is for the group to serve as a ‘megaphone to magnify the group’s voice’ in 
the GATT and other global fora. In the words of Malaysia’s Ambassador to Japan, H.M. Katib, the 
general objective of the proposal was to gain the ‘necessary leverage’ for Asian countries in multilateral 
negotiations.415 The name was subsequently changed to the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) to 
lessen its bloc-like connotations, and its consistency with GATT principles emphasized. 
 
4.2.2, Japan’s Reaction towards the proposed EAEG and EAEC 
The top body of Japanese big business, Keidanren, went on record in support of Malaysian Prime 
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411  Mendl,1995, p.105. 
412 Saito, Shiro, Japan a  the Summit: Its Role in the Western Alliance and in Asian Pacifi  
Cooperation, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 20. 
413  Quoted in Drifte, 1996, p.122. 
414  Far East Economic Review, 28 January 1993. 
415  Japan Economic Journal, 2 March 1991, p.10. 
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Minister Mahathir’s proposal for an East Asian Economic Group at a time when the Japanese government 
was equivocating about the issue, and has been active in advocating Japan’s negotiation of bilateral trade 
agreements. Overall, however, commentators have suggested that the role of private sector actors in 
Japanese policymaking on regionalism has been minor.’416
     The EAEC also seems to offer a tailor-made leadership role to Japan, whose participation is in any 
event critical to the viability of the concept. Japan, however, has been unwilling to oblige for several 
practical reasons: strong American opposition; reluctance, in light of Asian sensitivities outside Malaysia, 
to step forth into too prominent a leadership position; fear the EAEC would be perceived as a step toward 
an Asian bloc that would, in turn feed back into and encourage further defensive regionalization in 
Europe and North America; doubts about the viability of a more self-contained Asian regionalism given 
critical dependence on North American and EC markets; and, more speculatively, suspicions that the aim 
of Mahathir’s scheme was to gain easier access to Japanese markets.417 Japan has even been reported to 
have applied structural leverage by threatening ASEAN states with ODA cuts if they approved the 
EAEC.418 Yet Japan has stopped short of rejecting Mahathir’s EAEC concept altogether, apparently 
regarding it as an insurance policy of sorts against the possibility of the EC and the NAFTA turning in the 
direction of regionalized protection. This noncommittal stance has been ‘probably calculated as striking a 
balance between getting the attention of the United States without imposing unwanted responsibility on 
itself as the ‘core economy’ and main alternative market for Asian exports.’419 Malaysia has at various 
junctures states its intention to pursue the EAEC even if Japan does not sign on, but it would clearly be 
sharply diminished in status and potential effectiveness without Japanese participation.  
     Japan’s hesitancy to join the EAEC aggrieved Malaysian leaders, who responded with vitriol. In 
1992 the Malaysian MITI minister told her Japanese counterpart that it was strange that Japan must 
always comply with the United States. In an August 1994 meeting, Mahathir chastened Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama, stating that ‘Japan should stop apologizing for World War II and start being a world 
leader.’ Later that year, Mahathir suggested that the EAEC would be created without Japan’s participation 
and that he was uncertain whether he would participate in the APEC Osaka meeting.420
    While Mahathir had high hopes for Japan’s participation, his exclusion of North America and 
Oceania concerned Japanese leaders, rendering them unable to offer support for the proposal. During 
meetings with their Malaysian counterparts in April 1991, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and Foreign 
Minister Taro Nakayama were cautious. In September 1992, even though Japan was increasingly alarmed 
by the NAFTA, MITI Minister Kozo Watanabe was still wary of embracing the EAEC, explaining that it 
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might further drive NAFTA into regionalism.421 Miyazawa made the same argument to Mahathir, adding 
that East Asian should remain open to thwart protectionism in the EC as well.422
       Washington’s initial opposition to the Mahathir proposal had been unusually strident, with Baker 
reportedly exerting strong pressure on both the Korean and Japanese governments for them not to 
participate in the proposed arrangements. Baker is said to have told the Korean Foreign Minister, Lee 
Sang Ock, that ‘Malaysia did not spill blood for this country, but we did’. He also wrote to the Japanese 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Michio Watanabe, warning that Malaysia’s EAEG would ‘divide the Pacific 
region in half’.423 Michael Armacost, US Ambassador to Japan, warned that the EAEG could ‘encourage 
economic rivalry’ between Japan and the United States.424
United States opposition to the EAEC stems from obvious reasons, not least the unwillingness to 
sanction arrangements that would increase others’ potential leverage. American officials have also 
claimed, with justification, that the EAEC would be redundant with APEC, a criticism echoed by 
Australia and Canada.425   
In Singapore, ASEAN accepted the plan to establish an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 
which Japan was invited to join on an ad hoc basis for consultations on issues of common concern. 
Malaysia had tried to turn it into something more defined and regular, designed to counter the emergence 
of protectionist blocs in Europe and North America, but its partners in ASEAN diluted the proposal. Japan 
was reluctant to endorse it because the United States had not been included and also because it was afraid 
of anything that smacked of trading blocs and a breakup of the global free trading system, which Japan 
strongly supported abroad but was more reluctant to put into practice at home. Its emphasis on 
world-wide trade was reinforced by changes in the pattern of regional economic relations during the 
1980s. The differentiation between the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of East Asia and the 
remaining members of ASEAN had brought a change in the structure of intra-regional trade.  
Japan’s attitude toward EAEC has seen some changes since 1993. At a bilateral meeting between 
Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers in Seattle in 1993, Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata had 
responded to a press question about the status of the EAEC by saying that the most desirable option 
would be for the EAEC to be a caucus within APEC. Now that the APEC leaders’ meeting has been 
institutionalized, Japan’s guarded, noncommittal stance has been gradually replaced by an acceptance of 
the EAEC as a caucus within APEC. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was opposed to 
EAEC when it was first proposed, argued for its safe incorporation under a huge umbrella.426 ‘Make it 
true to the name ‘a caucus within APEC,’ ’ was Nakasone’s advice to Mahathir. Although the Japanese 
government still maintains that it is ‘looking into the matter’—a phrase one MITI official explains is a 
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euphemism for ‘no’427—it increasingly predicates its own membership on that of Australia and New 
Zealand. MITI’s Vice Minister for International Affairs Yoshihiro Sakamoto said that Japan’s consistent 
policy has been to advocate the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the EAEC, in some part to 
avoid their incorporation into NAFTA.428 This policy was strongly reiterated in May 1995 by Foreign 
Minister Kono.429 This is also the position that Japan has taken on Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s call 
for another grouping designed to exclude the United States: an EU-ASEAN plus 3 summit, and 
Malaysia’s proposal for a ‘6+3’ ASEAN Economic Ministerial (AEM) meeting, in which Japan, Korea, 
and China would sit down with ASEAN.430
While Prime Minister Murayama agrees that Australia and New Zealand should be included in the 
EAEC, he reportedly does not support the anti-EAEC argument for special consideration of the US-Japan 
relationship and has been frustrated by the perception of Japan as ‘parroting the Washington line’ and 
‘dancing a choreographed role’ to please the Americans. 
In December 1995, the Malaysian Minister for International Trade and Industry Rafidah Aziz was 
reported to say that while EAEC has already started on an informal basis and could be launched without 
Japan, ASEAN was giving it time, because ASEAN would like to have a more formalized ministerial 
level and to have an overall view.431
Malaysian Minister Dr. Lim Kheng Yaik said that Japan, being the most developed among the East 
Asian countries, could take the lead in initiating EAEC at the news conference just five days before of his 
boss’s meeting with Chinese Premier in December 1990.432 Here the role of Japan is to give credibility to 
a nascent regional cooperation arrangement and the credibility seems to derive from the economic success 
of Japan. According to Dr. Noordin Sopiee’s more elaborated view, EAEC aims to enhance the prospect 
of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, to marshal and magnify the voice of the intensely 
trade-dependent East Asian nations, and to promote a much greater East Asian economic cooperation. As 
Japan had and still has critical stake on these three objectives of EAEC, Dr. Sopiee seemed to suggest, it 
is only natural for it to play the leading role in launching EAEC. In addition to them, EAEC can anchor 
Japan to East Asia so that they will not uproot their industries and divert their investment elsewhere, and 
EAEC can be a much needed mutual protection society, to guard against being bashed and kicked by 
developed countries. But their views conspicuously fail to mention to the often reported fact that Japan is 
fatally constrained in its decision-making due to military dependence to the United States. According to 
Mahathir, Japan should enter into and deepen synergistic interdependence with China and other East 
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Asian countries which are still cautious about Japanese military ambition over the region. Therefore the 
participation of both China and Japan is indispensable for leading the EAEC, and the expected role of 
Japan is to allocate more resources to the region.433  
     Funabashi explains why Japan opposed the EAEC from the Japanese viewpoint. Firstly was Japan’s 
dilemma in choosing foreign direction (where does Japan belong)—the West or Asia? Secondly, 
following Japan’s domestic disputes among MITI and MOFA, agricultural sector, leadership, etc., 
Okamoto suspects the effectiveness of EAEC, arguing that ‘it should be stated here that EAEC is resolved 
to be a consultation caucus within the APEC framework and would not be an economic bloc of any kind. 
As have seen earlier, there is no economic rationale for any East Asian economies to confine their 
international economic activities to the East Asian region, at least for the time being.’  ‘Some parts of 
Japanese society argue that Japan should be a member of EAEC and promote the sustainable economic 
development of the region through environmental protection, human resource development and 
technology. They see such efforts by Japan as important steps in the maintenance of good relations with 
its neighbors. However, one question remains. Why can the East Asian economies not do this on an 
issue-by-issue basis and/or in the existing framework such as ASEAN-PMC or APEC? Even without a 
formal caucus, East Asian economies can consult with each other on any issue at any time. They can even 
invite Australia and New Zealand to consultations if the topic is relevant. When the East Asian economies 
organized ASEM in March 1996, they did not need to form a formal caucus for prior consultations. EAEC 
might be used as a potential negotiation card with North America or Europe if those regions become more 
inward-looking. However, that initiatives from East Asia first prevent them from doing so is more 
important.’434    
    Terada adds that a reason behind Japan’s unsupportive stance was that Japan did not view ‘East Asia’ 
as a concept for regional cooperation, and instead adhered to the concept of the ‘Asia Pacific’ as a basis 
for promoting cooperation within APEC.435
     Japan has been traumatized by the protracted debate that the EAEC and related proposals have 
inspired. Former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun is critical of Japan’s ‘not being able to have 
any independent point of view,’ and said, ‘they keep on changing their stances. First, they say if all of 
ASEAN agrees to the idea, they would have no objections to joining and then later they shift their stance 
again. They said that they would have to wait until Australia and New Zealand are included or something 
like that. So we do not know what the Japanese stand is or if they are going to keep upping the ante all the 
time.’436
     Membership in the EAEC is enticing to some Japanese leaders because it would provide Japan with 
leverage against the United States. The EAEC could be organized to balance any US inclinations to go 
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protectionist with NAFTA or expand NAFTA into East Asia. Such leverage would not be limited to the 
US-Japan bilateral relationship; it could be employed in the APEC context too. In Jakarta, MITI Minister 
Hashimoto hinted at this strategy when he warned his counterpart Mickey Kantor: ‘If you stick to a 
numerical target approach, you will be criticized by all the other APEC members.’437 Cho Soon Sung, 
chairman of the Trade, Industry, and Energy Committee inn Korea’s National Assembly and a 
parliamentarian who strongly opposes rice liberalization, suspects that EAEC is indeed ‘a ploy by Japan, 
which has wanted to use the EAEC to brake the liberalization of APEC pushed by the US.’ Cho admires 
what he perceives as Japan’s strategic acumen, saying that it would also be good for Korea to be able to 
resist ‘new colonization’ by the Unites States through liberalization.438
Not so veiled was Mahathir’s EAEC proposal, which so effectively captured Asianist sentiment that 
even former Thai Prime Minster Anand Panyarachun, an avowed internationalist, defended it. ‘I do not 
see anything wrong in theory about having an East Asian Economic Caucus within APEC---’ he said, 
explaining that caucuses are prevalent in the United Nations context and that the EAEC’s agenda need not 
even be strictly confined to APEC matters. According to Anand, the debate over EAEC’s legitimacy was 
actually precipitated by a ‘conflict of personalities’ between Mahathir and US Secretary of State James 
Baker that ‘was allowed to developed into a conflict of policy.’439
     By the mid-1990s, however, its effect was almost negligible. While the EAEC may have been 
useful to keep America’s interest in APEC alive in earlier years, the rationale for the EAEC’s continued 
existence became questionable after the successful completion of the Uruguay Round and the Bogor 
Declaration, according to Richard Wilson of the Asia Foundation. ‘Prior to these development, the EAEC 
could have had some utility as a bargaining group, but any such role now would almost certainly prove 
divisive,’ he said.440
 
4.3, Japan in New Process for Regional Cooperation after ASIAN Financial Crisis 
Besides bilateral FTA arrangements, East Asia as a whole regional economic cooperation is also 
speeding up. The discussed mechanism of East Asia economic cooperation includes the existing ASEAN 
plus Japan, China and Korea (10 plus 3), East Asia Summit and the suggesting East Asia Free Trade 
Agreement, and the suggesting Japan, China and Korea FTA arrangement, in all of which Japan plays a 
critical role.   
 
4.3.1, Asian financial crisis Stimulating East Asian regionalism 
The Asian financial crisis was began in Thailand.441 On July 2, the Bank of Thailand bowed to the 
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inevitable and introduced a more flexible exchange rate regime, floating the beleaguered baht, thereby 
replacing the basket of currencies, which dependsed heavily on the US dollar. Almost immediately the 
baht depreciated by a cumulative 20 percent (plummeting to a record low of 28.80 to the dollar), as 
investors, including domestic corporations, scrambled to buy foreign exchange. By the end of July, the 
baht had fallen by 25 percent (relative to January 1997); in August, the baht had dropped to 38 baht to the 
US dollar (a fall of 34 percent); and by the end of September, it was 42 percent below its start 1997 level.  
     The Thai government’s appallingly indecisive and desperate policy responses further shook market 
confidence. In fact, amid evidence of growing financial disintermediation, the authorities’ reluctance to 
close insolvent financial institutions and tighten monetary conditions—and the rapid reverberations of the 
financial contagion to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and South Korea, including the 
moderate weakening of the mighty Singapore and the New Taiwan dollar—only served to panic the 
already jittery market.  
     To the Thai government’s consternation, its urgent appeals for Japanese assistance were rebuffed 
(despite Japan’s huge financial stake in the country442), and it was finally forced to ask the IMF for 
technical assistance on July 28 to forestall a balance-of-payments crisis. A stand-by adjustment program 
with the IMF, agreed to in early August 1997, provided the basis for a $17.2 billion emergency 
international financial ‘bailout’ package.  
     The IMF’s bailout of Thailand failed to stop the spread of the financial contagion. This failure to 
some degree reflected rational market behavior. The net result was a 4 percent fall of the ringgit in less 
than two hours to a low of M$ 3.4080 to the US dollar. Indeed, by mid-October, the cumulative declines 
of the ASEAN four currencies against the American dollar exceed 30 percent for Indonesia and Thailand 
and 20 percent for Malaysia and the Philippines. 
     By early November the contagion had spread to South Korea. The simmering turmoil in South 
Korea’s financial markets boiled over in early January 1997 with the bankruptcy of Hanbo Steel, the 
fourteenth-largest chaebol, with $6 billion in debts. On November 17, South Korea financially abandoned 
its defense of the battered won, which crashed through the psychological 1,000:dollar level with shock 
waves hitting the bath, the rupiah, the ringgit, and other regional currencies, all of which fell even further 
relative to the dollar.  
     In the rescue that followed, the Japanese government played the leading role and committed over 
US$40 billion in financial aid and trade assistance to several regional countries. In addition, in September 
1997, the Japanese government proposed a US$ 100 billion regional assistance fund to defend local 
currencies against speculative attacks and capital flight. In all previous crises, the Japanese government 
had been subject to western criticisms that it was slow to react and that its responses were deficient. In the 
Asian financial crisis, the Japanese proposal for an Asian Fund was, in hindsight, an appropriate response 
to the crisis of confidence in regional countries. However, western governments, led by the United States, 
rejected it because of a concern that such a plan would compete with and dilute the effects of IMF 
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conditionality.  
     Indeed, if successful, the Japanese plan for an Asian Fund would have enhanced Japan’s regional 
standing. But, Japanese FDI in the region decreased during the Crisis. First, it should be noted that 
Japanese companies have not reacted to the Asian financial crisis by spending significantly more money 
on FDI in the region. During the fiscal years 1995 to 1998, the total Japanese FDI amounted to US$51, 
US$48, US$54, and US$41 billion respectively. This sluggishness is, of course, not unrelated to the 
general state of the Japanese economy.443  
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-9 provided a shock to regional trade expansion that might have 
led to major fractures in the regional trading system, and therefore might have contributed to cumulative 
decline into protection and trade contraction. It provided in an extreme form the type of shock that might 
have generated retreat into the inward-looking policies against which the conservative original conception 
of APEC was meant to provide protection.  
     At the time of the economic crisis, APEC was preoccupied with the debate on sectoral liberalization. 
To East Asian governments it seemed that the grouping had its priorities all wrong. Rather than attempt to 
construct creative approaches to tackle the crisis, APEC’s Western members continued to focus narrowly 
on the trade liberalization issue. In 1997 APEC was not geared to respond to the financial crisis, and its 
initial actions were clumsy. The Leaders’ response at Vancouver in 1997, when crisis was evident only in 
parts of Southeast Asia, was banal.  
Yamazawa analyses the influence of the Asian financial crisis, by saying that ‘impacts on the real 
economy', 'rapid outflow of foreign capital', 'excessive inflow of short-term capital', and 'deficiencies in 
the economic structure', all contributed to the crisis. However, as he argues, factors remain for regional 
cooperation. These factors include ‘high growth as an engine of regional cooperation’ ’weak financial 
cooperation in the region’ ’the need for closer financial cooperation’ and’regional facilitation, and 
economic and technical cooperation’.444
As Cheng argues, the Asian financial crisis ‘tarnished the institutional reputation of APEC’ as it did 
of other Asian regional organizations.445 ASEAN, APEC contributed little in terms of crisis management. 
As a result, the Asian financial crisis stimulated East Asian regionalism.  
 
4.3.2, ASEAN’s Leadership in Regional Economic Cooperation 
After the crisis, ASEAN painfully realized that it was economically too weak to contain the 
onslaught of the unregulated forces of financial globalization. Its most prosperous member, Singapore, is 
only a small city-state and hence unable to exert powerful leadership in the search for collective ways out 
of the crisis. At the same time, Indonesia, ASEAN’s primus inter pares, is a lower middle-income country, 
the country most severely hit by the crisis and immobilized by domestic turmoil. It is thus a rational 
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strategy to join forces and to build a larger coalition with better chances for negotiating more favorable 
conditions of crisis management. 
     Although East Asian and Southeast Asian countries operated for the first time as a unified actor in 
the ASEM process, cooperation intensified during the crisis. In December 1997 ASEAN sponsored the 
first East Asian Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur. The meeting paved the way for what has since become 
known as ASEAN+3 cooperation. In the meantime, a process of ‘creeping institutionalization446’ took 
place including ministerial rounds, senior officials meetings (SOM) and proposals to establish an East 
Asian Vision Group. ASEAN’s Informal Manila Summit in late 1999 further accelerated East and 
Southeast Asian cooperation.447 Japan began representing ASEAN interests in G-7 meetings, while—the 
other way round—some ASEAN countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia supported 
Japan in its resistance to early liberalization of fishery and forestry products under the EVSL scheme.448 
These activities as well as the Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation show very clearly what is in the 
offing of ASEAN+3: to exert balancing functions vis-à-vis North America and Europe, primarily in major 
international fora such as ‘the UN, WTO, APEC, ASEAN and the ARF as well as in regional and 
financial institution’.  
The ASEAN consists of ten member countries, and the East Asian multilateral cooperation would 
not be possible without the ASEAN. The relationship between the two is mutually supportive, meaning 
that whether it is CAFTA, JAFTA, KAFTA, IAFTA or ASEAN 10 plus 3, the ASEAN 10 play a core role 
in the cooperation.449 From the ASEAN’s perspective, CAFTA, JAFTA, KAFTA and IAFTA are all 
ASEAN plus 1.450  
John Ravenhill notices the catalytic effective of the Asian financial crisis to new initiatives for 
regional economic cooperation. He says, in the years since the financial crises of 1997-1998, proposals 
for regional collaboration in East Asia proliferated at multiple levels: for bilateral free trade arrangements, 
for sub-regional trade liberalization and most ambitiously, for various forms of cooperation in the 
monetary field.451  
    Shi Chunlai, deputy president of the China Institute for International Studies (CIIS) also notes the 
catalytic role of the Asia Crisis, saying that ‘the Financial and currency crisis in 1997 has played the 
catalytic role. East Asian countries perhaps for the first time genuinely realized that their economies are 
so closely bound together that the problems they faced are becoming regional and transnational in scope 
and have to be addressed from regional as well as national and international perspectives. Thus, a deeper 
awareness and appreciation of their common stake, a greater measure of regional consciousness have 
arisen throughout East Asia. This has given rise to the recognition that East Asian countries not only need 
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to cooperate more closely with each other but also to institutionalize their cooperative efforts for 
problems that have regional dimensions.’452  
 One of the consequences of the Asian economic crisis is that APEC has been marginalized. It is not 
currently where the action is in relation to regionalism: East Asian governments are concentrating their 
efforts either on bilateral arrangements or on collaboration at the East Asian (ASEAN Plus Three) level. 
The new institutions exclude the states of Oceania and of North and South America that are members of 
APEC. 
It was the triumphalism of Washington, particularly at the time of the financial crises, that was a 
decisive factor in encouraging East Asian governments to come together in regional arrangements that 
excluded the US, and which might be seen as an attempt to balance its power. The Clinton administration 
had begun its first term in 1993 with an aggressive stance against what it perceived to be a range of 
‘structural impediments’ that hindered US exports to the region.453
    And few would question the role that the financial crises played in fostering a sense of common 
identity, the image of a region in adversity besieged by outsiders ‘ganging up’ in their attempts to exploit 
the difficulties that East Asian governments faced. The timing of the new quest for regional 
collaboration—concentrated in the period since the crisis broke out—substantiates the argument. Whether 
East Asian governments’ interpretation of the crises is an accurate or a fair one is largely beside the point. 
What is relevant here are the (selective) perceptions of political elites. Bergsten is surely correct in his 
assessment of the crises that ‘most East Asians feel that they were both let down and put upon by the 
west’. It is the perception of the need to do something collectively to counter the vulnerability to outside 
influence, as much as any substantial change in power relations, which has driven the new quest for East 
Asian collaboration in the period since the crisis. 
 
4.3.3, Japan in ASEAN plus Three (APT) Process 
In the years since the financial crises of 1997-98, proposals for regional collaboration in East Asia 
proliferated at multiple levels: for bilateral free trade arrangements, for sub-regional trade liberalization 
and, most ambitiously, for various forms of cooperation in the monetary field.454  
A year after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, which clearly demonstrated a crucial need 
for strengthening intra-regional cooperation, at the ASEAN + 3 Summit in Hanoi in December 1998, 
President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea proposed the formation of an ‘East Asian Vision 
Group.’ To be ‘composed of eminent intellectuals charged with the task of drawing up a vision for 
mid-to-long term cooperation in East Asia for the 21st century.’ Supported by other heads of state and 
government, the EAVG’s task was ‘to facilitate the implementation of the new paradigm for 
cooperation------and propose concrete steps for closer cooperation among East Asian countries in 
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economic, political, environmental and socio-cultural sectors.’ 
     Entitled ‘Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress,’ the EAVG 
Reports sets forth a comprehensive agenda for joint regional efforts in political and security, environment 
and energy and socio-cultural and educational cooperation.  
The Vision Group recommends ‘the formation of an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and 
liberalization of trade well ahead of the Bogor Goal set by APEC. This could be facilitated by ‘the 
formation of a region-wide FTA. East Asia needs to consolidate all existing bilateral and sub-regional 
FTAs within the region.’ The Vision Group also recommends ‘the establishment of an East Asian 
Investment Area (EAIA) by expanding the Framework Agreement on ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) to 
cover East Asia as a whole.’ For enhancing financial stability and economic efficiency in East Asia, the 
Vision Group ‘proposes that East Asian governments adopt a staged, two-track approach towards greater 
financial integration: one track for establishing self-help financing arrangement and the other for 
coordinating a suitable exchange rate mechanism among countries in the region.’ The Vision group 
‘proposes that steps be taken toward the establishment of a full-fledged regional financing facility as the 
East Asian Arrangement to Borrow or an East Asian Monetary Fund.’  Such a facility should have 
‘conditionality that best fits the nature of the crisis, would be supplementary to the IMF, and would serve 
as a kind of safety net, acting as a regional lender of last resort in collaboration with the IMF and other 
international facilities.’  
In November 1999, when the leaders of China, Japan and Korea had a historic three-way talk in 
Manila, Prime Minister Obuchi and Prime Zhu Rongji agree upon trilateral joint research on economic 
cooperation between China, Japan and Korea that President Kim Dae Jung had proposed. Then in 
November 2000, the heads of the three representative institutes, Development Research Center (DRC) of 
China, National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) of Japan and Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy (KIEP) convened in Beijing and formally launched the trilateral joint 
research. The joint report was finally issued in October 2001, named ‘Report and Policy 
Recommendations on Strengthening Trade Relations between China, Japan and Korea.’ 
     The report recommends the following: 
1, Policy Measures Directly Linked to Trade Facilitation 
--Communication channels of laws and regulations; 
--Training system for customs, inspection and quarantine institutions; 
--establishment of trade dispute early warning system; 
--improving the mobility of businesspeople; 
2, Policy Measures with broader implications 
--Annual economic ministers meetings; 
--Tripartite Dialogue.455
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The proposal of the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) appeared in the headlines in newspapers in 
November 2000. This proposal was tabled at the ASEAN plus Three Summit—the gathering in Singapore 
of the members of the ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea—by Singaporean Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong. Yamazawa comments, the proposal of an EAFTA came in the middle of this increased 
momentum for regional cooperation in East Asia. Furthermore, sub-regional groupings of different 
combinations for FTAs or closer economic cooperation are going on among this ASEAN + Three 
members. Nowadays, there are plenty opportunities such as APEC, ASEAN plus Three, and ADB 
meetings for leaders and ministers of East Asian economies to discuss strengthening cooperation.  
The ASEAN plus Three Economic Ministers’ Meeting in Bandal Seri Begawan on September 13-15, 
2002 provided the most recent occasions to promote the China-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN FTAs. China 
and ASEAN leaders had agreed on forming a FTA within ten years in November 2001. This time their 
economic ministers added an early harvest implementation of tariff reduction of hundreds items in eight 
agricultural sectors within 2004-2006. A framework agreement incorporating all these is to be signed by 
their leaders at the Summit Meeting in November 2002. On the other hand, economic ministers of Japan 
and ASEAN agreed to conclude an Economic Partnership Agreement including FTA within ten years and 
to start its negotiation in 2003. The Korean economic minister also stated his efforts to explore the 
possibility of forming an FTA with ASEAN members. China, Japan and Korea have started their 
consultation on strengthening regional cooperation among the three.  
The achievements made so far by ASEAN plus 3 on the financial and monetary issues including 
the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ of May 2000, and the finance ministers meeting in Kobe in January 2001 are 
remarkable. The arrangement that embraces a network of bilateral swap and repurchase agreement 
facilities among ASEAN countries and China, Japan and Korea is perceived as a major step forward in 
strengthening cooperation among the East Asian countries. To enhance financial stability in the region, it 
is recommended that the countries concerned should adopt a staged approach towards greater financial 
integration: establishing a self-help financing facility such as the East Asia Arrangement to Borrow or 
East Asian Monetary Fund. This should work as a supplement in collaboration with IMF and other 
international facilities.  
Financial cooperation in the East Asia region is remarkable. As Kohsaka argued, capital market 
integration provides both opportunities and risks to integrated economies, particularly in the case of 
late-coming emerging market economies.456 The risk was too greatly exposed in the case of the Asian 
economic crisis. In the 1990s, many economies in East Asia have recently become highly integrated into 
the international capital market. Private capital inflows have increased sharply since the late 1980s and/or 
early 1990s in emerging market economies in East Asia. While the huge flows carry both blessings and 
risks, they certainly change the macroeconomic properties of those economies, forcing monetary 
authorities to grope for a new set of economic policy management tools. The Asian currency crisis 
exposed capital market integration as a double-edged sword. Prior exchange rate stabilization 
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paradoxically turned out to destabilize exchanges rates by distorting risk-taking behaviors. The Monetary 
authorities tried in vain to challenge the basis dilemma of policy goals.  
Regional monetary integration or collective fixed exchange rates could be one possible solution to 
the new reality of capital market integration in the region of East Asia, which are closely liked together 
through trade and investment flows. Chinese Financial Minister Xiang Huaicheng praised the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, saying that ‘The East Asian financial cooperation is gathering a good momentum to move 
forward. Initial  aims intend to expand the present ASEAN Swap Arrangement to all member countries 
and establish currency sway and repo. arrangements among ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea on 
bilateral basis. The Chiang Mai Initiative marked a substantial step towards financial cooperation among 
East Asian countries. It is a good start for the countries in the region to enhance financial self-help and 
support mechanisms. The objective is to complement existing current international facilities—by 
providing liquidity support for the nations in the difficulty of international payment.’457
       Taniguchi answers the question ‘why could East Asia so far not establish a regional integration, 
in spite of the strong economic potential to establish a regional economic integration in East Asia?’ by 
saying that ‘in this connection, what is lacking in East Asia is political incentive. There was no strong 
political incentive to move towards regional economic integration in East Asia except ASEAN, and this is 
particularly so in North East Asia. Japan, China and Korea are geographically closely linked—separated 
only by a narrow strip of water. However, this geographical closeness sometimes causes political conflicts 
among them, due to their delicate historical relations. Accordingly, these three countries should make all 
possible efforts to avoid such conflicts. In particular, Japan and China, big economic powers should try to 
find and agree on how they can co-operate in establishing regional economic integration which would be 
beneficial not only for both of them, but also for other Asian countries and the world as a whole.’458
     Ambassador Lee See-Young, President of Jeonju University and former vice foreign minister of 
Korea, admits the difficulties among East Asian economic cooperation, ‘Being a region of great diversity 
in terms of political, economic, social and cultural backgrounds, East Asia is faced with considerable 
difficulties in the way of economic cooperation, compared with Europe and North America. Moreover, 
the region has only a very few experiences in regional cooperation. On the other hand, however, the 
region has an internal market of US$6.5 trillion, population of 1.9 billion and trade volume of US$2.6 
trillion. Given the great complementarities among the economies of the region in terms of natural 
resources and arising from the different stages of economic development, East Asia has indeed enormous 
potential for economic cooperation and integration.’459 On 10+3, he comments, ‘the launching of the 
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ASEAN +3 process on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the foundation of ASEAN constituted the 
first important step towards establishing a system for regional cooperation in East Asia. After 5 years of 
preparatory processes, the ASEAN+3 now seems to have arrived at a stage where a momentum could be 
generated for the creation of such framework. There is a need for closer consultations among the 
governments of the ASEAN+3 in order to start engaging in substantive deliberations on the issue of 
medium to long term economic integration.’ 
Ravenhill argues, the substantial trade liberalization within East Asia from the early 1980s occurred 
overwhelmingly on voluntary, unilateral basis—the principles that were supposed to underlie APEC’s 
activities in this field. With the exception of ASEAN members, whose free trade agreement was until 
recently their only discriminatory arrangement, the East Asian governments traditionally eschewed the 
pursuit of discriminatory, preferential trade arrangements. China, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan 
were the only members of the WTO at the beginning of 2002 that had no preferential agreements with 
other WTO members. From 1998 onwards, however, East Asian governments began actively negotiating 
bilateral preferential agreements.  
As for why East Asian regionalism boomed after the crisis, Mireya Solis and Saori N. Katada 
conclude this as Competitive regionalism—explaining the diffusion and implications of the FTAs in Asia 
Pacific, including economic competition, political/security competition and legal competition.460 Urata 
agrees, saying that competition among East Asian countries, especially between China and Japan to 
obtain market access in East Asian countries and for gaining a leadership role in East Asia, meant 
integration has been a crucial factor leading to the proliferation of FTAs in the region.461  
 
4.3.4, Japan in East Asia Summit 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis had demonstrated the need for regional groupings and initiatives. 
The final report in 2002 of the East Asian Study Group, established by the ASEAN Plus Three countries, 
was based on an EAS involving ASEAN Plus Three, therefore not involving Australia, New Zealand or 
India. The EAS as proposal was an ASEAN led development, with the summit to be linked to ASEAN 
summit meetings. However, the issue was to which countries beyond those in ASEAN the EAS was to be 
extended. 
The decision to hold the EAS was reached during the 2004 ASEAN Plus Three summit and the 
initial 16 members determined at the ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting held in Laos at the end of 
July 2005. Credit for advancing the forum during the 2004 ASEAN Plus Three summit has been 
attributed to Malaysia. 
Prior to the first meeting there was significant discussion as to which countries should be represented 
[14]. At the time there were difficulties in the relationship between the "Plus Three" members (ie Japan, 
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China and South Korea) of ASEAN Plus Three, and the perception that India and to a lesser extent 
Australia and New Zealand were present to balance the growing China power all meant the first meeting's 
achievements were limited. Russia expressed early interest in EAS membership and attended the first 
EAS as an observer at the invitation of 2005 EAS host Malaysia. 
The first summit was held in Kuala Lumpur on December 14, 2005. The next EAS was to be held on 
December 13, 2006 in Metro Cebu, Philippines. After the confidence-building at the inaugural EAS, the 
2006 EAS will help to define the future role of the EAS, its relationship with ASEAN Plus Three and the 
involvement of Russia in EAS. However in the face of Tropical Typhoon Utor, the summit was postponed 
until January 2007. It was re-scheduled for January 15, 2007, approximately a month after the original 
scheduled date. 
After the EAS was established the issue arose of whether any future East Asia Community would 
arise from the EAS or ASEAN Plus Three. Prior to the creation of the EAS it appeared that ASEAN Plus 
Three would take on the role of community building in East Asia. However, with the relationship between 
the EAS on the one hand and ASEAN Plus Three on the other is still not clear. As discussed above, some 
countries are more supportive of the narrower ASEAN Plus Three grouping whereas others support the 
broader, more inclusive EAS. ASEAN Plus Three, which has been meeting since December 1997 has a 
history, including the Chiang Mai initiative which appears to have led to the development of the Asian 
Currency Unit. This may be significant for those advocating a broader role for EAS in the future. 
On the EAS process, the most impressive thing is Japan’s insistence on the membership of Australia, 
New Zealand and India. Japan’s insistence got some ASEAN member’s support and finally, these three 
countries became members of EAS. This made the EAS process more complicated, and it is not the 
natural extension of the ASEAN plus 3.  
 
4.4, Japan’s Bilateral FTAs: Progress and Problems 
Also after the Asian crisis, Japan sped up its bilateral FTAs process. The new interest of the Japanese 
government in the last years of the twentieth century in negotiating discriminatory free-trade 
arrangements can be traced to its belief that such agreements had contributed to the economic success of 
its principal competitors.  
 
4.4.1, Japan’s FTA Strategy 
Japan has most consistently (after the US change of direction when it signed free trade agreements 
with Israel and Canada) and most strongly advocated a multilateral non-discriminatory rather than a 
regional preferential approach to trade liberalization. Tokyo’s stance had previously been grounded in 
fears that as an economy with an unusually diverse range of export markets, it would be particularly 
vulnerable to discriminatory regional trade arrangements (and officials in Tokyo would recall that other 
countries continued to discriminate against its experts even after Japan was admitted to GATT). The 1999 
MITI White Paper on International Trade signaled a dramatic alteration in Japanese government policy, 
explicitly calling for the development of a free trade agreement in Northeast Asia.  
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The White Paper asserted that Japan’s abstention from preferential arrangements had increasingly 
placed it in an anomalous position in the world trading system: close to 80 regional trade agreements had 
been reported to the WTO in the 1990s alone. The MITI report identified three benefits from regional 
arrangements. They had contributed to the expansion of trade and investment flows among participants: 
the White Paper pointed to NAFTA and to the EU as successful schemes in this regards. Second, regional 
arrangements had forced participating economies to become more competitive; the reduction of 
government and commercial barriers to trade was beneficial to countries competing in a globalized 
economy. Finally, regional groupings had played an important role in advancing trade negotiations within 
the multilateral framework of GATT.462
Yamazawa notices the transition of Japan’s policy toward regional economic cooperation, saying 
‘since 1997-98 Japan has been adjusting her commercial policy stance to a pragmatic one allowing a 
wider choice including various forms of RTAs. Japan, more than many other countries, showed strong 
attachment to the traditional multilateral approach to trade relations. But with the regionalism trend 
gaining ground around the world and increased pressure of ‘competitive liberalization,’ she has to leave 
her options open. The competitive liberalization refers to the phenomenon wherein liberalization 
occurring between two nations or among several in a region spark participation in process by other 
nations anxious not to be left out. Without a flexible approach to regionalism, Japan could not well end up 
tying her own hands in the diplomatic sphere.’463 In 1997 JETRO, a public corporation subordinate to 
MITI, started a joint study with the Mexican Ministry of Commerce into the feasibility of a Japan-Mexico 
FTA. It responded to Japanese concern about being discriminated in Mexico against American and 
European firms resulting from NAFTA and EU-Mexico FTA. 
As for why Japan adjusts to FTA, Yamazawa answers, ‘FTA helps revitalize Japan.’ He adds, 
‘Japan’s change in policy stance also meets her necessity to utilize East Asian dynamism in order to 
sustain the growth of her matured economy. The relationship between Japan and East Asia has undergone 
fundamental changes in the last 10 years. A decade ago, Japan stood out as a leader of the flying geese in 
Asian development. It provided assistance for development in other East Asian countries much as a father 
would treat his sons. Now the sons have grown strong and the father has matured and entered old age. 
Japan still has money and technology, but it has lost its vigor for new growth and has little stomach for 
bold reforms. Not only must it live in harmony with its sons, it must also survive in a globalized 
world.’464
Urata explains the motives behind Japan’s FTA strategy: Japan recognizes the FTA as one of its trade 
policy options in addition to multilateral framework under the WTO. First, greater access to foreign 
markets was one of the important motives that aroused Japan’s interests in FTAs. The second is the 
stimulation of structural reforms. Third, Japan is interested in assisting development countries, especially 
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those in East Asia to promote economic growth by FTAs. Fourth, obtaining access to natural resources 
such as oil and foods, which have vital positions in Japanese economy.465  
Mireya Solis argues that competitive dynamics explain best Japan’s FTA policy shift, that Japan has 
used its FTAs to meet three main challenges: 1), to restore or advance the competitive advantage of 
international-oriented business sectors in selected overseas markets; 2), to disseminate a distinct Japanese 
approach to preferential economic integration different both from the American and Chinese FTAs; and 3) 
to hone its regional leadership credentials vis-à-vis China by reaching out to Southeast Asian nations,  
and inviting extra-regional partners to integration talks in order to balance China’s influence .466
Nevertheless, some observers warn against the tendency of regionalism in East Asia. They contend 
that new bilateral FTAs are inconsistent with the Bogor goal, may erode the APEC’s fragile efforts for 
liberalization, and will impede the liberalization efforts under WTO. EAFTA bloc will become 
inward-looking so that it will discriminate against non-East Asian members of APEC and thus stimulate 
similar regional grouping in the other regions, especially in North and South America, and APEC will fall 
apart into FTAA and EAFTA.467  
     

















































































Source: Urata, 2002, p.11. 
 
But Yamazawa argues, this reflects imaginary fear and a little over-reaction, while neglecting the 
region’s need for closer cooperation. East Asian economies are late comers on the RTA initiatives. As a 
matter of fact, there are only five East Asian economies, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan as well as Japan 
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and Korea, which have not formed FTAs either bilaterally or plurally. Its regionalism is never an 
aggressive one but no more than a pragmatic approach under competitive liberalization. Furthermore 
these regional grouping proposals differ in their feasibility in near future.468
The Japan Economic Research Center (JERC) uses the CGE model to research each kind of FTA and 
their influences to members’ economies in the East Asia region, as Table 4-5 shows.       
 
4.4.2, Japan Bilateral FTAs: Progress and Problems 
Japan first signed an FTA agreement with Singapore. In 2000, Japan and Singapore conducted a 
joint official study on an FTA between the two countries, which was followed by intergovernmental 
negotiation in 2001. The Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) was concluded by 
the two Prime Ministers in January 2002. It fits with Prime Minister Goh Chock Tong’s New Age FTA 
and incorporates facilitation and Ecotech elements as well as the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff 
measure. Singapore eliminates all tariffs while Japan eliminates 98 percent of its tariffs on manufactured 
products but excludes some sensitive agricultural products. Services trade is liberalized 90 percent by 
Singapore and 86 percent by Japan. Agreement on investment, mutual recognition agreement, movements 
of professionals, and intellectual property rights are also included. The scope for economic partnership is 
extended so as to cover IT technology, human resource development, trade and investment promotion, 
small and medium enterprises, tourism, electronic trade documents exchange. Prime Minister Koizumi 
made it clear in his speech in Singapore that Japan was willing to conclude similar economic partnership 
agreements with other ASEAN members in working out a Japan-ASEAN FTA.469
As Japan’s first FTA, JSEPA has both strengths and weaknesses. One of the strengths is its 
comprehensiveness. Another strength is its symbolic nature as JSEPA send a message to the world about 
Japan’s strong interest in FTAs. One of its weaknesses is the limited coverage of trade liberalization on 
Japan’s side. Singapore removed tariffs on all imports from Japan, while Japan removed tariffs of 94 
percent of imports from Singapore. It should be noted that those imports from Singapore that were not 
liberalized include not only agricultural products but also selected manufactured products including some 
petrochemical products and leather goods.470  
Japan has also explored an FTA with South Korea. If a Japan-Korea FTA could be signed, if could 
be a landmark for Japan’s FTA policies. During a visit to Japan in October 1998, Korean President Kim 
Kae Jung proposed the ‘Action Plan for the New Korean-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century,’ Japan's 
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi echoed him in his visit to Korea in March 1999, proposing going beyond 
existing economic cooperative frameworks to strengthen bilateral relations through the ‘Japan-Korea 
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Economic Agenda.’ On May 23 2000, the IDE and the KIEP issued joint communiqué called ‘Towards 
Closer Japan-Korea Economic Relations: Proposal for Formulating a 21st Century Partnership.’ The 
communiqué stresses that a Japan-Korea FTA would bring the expansion of bilateral trade through the 
abolition of tariff and non-tariff measures; there also would be a steady increase in intra-industry trade 
between Japan and Korea, in which both countries mutually export and import bow-end and high-end 
products as well as components and finished products, and travel, transport, construction, 
telecommunications, financing, and other service industries are also included.471 FTA negotiations 
between Japan and Korea started in December 2003, with an aim to conclude the negotiations in two 
years. Although both Japan and Korea aspired to establish a model FTA for East Asian countries with a 
high degree of liberalization, the negotiations have been deadlocked since the beginning because of their 
dissatisfaction with the framework of negotiations on market access.  
Japan also signed with ASEAN ‘Initiative for Comprehensive Economic Partnership between Japan 
and ASEAN’ in January, 2002. On 15 April 2002, the Japanese government put forward an ‘Asian FTA’ 
proposal. This proposal includes 10 + 3 plus Hong Kong and Taiwan. But some observers notice the 
limitations of Japan’s proposals and initiatives. Lim Hua Sing states the problems of Japan’s proposal. He 
assesses that this proposal is unrealistic, because it includes so many members, and no targets. Moreover, 
Japan has not expressed its sincerity to open its agricultural sector.472
Table 4-10  Japan’s FTA Network 
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Table 4-10 shows the current Japanese FTA network.  
The biggest feature of the Japanese FTA network is that all Japan’s FTA partners are not its 
important trade partners. The volume of trade and investment flows comprised by these bilateral FTAs is 
rather modest-never exceeding the 4% ceiling (with the exception of the FTA with Korea which is 
deadlocked). 
Though China is Japan’s biggest trade partner, it is reported that Japan has no interest in discussing a 
China-Japan FTA. China’s Premier Zhu Rongji informally proposed to the leaders of Japan and Korea the 
establishment of a trilateral FTA among these three countries at the leaders’ meeting in 2002. Japan did 
not accept China’s proposal by indicating that Japan would like to be sure that China, a new WTO 
member, abides by the WTO commitments and rules before discussing an FTA. Urata lists two reasons 
for Japan’s rejection to China----first is its possible negative impacts on non-competitive sectors such as 
the agriculture and labor-intensive apparel industries, and the other is its rivalry vis-à-vis China.473  Lim 
explains it as “in Asia, China and Japan have always been competing with each other head-to-head. On 
the issue of CAFTA, JAFTA or the ASEAN plus 3, whether it is China or Japan to play the leading role 
has apparently become a tug of war.”474  
There are many problems in the Japanese FTA process. The most serious obstacle in the negotiations 
was Japan’s strong resistance to liberalization of agricultural products. Urata lists the main contentious 
issues for Japan in FTA negotiations:  
Mexico:  agricultural products, specifically pork, beef, and chicken products, oranges and orange juice 
Thailand: agricultural products, specifically rice 
        Movement of natural persons, specifically cooks, nurses, massage therapists, and care-givers 
 for the elderly 
Philippines: agricultural products, specifically bananas 
           Movement of natural persons, specifically cooks, nurses, and care-givers for the elderly 
Malaysia: Trade liberalization in plywood.  
Korea:  Trade liberalization in fish products, refined cooper products.475
 
Agriculture has consistently been the major sticking point in Japan’s negotiations with partner 
countries. It has not only delayed their completion but also, in some cases, brought them to an abrupt halt.  
Difficulties with agriculture have meant that the trade liberalization rate for Japan (on a trade value 
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basis) is lower than for partner countries.476 Developing countries such as Mexico, Thailand, the 
Philippines and Malaysia have accepted the uneven terms in the expectation of benefits in areas such as 
aid, investment and technical cooperation. Japan has used a variety of mechanisms to limit the extent of 
agricultural concessions “including outright exclusions, renegotiations, and tariff rate quotas”477
Aurelia George Mulgan argues that Japan’s willingness to negotiate FTA is not matched by a 
readiness to liberalize agricultural trade, and Japan has used a variety of mechanisms to limit the extent of 
agricultural concessions in FTAs.478
Japan’s burst of FTA activity should not be interpreted as a sign that it is ready to liberalize its 
agricultural trade sector. Urata says the main reason for the difficulty in liberalizing agriculture is its 
negative impact on employment. It is important to recognize that protection of the agriculture sector does 
not ensure employment of the farmers alone, but also the workers engaged in agricultural sectors such as 
construction workers building irrigation systems and workers at farmers cooperatives.479   
 
4.5, Arguments on Japan in East Asian Economic Cooperation: 1990s to 2000s 
Where does Japan place Asia in its world strategy?480 This is a big question to be answered by the 
Japanese. 
     Watanabe and Kikuchi analyze Japan’s political-strategic objectives of regional economic 
cooperation: the creation of a de facto free trade area in the region will serve several political-strategic 
purposes: (regional arrangement for Japan) 
 It will sustain U.S.'s economic interests, thereby preserving the strategic importance of the region to 
the United States. Pacific cooperation is expected to encourage the United States to maintain its interest in 
Asian affairs, thereby contributing to the maintenance of the U.S. political and military presence in the 
region. Asia still needs the involvement of a reliable outside power to sustain a regional order. The United 
States is well-suited for this role as a regional stabilizer. In this regard, Asia-Pacific economic cooperation 
will be a hidden driving force for a stable regional political and security environment.  
 It will help maintain harmonious economic relations between Japan and the United States, which is of 
utmost important not only for both nations but also for the peace and prosperity of the entire region. 
APEC will also provide a convenient framework for Japan to take a leadership role in regional affairs 
without causing undue concern on the part of other Asian countries.  
 It will help to bring an emerging giant, China, into a regional arrangement within which it could play 
a positive role for regional stability.  
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 The creation of a regional de facto free trade area will help to create a cooperative relationship 
between the industrialized countries and the developing countries of the region that could serve as a 
model for the rest of the world. In particular, APEC could provide a useful multilateral forum to promote 
development cooperation (e.g., development of human resources and infrastructure), which along with 
trade liberalization and facilitation, would contribute to the welfare of the developing countries. 
 A de facto trade area will open the region to the outside would and will place a check on the 
inward-looking moves by NAFTA and the EU.  
 It will ensure that the annual informal APEC summit meeting will provide an overall framework for 
regional confidence-building and cooperation.481  
 
Maswood argues that ‘Japanese interests are best served by a broad Pan-Pacific regional structure 
but we cannot expect Japan to pursue those interests in an assertive manner. In the meantime, as the 
second prong of its policy to limit the potential for Pan-Asian regionalism, the Japanese government has 
emphasized sub-regional engagement in order to contain comprehensive East Asian regionalism.’482 
Japan’s regional diplomacy and leadership can, therefore, be understood as serving to channel East Asian 
regionalism in the direction of subdued identity and consistency with the US-Japan security ties. In some 
ways, therefore, the Japanese leadership may be at odds with regional aspirations and this feature 
underscores the importance of building relations of trust within the region to eliminate the remaining 
pockets of hostility and resentment.  
But Maswood also notices Japan’s reluctance to East Asian regionalism, arguing that, Japan, 
however, has not been an active supporter of East Asian regionalism.483 Noda argues that East Asian 
regionalism could potentially unleash developments paralleling the pre-war period when the Japanese 
government tried to exclude the US in order to realize the EACPS. He writes that, ‘if we hope not to 
repeat this tragic blunder, we must do everything we can to stop the rising tide of Asianism----’ especially 
if it leads to anti-American sentiments.484 Even discounting the probability of this particular scenario, 
there remains a possibility that East Asian regionalism will impede Japan’s primary foreign policy 
objective of maintaining good relations with the US. Instead of a narrowly conceived East Asian 
regionalism, Funabashi argues that Japan, because of its global economic interests, should play a global 
political role rather than a regional role.485 Nonetheless, as indicated above, the Malaysian government is 
avidly pursuing East Asian regionalism and there appears to be some support for it from the Chinese 
government. The challenge for the Japanese government is to counter this drive for regionalism.  
     Pyle notices that little in Japan’s two-thousand-year history has prepared it for this new era in the 
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Pacific in which it must play a leading role.486 Since entering the international state system in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, Japan’s foreign policy has had several distinctive traits, none of which is conducive 
to the role of regional and international leadership that it is expected to play. He adds, first of all, that Japan 
has been a reactive state in its foreign relations. A second fundamental trait of Japan’s international 
relations is that pragmatic nationalism more than fixed principles has been Japan’s guiding philosophy. A 
third legacy of Japan’s foreign relations is the relative lack of positive experience in international 
organizations.  A final historical constraint on Japan’s capacity for international leadership is the difficult 
legacy of its relations with Asia. In the first four decades of the postwar period, Japan’s relations with the 
rest of Asia were distant and largely limited to trade.487  
Many observers make suggestions for Japan’s policy options. Funabashi suggests, concerning 
regionalism, that Japan should contribute to enhancing the APEC by liberalizing its trade and economic 
system and maintaining vigorous domestic demand. The U.S. presence and contribution is essential in the 
formation of any Asian-Pacific regional arrangement. Thus Japan should resist that call for an East Asian 
Economic Grouping (EAEG) by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysis, due to its exclusivity to the East 
Asian region.488  Maswood states, the suggested alternatives for Japanese foreign policy include a 
re-orientation to reflect Japan’s geographic position; preparedness to act as a bridge between Asia and the 
US; continuation of a US centered foreign policy: or rejection of bilateralism and the American connection 
altogether in favor of a foreign policy grounded in multilateral initiatives and centered on APEC.489 In the 
context of increased support for East Asian regionalism, these suggestions are understandable. 490
Iwata argues, in view of the move toward regionalism by the EC and the United States and the 
thus-far unsuccessful outcome of the Uruguay Round talks, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir bin 
Mohamed proposed the East Asian Economic Group, excluding Australia, the United States, and Canada. 
The United States criticized the proposal while Japan has not expressed any official view. Yet Japan’s basic 
thrust of policy lies in open regionalism of the Pacific area, including the United States and Canada, Japan 
has already taken the initiative to develop the PECC and APEC together with Australia and Singapore. 
These institutions are oriented toward open regionalism and can be characterized by informality and 
flexibility; nondiscrimination in action and non-exclusivity of international relations constitute the core 
principles of open regionalism. He concludes, the close business interdependence among the United States, 
Japan and the Asian countries seems to negate the formation of an Asian bloc in the near future.491  
Glenn D. Hook notices Japan’s role in the region, saying that it is clear from the burgeoning activities 
of East Asian states and sub-national actors in the post-Cold War era that, irrespective of the political shade 
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of government in power in Japan, the Japanese state and sub-national actors are set to play an increasingly 
important role in shaping the subjective representation of such regional and sub-regional identities as well 
as the objective economic and other links at the heart of these regionalization process. The Japan Sea Rim 
Zone provides a recent example of the way local, sub-national actors are playing an international role in the 
region-building process in post-Cold War East Asia.492
Maswood concludes that, in the context of regionalism, the primacy of relations with the United 
States and the potential adverse consequences of East Asian regionalism, give clear indication of Japanese 
objectives. The Japanese government is unlikely to offer support to any moves to establish regional 
institutions and promote regionalism. For the moment, however, regionalism is not a pressing concern as 
there are more pressing concerns as a consequence of the currency and economic crisis that engulfed the 
region in 1997.493 He adds, Japan was never completely reactive and passive but, in recent years, there has 
been a shift to a more activist foreign policy stance.494
Okamoto argues, ‘following the Cold War the expectation for Japan to play a greater international 
role is glowing. It seems that the expectation for, and sometimes the pressure on, Japan to play a greater 
role has taken over the traditional caution of the neighboring states.’  He adds, ‘if Japan is to assume a 
greater role in the regional and global context, it needs to define its foreign policy objectives. In other 
words, Japan should define its mid to long term international strategy and the principles for action. If not, 
the Japanese government will not gain support for its policy changes from its own people and some 
neighboring states that remain cautious. The objectives are not necessarily APEC-specific, as the 
international role that Japan should play is not confined to the APEC context. Rather, the APEC policy of 
Japan should be consistent with its general foreign policy objectives. ’495 ‘In the Asia Pacific context, Japan 
must, of course, play a role according to its foreign policy objectives. The region should be seen as a vital 
part of its global strategy. APEC and ARF should be the main vehicles for Japan’s multilateral diplomacy in 
the region. In a way, Japan’s effort in the APEC process has been assisting Asian regionalism.’ 496
     Jin Xide argues that Japan’s policy toward 10+3 has two scenarios. The first scenario is a worse one, 
which Japan will try to avoid. This scenario includes: (1) worsening Japan-US relations; (2) China 
dominates regional process. The second scenario is a good one, which Japan will try to reach. This scenario 
includes (1) lightening diplomatic dependence on Japan-US relations and improving relations with 
neighboring countries; (2) engaging China into multilateral mechanisms; (3) dominating regional economic 
cooperation process through its economic advantages.497  
Xiao Wanchang, former premier of Taiwan, argues that Japan signed arrangements with ASEAN 
resulting from the ‘check and balance of power,’ because China has already signed arrangements with 
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ASEAN countries.498  
Terada explains why Japan has no strong interests in East Asian regionalism, saying that as a nation 
that long pursued the regional concept of ‘Asia Pacific’ or ’Pacific’ for promoting regional economic 
cooperation, Japan was not interested in joining regional institutions excluding ‘Pacific’ nations such as the 
United States and Australia.499  
4.6, Conclusion: Japan in East Asian Regionalism 1990s-2000s 
After the Asian financial crisis, East Asian regionalism is getting stronger and stronger. Being the No. 
2 biggest economic power in the world and having the leading role in the Asia Pacific, Japan’s participation 
in the East Asian regionalism is questionable.  
The following facts have been found when Japan’s participation in the East Asian regionalism process 
has been reviewed:  
 
----On the proposed EAEG/EAEC—the first concrete proposal for East Asia economic cooperation, the 
Japanese response has remained non-committal and unenthusiastic, even if Mahathir offers a tailor-made 
leadership role to Japan. What impressed the world most is that Japan has even been reported to have 
applied structural leverage by threatening ASEAN states with ODA cuts if they approved the EAEC.  
 
----On the current ASEAN plus Three and East Asia Summit process, the most impressive thing is Japan’s 
insistence on the membership of Australia, New Zealand and India. This made the EAS process more 
complicated, and it is not the natural extension of the ASEAN plus 3. Japan here still uses ‘Open 
regionalism’- means ‘Open Membership’ which is the mantra of APEC as its standpoint in East Asia 
economic cooperation process.  
 
----On the bilateral FTAs, Japan seems active in negotiating bilateral FTAs. But taking into account that 1) 
all Japan’s FTA partners are not its important trade partners. The volume of trade and investment flows 
comprised by these bilateral FTAs is rather modest-never breaking through the 4% ceiling (with the 
exception of the FTA with Korea which is deadlocked); 2) Japan is not willing to open agricultural goods, 
human flows, even some manufactured goods; 3) There is no possibility to have an FTA with its most 
important trade partners—China, US, EU and Korea in the near future; it could be concluded that Japan’s 
bilateral FTAs are defensive and competitive.  
 
The conclusion of this chapter is that Japan is active in East Asian regionalism, but afraid of a closed, 
binding regional institution. This reconfirmed the conclusion from the studies on Japan’s participation in 
the APEC process in Chapter Three.  
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There are some reasons to explain Japan’s participation in East Asian regionalism. The US factor, the 
agricultural factor, the political factor, etc. are among the top, but also some studies found that Japanese 
interests are best served by a broad Pan-Pacific regional structures.  Japan’s reluctance to promote East 
Asian regionalism confirmed that Japan has not been an active supporter of East Asian regionalism, and it 
should be noted also that there is no evidence that Japan is pushing for East Asian regionalism even under 
its own tutelage. Instead, Japanese interests are best served by ‘soft regionalism’ in the form of “open 
regionalism” and Pan-Pacific regional grouping. In the Open Regionalism’s view, the advantage of 
Pan-Pacific regionalism is not only that it might help contain the more virulent forms of Asian nationalism 




5.1, What is Japan’s Strategy towards Regional Economic Cooperation? 
5.2, The Reasons Behind Japan’s Strategy  
5.3, The Implications of Expectations on Japan in Regional Economic Cooperation 
 
This dissertation has reviewed Japan’s participation in Asia Pacific regionalism since the 1960s. The 
review focuses on three continuous processes--Asia Pacific regionalism from the 1960s to the 1980s; APEC 
process between the  1980s to the 1990s and East Asian regionalism from the 1990s to the present—in 
Chapter II, III and IV respectively.  
Chapter II analyzed Japan’s participation in Asia Pacific regionalism in the context of global 
regionalism in between the 1960s and the 1980s. Special discussions focused on Japan’s initiatives in the 
establishment of three-level regional institutions----non-governmental regional institutions, such as 
PAFTAD, quasi-governmental regional institutions, such as PECC and functional regional institutions, such 
as ADB. The 1960s to the 1980s was the primary regionalism period in the Asia Pacific region,  and Japan 
has been found to be  1) beginning to search for its role in the Asia Pacific region and adjust its policies 
towards regional economic cooperation, with its economic rising growth; 2)actively participating in all 
level regional initiatives and activities, and thus Japan initiated the establishment of most regional 
institutions; 3)in a dominant or influential role in non-governmental /quasi-governmental regional 
institutions, such as PAFTAD, PBEC and PECC, and Japan did well in shaping these regional institutions; 
4) a co-sponsor in the establishment of functional regional institution---ADB and strongly controlled the 
ADB process, and found the ADB as an example of functional regionalism can serve its interests well in the 
region.   
Chapter III analyzed Japan’s participation in APEC process from the 1980s to the 1990s. Special 
discussions focused on Japan’s initiatives in the establishment of APEC and shaping APEC’s structure and 
principles, as host of the Osaka meeting, Japan’s EVSL policy in APEC’s TILF process, Japan’s FTA and 
ODA strategy. In the 1980s and 1990s before the Asian Financial Crisis, APEC was the main regional 
institution, and Japan has been found to be 1) active in APEC’s establishment; 2) APEC’s structure and 
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principles have been mainly shaped by Japan’s input, and thus Japan should be seen as responsible for 
APEC’s ambiguity between its goal and method, particularly when Japan insisted on “flexibility” and 
“voluntarism” as APEC’s principles at the Osaka meeting in 1995; 3)completely opposed to APEC’s 
institutionalization and negotiating mechanism in APEC’s EVSL process; 4) more committed to its FTA 
and ODA than to APEC TILF and ECOTECH; 5)the forerunner for “Open Regionalism” as APEC’s mantra, 
and Japan used this mantra to enlarge APEC’s membership and discussion scope, preventing APEC from 
becoming a close regional institution.  
Chapter IV analyzed Japan’s participation in East Asian regionalism since the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997. Special discussions focused on Japan’s reaction to EAEG/EAEC--the first supposed concrete 
regional institution in East Asia, and in the ASEAN plus 3/East Asia Summit process. In addition, Japan’s 
bilateral FTAs----its progress and problems were also discussed, and Japan has been found to be 1) active in 
East Asian regionalism, both historically and currently; 2)reluctant to develop ASEAN plus 3 into the East 
Asia Summit and insisted on wide membership of EAS,  and thus, Japan was successful in making both 
the ASEAN plus 3 process and East Asia Summit process loose and complicated; 3) holding a changed 
attitude towards bilateral FTAs, but since all of Japan’s FTA/EPAs are with less-important trade partners 
and are at a low liberalization level, Japan’s FTA strategy could be concluded as defensive and competitive.  
 
5.1, What is Japan’s Strategy towards Regional Economic Cooperation 
If “strategy” suggests comprehensive reflection and planning, the aim of which is to decide processes 
and draw up measures to achieve specific goals, Japan’s long-term participation in different regional 
institutions since the Asia Pacific regionalism in the 1960s could reflect its strategy towards regional 
economic cooperation. 
The above-mentioned facts about Japan in Asia Pacific regionalism since the 1960s imply that Japan 
has had a united, continuous strategy towards regional economic integration. What has changed over time 
from the 1960s to the 21st century are Japan’s temporary policies in regard to concrete issues, what has not 
changed is its long-term strategy towards regional economic cooperation. This strategy can be summarized 
as:  
 
1, Japan should actively participate in all kinds of regionalism, which include regional discussions, 
activities, initiatives, organizations and institutions;  
2, If a regional institution has been established, Japan should be a dominant or influential role. In the 
institution’s process, Japan should use its influence to lead the institution to a loose, forum-like 
mechanism, but not a well-organized, well-managed, effective binding institution.   
3,  If the institution does not seem to be meeting Japan's expectations, or faces some breakthrough in 
institutionalization or negotiating mechanism which Japan opposes, Japan would use the mantra of 
“Open Regionalism” to affect the institution’s process, such as enlarging membership and discussion 
scope of the institution, to make the institution weak, ambiguous, controversial and complicated.  
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In other words, Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation could be partly concluded as 
“Soft Regionalism” or “Functional Regionalism”. Japan has been a main player, active promoter and 
agenda-setter in Asia Pacific regionalism since the 1960s, but what Japan needs is a limited 
regionalism—an open but not closed, a voluntary but not binding, a functional but not comprehensive 
regional institution. This kind of regional institutions are in Japan’s best interests. 
This strategy has never been announced by the Japanese government or completely expressed by other 
researchers. It challenges the prevailing opinions that ‘Japan lacks strategy’ or ‘Japan is weak in strategy’ in 
regional economic cooperation. 
Though scholars’ analyses of Japan’s strategies for regional-level economic cooperation are 
abundant, much of these works are by economists with little interest in the complex socio-political 
processes at the heart of regional-building (e.g. Garnaut and Drysdale 1994). Other work has gone 
beyond the focus on regional economic cooperation. Still other work has examined Japan in the regional 
political economy, regional ‘networks’, regional culture, and so on. Nevertheless, the extant literature on 
Japan's strategy with regard to regionalism remains limited.  
This strategy can explain why Japan’s appearances in regional economic cooperation look so 
contradictory—sometimes, Japan looked like eager to push regional economic cooperation forward, but 
sometimes Japan was too reluctant or even afraid to see regional institutions to get a breakthrough.   
Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation is also in line with the basic hypothesis of 
regime theory’—states pursue their own self-interests by choosing which international regimes to join and 
which to avoid.  
 
5.2, The Reasons behind Japan’s Strategy 
The dissertation has found some reasons behind Japan’s strategy towards regional economic 
cooperation with the analysis of Japan’s participation in the Asia Pacific regionalism since the 1960s.  
    The reasons would be summarized as economic reason and political reason.  
Economically, Japan is the No. 2 economic power in the world. Its economic interests exists globally, 
rather than regionally. As a global economic giant, the Japanese government regarded the multilateral 
trading system as the vehicle to secure market access abroad for Japanese enterprises, criticized trade 
regionalism as harmful to the GATT/WTO’s principle of non-discrimination, and played a positive role in 
the definition of trade governance rules in the multilateral forum. Japan has been afraid of participating in 
discriminatory, regional arrangements that might have a negative impact on global free trade agreements, as 
an exclusive regional institution is not in Japan’s interests and Japan should not be a leader in this 
institution to avoid being a target attacked by other big powers.   
But as Japan’s FDI and trade with the region has been getting closer and closer since1960s, some 
kinds of regionalism which may result in closer regional economic relations would be in Japan’s interests in 
the region. This is why Japan also needs some kinds of regionalism in the Asia Pacific region. How to 
balance multilateralism and regionalism is really a difficulty faced by the Japanese from the 1960s.  
Politically, Japan is the military and strategic ally of the United States, and so Japan could not support 
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a strong ‘regionalism’, giving the fact that the US is generally opposed to any exclusive regional institution 
in the Asia Pacific. ‘Soft regionalism’ in the Asia Pacific on the one hand helps Japan to engage the United 
States in the Asia Pacific region, and on the another hand avoids isolation from the exclusive European 
Union and NAFTA, because Japan alone is not powerful enough to deal with the EU and NAFTA.  
However, if Japan plus the region as a whole, then the EU and NAFTA would pay more attention to Japan’s 
role in the region and in the world. 
Some other scholars also partly discovered Japan’s strategy and the reasons behind the strategy.  
Scalapino found that ‘heavy dependence of its economic expansion on the United States and world 
trade have made Japan one of the few countries in the modern world with truly global interests’ (Scalapino, 
1977).  
Yamamoto and Kikuchi found that ‘throughout the post war era, Japan has been reluctant to 
participate in discriminatory, regional arrangements that might have a negative impact on global free trade 
agreements. It has been a firm belief among Japanese political, business, and academic communities that, 
as a global trading nation, Japan must place the highest priority on maintaining the stable development of 
international regimes such as GATT (and WTO). A free and open trading system supported by 
GATT/WTO is believed to be indispensable to Japan’s economic welfare’ (Yamamoto and Kikuchi, 
1995).  
Funabashi also stressed ‘Restraint of Regional Strategy’ was one of Japan’s postwar strategies. He 
states, ‘regionalism was regarded as a tainted word both politically and economically. It was bad politics 
and bad economics because it implied political domination by an ambitious hegemonic power and a bloc 
economy that threatened to destroy the free trade system. Japan’s diversification of its export markets, 
especially its dependence on the US market, unlike the concentration on Asian markets in prewar days, 
encouraged Japan to devote itself to engaging in the global but US-led multilateral economic framework.’ 
(Funabashi, 1994) 
Some other experts failed to find this strategy, and misunderstood or mistakenly explained Japan’s 
contradictory appearances and participation in regional cooperation. They usually used the lacked strong 
political leadership in APEC policymaking to explain Japan’s ‘complete objection’ to APEC EVSL, or 
regarded MITI and MOFA’s controversy, interest-vested organizations in agriculture, fishery and forestry 
products sector, etc., as impediments to Japan’s regional policy (Okamoto, 2001).  Yet some of them also 
suspected that they had found a governmental strategy towards regional economic cooperation, and only 
used the above reasons as excuses to avoid writing out this strategy.  
Though these analysts have partly observed Japan’s this strategy towards regional economic 
cooperation, they had neither clearly answered whether or not Japan has had a strategy towards regional 
economic cooperation, nor expressed what this strategy has been.   
As for Japanese strategy towards APEC and regional economic cooperation, I interviewed some 
experts. Ambassador Wang Yusheng was the Chinese ambassador to APEC from 1993 to 1999 and had long 
experience of dealing with Japanese in APEC affairs. Amb. Wang stressed that Japanese representatives in 
APEC were persistent on what they wanted. They almost never gave up their demands. What they did in 
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APEC and other regional economic organizations showed long-term planning, well-organized and 
well-coordinated strategy (Personal interview with Amb. Wang Yusheng, Beijing, March 6, 2002). 
Ambassador Lee See-Young, who was former Vice Foreign Minister of Korea, and Korean ambassador to 
APEC, current President of Jeonju University of Korea, stated that Japanese was reluctant to take part in 
regional economic cooperation in East Asia (personal interview with Amb. Lee See-Young, Macao, May 12, 
2002).  Michael Yeoh, the executive director of ASLI (Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute) of 
Malaysia, said he could not invite even one Japanese participant to attend ‘Asia Economic Summit’ which 
focuses on East Asia economic cooperation hosted by ASLI in Kuala Lumpur on March 12-14 2002, even 
if he had sent many invitations. He could not understand why the Japanese had not interest in regional 
economic cooperation and laughed that the Japanese may has been nervous after they were knocked by the 
US when the Malaysians initiated EAEC in 1990 (personal interview with Michael Yeoh, Kuala Lumpur, 
March 12, 2002). 
 
     If we compare Japan’s strategy towards regional economic cooperation with that of the United States, 
we may find an interesting phenomenon: the United States is never afraid of strong regional 
institutions—the US had great enthusiasm for US-Canada Free Trade Arrangement, NAFTA, APEC TILF 
process, FTAA (Free Trade Area of Americas) and proposed FTAAP (Free Trade Agreement in the Asia 
Pacific), though the US is also another big country with global interests. The reasons may be interpreted as 
1) the US believes that it has the ability to be engaged both regionally and globally; 2) the US is already the 
leader of existing world system and is not afraid of being isolated by the others, 3) the US has 
self-confidence to be engaged both regionally and globally, given its political, military and economic 
hegemony in the world after the Second World War.  
 
5.3, The Implications of Expectation on Japan in Regional Economic Cooperation 
Japan’s policies towards regional economic cooperation are mainly responsible for a lack of a strong 
regional mechanism in the Asia Pacific region, but Japan’s strategy could not be simply classified as ‘good’ 
or ’bad’ for regional economic cooperation. What is the most important is that it is in Japan’s best interests.  
Japan’s ‘soft regionalism’ strategy towards regional economic cooperation also could not deny Japan’s 
contribution to the regional economic development and cooperation. This contribution came both from 
Japanese government, business and academia. Some big names, Kiyoshi Kojima, Saburo Okita, Masayoshi 
Ohira and their followers are the lighthouse in Asia Pacific regionalism process. But, it should be noticed 
that national strategy is based on a nation’s interests, not on an individual’s desire or input.  
As Japan is in fact afraid of any strong institutionalized regional regime, any expectation on Japan’s 
aggressive, radical role in regional economic cooperation is unrealistic. If Japan continues its strategy 
towards regional economic cooperation as before, the following predictions would not be far from the 
reality:  
 
On Asia Pacific Regionalism:  Japan will be a generally active participant at all  
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 all levels of Asia Pacific regionalism and play a critical role;  
On Regionalism’s Principles: ‘open regionalism’, ‘voluntarism’ and ‘flexibility’ which  
were successfully used in APEC and EAS will be the main three principles that  
Japan will hold in the new regional institutions; in other words, Japan will  
welcome any regional institution if it is non-binding, non-negotiating.  
On APEC: Japan will continue its support to the Osaka Agenda and enjoy APEC’s loose  
institutionalization, and could not wholeheartedly support APEC’s FTAAP initiative.  
If one day FTAAP comes true and Japan joins the process, it will continue to use  
‘open regionalism’, ‘voluntarism’ and ‘flexibility’ as principles to make the  
process non-binding. 
On East Asian regionalism: Japan could not sincerely support the process of APT and EAS, EAFTA is far 
from Japan’s interests, and so, Japan will once more lead the APT and EAS process to a loose, soft 
regional mechanism as Japan has done in APEC.  
On bilateral FTAs, Japan will be somewhat active in seeking FTAs with non-important trade partners and 
resources countries for the sake of defense and competitiveness. But in the short-to-middle term, 
Japan could not have FTAs with its most important trade partners such as China, the US, the EU 
and South Korea if political consideration has not been heavily changed.  
 
The dissertation provides these hypotheses for being tested with the process in regional economic 
cooperation in the future.  
The predictions are based on Japan’s past strategy, but ‘what worked in the past may not prove 
appropriate in the future.’(Yasutomo, 1995) Will the past Japanese strategy towards regional economic 
cooperation be appropriate for both Japan’s and the region’s interests in the future? 
The Asia Pacific regionalism originated from Japan. There were two factors that have consistently 
driven the push for closer inter-state collaboration in Japan. One was defensive: a fear of the 
consequences of protectionism elsewhere in the world economy. The second was the desire to manage the 
challenges of, and take advantage of the opportunities provided by increasing economic interdependence, 
in this instance driven by Japan’s rapid economic growth and reindustrialization.  
Since the Meiji era, Japan has been ‘in Asia’ but not fully 'of Asia.’(Funabashi, 1995)  Its own 
self-perception and its image in the region have always been somewhat exceptionalist and separate. 
Japan’s self-perception of uniqueness was strengthened by the nation’s spectacular reconstruction and 
ascendance to global power status in the past half-century.  
Regional expectation of Japan’s greater contribution to the region has been increasing since the 1980s. 
Asia is now facing the same challenges that Japan confronted earlier. More than in any previous era, Japan 
can now share its experiences with Asia. As Japan has challenged the world trading system and world 
economy, Asia is just beginning to challenge it. Today, Asia’s economic development presents theoretical 
and policy horizons of development that vary from the Chicago School model, just as Japan took a different 
trajectory from that model. Japan has already realigned the world power balance, but Asia will seek its 
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alignment. Asia is confronted with a conflict between tradition and modernization similar to the one that 
Japan has suffered. Japan can and should share its experience and perspectives on liberalization and offer 
its markets to the region. Japan needs to redefine its role in the region and in the world. To accomplish this, 
it must become an integral part of Asia, of a globalizing Asia, and of a global Asia. 
After the end of the Cold war, the regional situation changed quickly. The East Asia economic 
cooperation is becoming a consensus among many Asian countries after the Asian Financial Crisis. But 
Japan hesitated on East Asia economic cooperation. How to balance regionalism and globalism is very 
difficult dilemma for Japan. Japan attempt to cope with the momentous changes in the international 
system, and its regional economic integration policy is one component of this effort to match a newly 
emerging world with a new diplomacy. If Japan continues its past strategy toward regional economic 
integration as discussed above, Japan’s constructive role in East Asia economic cooperation could not be 
expected. But as ‘he who hesitates is lost’, how to define its role in the region and in the world is a 
dilemma for Japan.  
As regional economic interdependence has been increasing since the 1990s, the region faces many 
challenges. How to meet these challenges is a big problem both for Japan and for the region. Some scholars, 
both Japanese and foreigners give good answers. For example, Kawai suggests, first, that the regional 
economies should accelerate negotiations on bilateral and sub-regional FTAs—such as Japan–Korea EPA, 
Japan–ASEAN EPA, China–ASEAN FTA and Korea–ASEAN FTA—which provide a critical basis for 
further integration and interdependence. Second, the regional economies need to make further progress in 
the area of money and finance, by strengthening the liquidity provision mechanism (CMI), the policy 
dialogue and economic surveillance process, and Asian bond market development initiatives. Third, it is 
time to initiate exchange rate policy coordination because there has not been much progress in this area. 
Finally, it is important to overcome various impediments to closer economic regionalism.(Kawai, 2005) 
Lim Huasing suggests, as Japan’s economic advancement depends greatly on the prosperity of the 
Asia-Pacific region, Japan should open up her domestic markets and import manufactured goods at much 
more reasonable prices from the region. (Lim, 2008) 
Summing up, Japan has practiced an effective strategy towards regional economic cooperation for its 
best interests in the past; but with the global and regional situation changing, Japan’s strategy towards 
regional economic cooperation also needs to develop. As such, Japan’s greater engagement in the region 
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